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Governmental Affairs

HARPER'S
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Sam Adams

VIETNAM COVER-UP: PLAYING WAR WITH NUMBERS

Sam Adams is a fourth cousin, seven times removed, of President John Adams. His great-great-great-grandfather, also named John, lost an ear at the Battle of Bunker Hill. Mr. Adams raises cattle in Leesburg, Virginia, and is writing a book about his now-aborted CIA career.

A CIA conspiracy against its own intelligence

IN LATE 1965, WELL AFTER the United States had committed ground troops to Vietnam, the CIA assigned me to study the Vietcong. Despite the almost 200,000 American troops and the advanced state of warfare in South Vietnam, I was the first intelligence analyst in Washington to be given the full-time job of researching our South Vietnamese enemies. Incredible as it now seems, I remained the only analyst with this assignment until just before the Tet offensive of 1968.

At CIA headquarters in 1965 nobody was studying the enemy systematically, the principal effort being geared to a daily publication called the "Sitrep" (Vietnam Situation Report), which concerned itself with news about the activities of South Vietnamese politicians and the location of Vietcong units. The Sitrep analysts used the latest cables from Saigon, and tended to neglect information that didn't fit their objectives. The Johnson Administration was already wondering how long the Vietcong could stick it out, and since this seemed too complicated a question for the Sitrep to answer, the CIA's research department assigned it to me. I was told to find out the state of enemy morale.

Good news and bad news

I LOOKED UPON THE NEW JOB as something of a promotion. Although I had graduated from Harvard in 1955, I didn't join the Agency until 1963, and I had been fortunate in my first assignment as an analyst of the Congo rebellion. My daily and weekly reports earned the praise of my superiors, and the Vietcong study was given to me by way of reward, encouraging me in my ambition to make a career within the CIA.

Without guidance and not knowing what else to do, I began to tinker with the VC defector statistics, trying to figure out such things as where the defectors came from, what jobs they had, and why they had wanted to quit. In short order I read through the collection of weekly reports, and so I asked for a ticket to Vietnam to see what other evidence was available over there. In mid-January 1966, I arrived in Saigon to take up a desk in the U.S. Embassy. After a couple of weeks, the CIA station chief (everyone called him "Jorgy") heard I was in the

building adding and subtracting the number of defectors. He called me into his office. "Those statistics aren't worth a damn," he said. "No numbers in Vietnam are, and, besides, you'll never learn anything sitting around Saigon." He told me I ought to go to the field and start reading captured documents. I followed Jorgy's advice.

The captured documents suggested a phenomenon that seemed incredible to me. Not only were the VC taking extremely heavy casualties, but large numbers of them were deserting. I got together two sets of captured papers concerning desertion. The first set consisted of enemy unit rosters, which would say, for example, that in a certain seventy-seven-man outfit, only sixty men were "present for duty." Of the seventeen absent, two were down with malaria, two were at training school, and thirteen had deserted. The other documents were directives from various VC headquarters telling subordinates to do something about the growing desertion rate. "Christ Almighty," they all seemed to say. "These AWOLs are getting out of hand. Far too many of our boys are going over the hill."

I soon collected a respectable stack of rosters, some of them from large units, and I began to extrapolate. I set up an equation which went like this: if A, B, and C units (the ones for which I had documents) had so many deserters in such and such a period of time, then the number of deserters per year for the whole VC Army was X. No matter how I arranged the equation, X always turned out to be a very big number. I could never get it below 50,000. Once I even got it up to 100,000.

The significance of this finding in 1966 was immense. At that time our official estimate of the strength of the enemy was 270,000. We were killing, capturing, and wounding VC at a rate of almost 150,000 a year. If to these casualties you added 50,000 to 100,000 deserters—well, it was hard to see how a 270,000-man army could last more than a year or two longer.

I returned in May to tell everyone the good news. No one at CIA headquarters had paid much attention to VC deserters because captured documents were almost entirely neglected. The finding created a big stir. Adm. William F. Raborn, Jr., then director of the CIA, called me in to brief him and his deputies about the Vietcong's AWOL problem. Right after the briefing, I was told that the Agency's chief of

research, R. Jack Smith, had called me "the outstanding analyst" in the research directorate.

But there were also skeptics, particularly among the CIA's old Vietnam hands, who had long since learned that good news was often illusory. To be on the safe side, the Agency formed what was called a "Vietcong morale team" and sent it to Saigon to see if the news was really true. The team consisted of myself, acting as a "consultant," and four Agency psychiatrists, who presumably understood things like morale.

THE PSYCHIATRISTS had no better idea than I'd had, when I started out, how to plumb the Vietcong mind. One of the psychiatrists said, "We'll never get Ho Chi Minh to lie still on a leather couch, so we better think up something else quick." They decided to ask the CIA men in the provinces what they thought about enemy morale. After a month or so of doing this, the psychiatrists went back to Washington convinced that, by and large, Vietcong spirits were in good shape. I went back with suitcases full of captured documents that supported my thesis about the Vietcong desertion rate.

But I was getting uneasy. I trusted the opinion of the CIA men in the field who had told the psychiatrists of the Vietcong's resilience. The South Vietnamese government was in one of its periodic states of collapse, and somehow it seemed unlikely that the Vietcong would be falling apart at the same time. I began to suspect that something was wrong with my prediction that the VC were headed for imminent trouble. On reexamining the logic that had led me to the prediction, I saw that it was based on three main premises. Premise number one was that the Vietcong were suffering very heavy casualties. Although I'd heard all the stories about exaggerated reporting, I tended not to believe them, because the heavy losses were also reflected in the documents. Premise two was my finding that the enemy army had a high desertion rate. Again, I believed the documents. Premise three was that both the casualties and the deserters came out of an enemy force of 270,000. An old Vietnam hand, George Allen, had already told me that this number was suspect.

In July, I went to my supervisor and told him I thought there might be something radically wrong with our estimate of enemy strength, or, in military jargon, the order of battle. "Maybe the 270,000 number is too low," I said. "Can I take a closer look at it?" He said it was okay with him just so long as I handed in an occasional item for the Sitrep. This seemed fair enough, and so I began to put together a file of captured documents.

The documents in those days were arranged in "bulletins," and by mid-August I had collected more than 600 of them. Each bulletin contained several sheets of paper with summaries in English of the information in the papers taken by American military units. On the afternoon of August 19, 1966, a Friday, Bulletin 689 reached my desk on the CIA's fifth floor. It contained a report put out by the Vietcong headquarters in Binh Dinh province, to the effect that the guerrilla-militia in the province numbered just over 50,000. I looked for our

own intelligence figures for Binh Dinh in the order of battle and found the number 4,500.

"My God," I thought, "that's not even a tenth of what the VC say."

In a state of nervous excitement, I began searching through my file of bulletins for other discrepancies. Almost the next document I looked at, the one for Phu Yen province, showed 11,000 guerrilla-militia. In the official order of battle we had listed 1,400, an eighth of the Vietcong estimate. I almost shouted from my desk, "There goes the whole damn order of battle!"

Unable to contain my excitement, I began walking around the office, telling anybody who would listen about the enormity of the oversight and the implications of it for our conduct of the war. That weekend I returned to the office, and on both Saturday and Sunday I searched through the entire collection of 600-odd bulletins and found further proof of a gross underestimate of the strength of the enemy we had been fighting for almost two years. When I arrived in the office on Monday a colleague of mine brought me a document of a year earlier which he thought might interest me. It was from Vietcong headquarters in South Vietnam, and it showed that in early 1965 the VC had about 200,000 guerrilla-militia in the south, and that they were planning to build up to 300,000 by the end of the year. Once again, I checked the official order of battle. It listed a figure of exactly 103,573 guerrilla-militia—in other words, half as many as the Vietcong said they had in early 1965, and a third as many as they planned to have by 1966.*

No official comment

THAT AFTERNOON, August 22, I wrote a memorandum suggesting that the overall order of battle estimate of 270,000 might be 200,000 men too low. Supporting it with references to numerous bulletins, I sent it up to the seventh floor, and then waited anxiously for the response. I imagined all kinds of sudden and dramatic telephone calls. "Mr. Adams, come brief the director." "The President's got to be told about this, and you'd better be able to defend those numbers." I wasn't sure what would happen, but I was sure it would be significant, because I knew this was the biggest intelligence find of the war—by far. It was important because the planners running the war in those days used statistics as a basis for everything they did, and the most important figure of all was the size of the enemy army—that order of battle number, 270,000. All our other intelligence estimates were tied to the order of battle: how much rice the VC ate, how much ammunition they shot off, and so forth. If the Vietcong Army suddenly doubled in size, our whole statistical system would collapse. We'd be fighting a war twice as big as the one we thought we were fighting. We already had about 350,000 soldiers in Vietnam, and everyone was talking about "force ratios." Some experts maintained that in a guerrilla war our side had to outnumber the enemy by a ratio of 10 to 1; others

* A document was later captured which showed the Vietcong not only reached but exceeded their quota. Dated April 1966, it put the number of guerrilla-militia at 330,000.

said 5 to 1; the most optimistic said 3 to 1. But even if we used the 3 to 1 ratio, the addition of 200,000 men to the enemy order of battle meant that somebody had to find an extra 600,000 troops for our side. This would put President Johnson in a very tight fix—either quit the war or send more soldiers. Once he was informed of the actual enemy strength, it seemed inconceivable that he could continue with the existing force levels. I envisioned the President calling the director on the carpet, asking him why this information hadn't been found out before.

Nothing happened. No phone calls from anybody. On Wednesday I still thought there must have been some terrible mistake; on Thursday I thought the news might have been so important that people were still trying to decide what to do with it. Instead, on Friday, the memorandum dropped back in my in-box. There was no comment on it at all—no request for amplification, no question about my numbers, nothing, just a routine slip attached showing that the entire CIA hierarchy had read it.

I was aghast. Here I had come up with 200,000 additional enemy troops, and the CIA hadn't even bothered to ask me about it, let alone tell anybody else. I got rather angry and wrote a second memorandum, attaching even more references to other documents. Among these was a report from the Vietcong high command showing that the VC controlled not 3 million people (as in our official estimate) but 6 million (their estimate). I thought that this helped to explain the origins of the extra 200,000 guerrilla-militia, and also that it was an extraordinary piece of news in its own right. A memorandum from my office—the office of Current Intelligence—ordinarily would be read, edited, and distributed within a few days to the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department. It's a routine procedure, but once again I found myself sitting around waiting for a response, getting angrier and angrier. After about a week I went up to the seventh floor to find out what had happened to my memo. I found it in a safe, in a manila folder marked "Indefinite Hold."

I went back down to the fifth floor, and wrote still another memo, referencing even more documents. This time I didn't send it up, as I had the others, through regular channels. Instead, I carried it upstairs with the intention of giving it to somebody who would comment on it. When I reached the office of the Asia-Africa area chief, Waldo Duberstein, he looked at me and said: "It's that Coddamn memo again. Adams, stop being such a prima donna." In the next office, an official said that the order of battle was General Westmoreland's concern, and we had no business intruding. This made me even angrier. "We're all in the same government," I said. "If there's a discrepancy this big, it doesn't matter who points it out. This is no joke. We're in a war with these guys." My remarks were dismissed as rhetorical, bombastic, and irrelevant.

On the ninth of September, eighteen days after I'd written the first memo, the CIA agreed to let a version of it out of the building, but with very strange restrictions. It was to be called a "draft working paper," meaning that

it lacked official status; it was issued in only 25 copies, instead of the usual run of over 200; it could go to "working-level types" only—analysts and staff people—but not to anyone in a policy-making position—to no one, for example, on the National Security Council. One copy went to Saigon, care of Westmoreland's Order of Battle Section, carried by an official who worked in the Pentagon for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

BY THIS TIME I was so angry and exhausted that I decided to take two weeks off to simmer down. This was useless. I spent the whole vacation thinking about the order of battle. When I returned to the Agency, I found that it came out monthly and was divided into four parts, as follows:

Communist regulars	About 110,000 (it varied by month)
Guerrilla-militia	Exactly 103,573
Service troops	Exactly 18,553
Political cadres	Exactly 39,175
	That is, 271,301, or about 270,000

The only category that ever changed was "Communist regulars" (uniformed soldiers in the Vietcong Army). In the last two years, this figure had more than doubled. The numbers for the other three categories had remained precisely the same, even to the last digit. There was only one conclusion: no one had even looked at them! I decided to do so right away, and to find out where the numbers came from and whom they were describing.

I began by collecting more documents on the guerrilla-militia. These were "the soldiers in black pajamas" the press kept talking about; lightly armed in some areas, armed to the teeth in others, they planted most of the VC's mines and booby traps. This was important, I discovered, because in the Da Nang area, for example, mines and booby traps caused about two-thirds of all the casualties suffered by U.S. Marines.

I also found where the number 103,573 came from. The South Vietnamese had thought it up in 1964; American Intelligence had accepted it without question, and hadn't checked it since. "Can you believe it?" I said to a fellow analyst. "Here we are in the middle of a guerrilla war, and we haven't even bothered to count the number of guerrillas."

The service troops were harder to locate. The order of battle made it clear that these VC soldiers were comparable to specialists in the American Army—ordnance sergeants, quartermasters, medics, engineers, and so forth. But despite repeated phone calls to the Pentagon, to U.S. Army headquarters, and to the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I couldn't find anyone who knew where or when we'd hit upon the number 18,553. Again I began collecting VC documents, and within a week or so had come to the astonishing conclusion that our official estimate for service troops was at least two years old and five times too low—it should not have been 18,553, but more like 100,000. In the process I discovered a whole new category of sol-

diers known as "assault youths" who weren't in the order of battle at all.

I also drew a blank at the Pentagon regarding political cadres, so I started asking CIA analysts who these cadres might be. One analyst said they belonged to something called the "infrastructure," but he wasn't quite sure what it was. Finally, George Allen, who seemed to know more about the VC than anyone else, said the "infrastructure" included Communist party members and armed police and people like that, and that there was a study around which showed how the 39,175 number had been arrived at. I eventually found a copy on a shelf in the CIA archives. Unopened, it had never been looked at before. The study had been published in Saigon in 1965, and one glance showed it was full of holes. Among other things, it left out all the VC cadres serving in the countryside—where most of them were.

By December 1966 I had concluded that the number of Vietcong in South Vietnam, instead of being 270,000, was more like 600,000, or over twice the official estimate.* The higher number made many things about the Vietnam war fall into place. It explained, for instance, how the Vietcong Army could have so many deserters and casualties and still remain effective.

Nobody listens

MIND YOU, DURING ALL THIS TIME I didn't keep this information secret—just the opposite. I not only told everyone in the Agency who'd listen, I also wrote a continuous sequence of memorandums, none of which provoked the least response. I'd write a memo, document it with footnotes, and send it up to the seventh floor. A week would pass, and then the paper would return to my in-box: no comment, only the same old buck slip showing that everyone upstairs had read it.

By this time I was so angry and so discouraged with the research directorate that I began looking for another job within the CIA, preferably in a section that had some use for real numbers. I still believed that all this indifference to unwelcome information afflicted only part of the bureaucracy, that it was not something characteristic of the entire Agency. Through George Allen I met George Carver, a man on the staff of Richard Helms, the new CIA director, who had the title "special assistant for Vietnamese affairs." Carver told me that I was "on the right track" with the numbers, and he seemed an independent-minded man who could circumvent the bureaucratic timidities of the research directorate. At the time I had great hopes of Carver because, partly as a result of his efforts, word of my memorandums had reached the White House. Cables were passing back and forth between Saigon and Washington, and it had become fairly common knowledge that something was very wrong with the enemy strength estimates.

In mid-January 1967, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for an order-of-battle conference to be held in Honolulu.

*This was broken down as follows: Communist regulars, about 100,000; guerrilla militia, about 300,000; service troops, about 100,000; political cadres, about 100,000.

lulu. The idea was to assemble all the analysts from the military, the CIA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency in the hope that they might reach a consensus on the numbers. I went to Honolulu as part of the CIA delegation. I didn't trust the military and, frankly, I expected them to pull a fast one and lie about the numbers. What happened instead was that the head of Westmoreland's Order of Battle Section, Col. Gains B. Hawkins, got up right at the beginning of the conference and said, "You know, there's a lot more of these little bastards out there than we thought there were." He and his analysts then raised the estimate of enemy strength in each category of the order of battle; instead of the 103,573 guerrilla militia, for example, they'd come up with 193,000. Hawkins's remarks were unofficial, but nevertheless, I figured, "the fight's over. They're reading the same documents that I am, and everybody's beginning to use real numbers."

I couldn't have been more wrong.

After a study trip to Vietnam, I returned to Washington in May 1967, to find a new CIA report to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara called something like "Whither Vietnam?" Its section on the Vietcong Army listed all the discredited official figures, adding up to 270,000. Dumbfounded, I rushed into George Carver's office and got permission to correct the numbers. Instead of my own total of 600,000, I used 500,000, which was more in line with what Colonel Hawkins had said in Honolulu. Even so, one of the chief deputies of the research directorate, Drexel Godfrey, called me up to say that the directorate couldn't use 500,000 because "it wasn't official." I said: "That's the silliest thing I've ever heard. We're going to use real numbers for a change." Much to my satisfaction and relief, George Carver supported my figures. For the first time in the history of the Vietnam war a CIA paper challenging the previous estimates went directly to McNamara. Once again I said to myself: "The battle's won; virtue triumphs." Once again, I was wrong.

SOON AFTER, I attended the annual meeting of the Board of National Estimates on Vietnam. Held in a windowless room on the CIA's seventh floor, a room furnished with leather chairs, blackboards, maps, and a large conference table, the meeting comprised the whole of the intelligence community, about forty people representing the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the State Department. Ordinarily the meeting lasted about a week, its purpose being to come to a community-wide agreement about the progress of the war. This particular consensus required the better part of six months.

The procedure of these estimates requires the CIA to submit the first draft, and then everyone else argues his group's position. If one of the services violently disagrees, it is allowed to take exception in a footnote to the report. The CIA's first draft used the same 500,000 number that had gone to McNamara in May. None of us expected what followed.

George Fowler from DIA, the same man who'd carried my guerrilla memo to Saigon in September 1966, got up and explained he was speaking for the entire military. "Gentlemen,

we cannot agree to this estimate as currently written. What we object to are the numbers. We feel we should continue with the official order of battle." I almost fell off my chair. The official OB figure at that time, June 1967, was still 270,000, with all the old components, including 103,573 guerrilla-militia.

In disbelief I hurried downstairs to tell my boss, George Carver, of the deception. He was reassuring. "Now, Sam," he said, "don't you worry. It's time to bite the bullet. You go on back up there and do the best you can." For the next two-and-a-half months, armed with stacks of documents, I argued with the military over the numbers. By the end of August, they no longer insisted on the official order of battle figures, but would not raise them above 300,000. The CIA numbers remained at about 500,000. The meetings recessed for a few weeks at the end of the month, and I left Washington with my wife, Eleanor, to visit her parents in Alabama. No sooner had we arrived at their house when the phone rang. It was George Carver. "Sam, come back up. We're going to Saigon to thrash out the numbers."

I was a little cynical. "We won't sell out, will we?"

"No, no, we're going to bite the bullet," he said.

Army estimate

WE WENT TO SAIGON in early September to yet another order-of-battle meeting, this one convened in the austere conference room in Westmoreland's headquarters. Among the officers supporting Westmoreland were Gen. Philip Davidson, head of intelligence (the military calls it G-2); General Sidle, head of press relations ("What the dickens is he doing at an OB conference?" I thought); Colonel Morris, one of Davidson's aides; Col. Danny Graham, head of the G-2 Estimates Staff; and, of course, Col. Gains B. Hawkins, chief of the G-2 Order of Battle Section. There were also numerous lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains, all equipped with maps, charts, files, and pointers.

The military dominated the first day of the conference. A major gave a lecture on the VC's low morale. I kept my mouth shut on the subject, even though I knew their documents showed a dwindling VC desertion rate. Another officer gave a talk full of complicated statistics which proved the Vietcong were running out of men. It was based on something called the cross-over memo which had been put together by Colonel Graham's staff. On the second day we got down to business—the numbers.

It was suspicious from the start. Every time I'd argue one category up, the military would drop another category down by the same amount. Then there was the little piece of paper put on everybody's desk saying that the military would agree to count more of one type of VC if we'd agree to eliminate another type of VC. Finally, there was the argument over a subcategory called the district-level service troops.

I stood up to present the CIA's case. I said that I had estimated that there were about seventy-five service soldiers in each of the VC's districts, explaining that I had averaged the

numbers in a sample of twenty-eight documents. I briefly reviewed the evidence and asked whether there were any questions.

"I have a question," said General Davidson. "You mean to tell me that you only have twenty-eight documents?"

"Yes sir," I said. "That's all I could find."

"Well, I've been in the intelligence business for many years, and if you're trying to sell me a number on the basis of that small a sample, you might as well pack up and go home." As I resumed my seat, Davidson's aide, Colonel Morris, turned around and said, "Adams, you're full of shit."

A lieutenant colonel then got up to present the military's side of the case. He had counted about twenty service soldiers per district, he said, and then he went on to describe how a district was organized. When he asked for questions, I said, "How many documents are in your sample?"

He looked as if somebody had kicked him in the stomach. Instead of answering the question, he repeated his description of how the VC organized a district.

Then George Carver interrupted him. "Come, come, Colonel," he said. "You're not answering the question. General Davidson has just taken Mr. Adams to task for having only twenty-eight documents in his sample. It's a perfectly legitimate question. How many have you in yours?"

In a very low voice, the lieutenant colonel said, "One." I looked over at General Davidson and Colonel Morris to see whether they'd denounce the lieutenant colonel for having such a small sample. Both of them were looking at the ceiling.

"Colonel," I continued, "may I see your document?" He didn't have it, he said, and, besides, it wasn't a document, it was a POW report.

Well, I asked, could he please try and remember who the twenty service soldiers were? He ticked them off. I kept count. The total was forty.

"Colonel," I said, "you have forty soldiers here, not twenty. How did you get from forty to twenty?"

"We scaled down the evidence," he replied.

"Scaled down the evidence?"

"Yes," he said. "We cut out the hangers-on."

"And how do you determine what a hanger-on is?"

"Civilians, for example."

Now, I knew that civilians sometimes worked alongside VC service troops, but normally the rosters listed them separately. So I waited until the next coffee break to ask Colonel Hawkins how he'd "scale down" the service troops in a document I had. It concerned Long Dat District in the southern half of South Vietnam, and its 111 service troops were broken down by components. We went over each one. Of the twenty in the medical component, Hawkins would count three, of the twelve in the ordnance section, he'd count two, and so forth, until Long Dat's 111 service soldiers were down to just over forty. There was no indication in the document that any of those dropped were civilians.

As we were driving back from the conference that day, an Army officer in the car with us explained what the real trouble was: "You

know, our basic problem is that we've been told to keep our numbers under 300,000."

LATER, AFTER RETIRING from the Army, Colonel Hawkins confirmed that this was basically the case. At the start of the conference, he'd been told to stay below a certain number. He could no longer remember what it was, but he recalled that the person who gave it to him was Colonel Morris, the officer who had told me I was "full of shit."

The Saigon conference was in its third day, when we received a cable from Helms that, for all its euphemisms, gave us no choice but to accept the military's numbers. We did so, and the conference concluded that the size of the Vietcong force in South Vietnam was 299,000. We accomplished this by simply marching certain categories of Vietcong out of the order of battle, and by using the military's "scaled-down" numbers.

I left the conference extremely angry. Another member of the CIA contingent, William Hyland (now head of intelligence at the Department of State), tried to explain. "Sam, don't take it so hard. You know what the political climate is. If you think they'd accept the higher numbers, you're living in a dream world." Shortly after the conference ended, another category was frog-marched out of the estimate, which dropped from 299,000 to 248,000.

I returned to Washington, and in October I went once again in front of the Board of National Estimates, by this time reduced to only its CIA members. I told them exactly what had happened at the conference—how the numbers had been scaled down, which types of Vietcong had left the order of battle, and even about the affair of Long Dat District. They were sympathetic.

"Sam, it makes my blood boil to see the military cooking the books," one of the board members said. Another asked, "Sam, have we gone beyond the bounds of reasonable dishonesty?" And I said, "Sir, we went past them last August." Nonetheless, the board sent the estimate forward for the director's signature, with the numbers unchanged. I was told there was no other choice because Helms had committed the CIA to the military's numbers.

"But that's crazy," I said. "The numbers were faked." I made one last try. My memorandum was nine pages long. The first eight pages told how the numbers had got that way. The ninth page accused the military of lying. If we accepted their numbers, I argued, we would not only be dishonest and cowardly, we would be stupid. I handed the memo to George Carver to give to the director, and sent copies to everyone I could think of in the research branch. Although I was the only CIA analyst working on the subject at the time, nobody replied. Two days later Helms signed the estimate, along with its doctored numbers.

That was that. I went into Carver's office and quit Helms's staff. He looked embarrassed when I told him why I was doing so, but he said there was nothing he could do. I thanked him for all he had done in the earlier part of the year and for his attempt at trying to deal with real rather than imaginary numbers. I thought of leaving the CIA, but I still retained some faith in the

Agency, and I knew that I was the only person in the government arguing for higher numbers, with accurate evidence. I told Carver that the research directorate had formed a VC branch, in which, I said, I hoped to find somebody who would listen to me.

Facing facts

IN NOVEMBER General Westmoreland returned to Washington and held a press conference. "The enemy is running out of men," he said. He based this on the fabricated numbers, and on Colonel Graham's crossover memo. In early December, the CIA sent McNamara another "Whither Vietnam?" memo. It had the doctored numbers, but this time I was forbidden to change them. It was the same story with Helms's New Year briefing to Congress. Wrong numbers, no changes allowed. When I heard that Colonel Hawkins, whom I still liked and admired, had been reassigned to Fort Holabird in Baltimore, I went to see him to find out what he really thought about the order of battle. "Those were the worst three months in my life," he said, referring to July, August, and September, and he offered to do anything he could to help. When he had been asked to lower the estimates, he said, he had retained as many of the front-line VC troops as possible. For several hours we went over the order of battle. We had few disagreements, but I began to see for the first time that the Communist regulars, the only category I'd never looked at, were also seriously understated—perhaps by as many as 50,000 men. No one was interested, because adding 50,000 troops would have forced a reopening of the issue of numbers, which everyone thought was settled. On January 29, 1968, I began the laborious job of transferring my files from Carver's office to the newly formed Vietcong branch.

The next day the VC launched the Tet offensive. Carver's office was chaos. There were so many separate attacks that someone was assigned full time to stick red pins in the map of South Vietnam just to keep track of them. Within a week's time it was clear that the scale of the Tet offensive was the biggest surprise to American intelligence since Pearl Harbor. As I read the cables coming in, I experienced both anger and a sort of grim satisfaction. There was just no way they could have pulled it off with only 248,000 men, and the cables were beginning to show which units had taken part. Many had never been in the order of battle at all; others had been taken out or scaled down. I made a collection of these units, which I showed Carver. Two weeks later, the CIA agreed to re-open the order-of-battle controversy.

SUDDENLY I WAS ASKED to revise and extend the memorandums that I had been attempting to submit for the past eighteen months. People began to congratulate me, to slap me on the back and say what a fine intelligence analyst I was. The Agency's chief of research, R. Jack Smith, who had once called me "the outstanding analyst" in the CIA but who had ignored all my reporting on the Vietcong, came down from the seventh floor to shake my hand.

"We're glad to have you back," he said. "You know more about Vietnam than you did about the Congo." All of this disgusted me, and I accepted the compliments without comment. What was the purpose of intelligence, I thought, if not to warn people, to tell them what to expect? As many as 10,000 American soldiers had been killed in the Tet offensive because the generals had played politics with the numbers, and here I was being congratulated by the people who had agreed to the fiction.

In February the Agency accepted my analysis, and in April another order-of-battle conference was convened at CIA headquarters. Westmoreland's delegation, headed by Colonel Graham (now a lieutenant general and head of the Defense Intelligence Agency) continued to argue for the lower numbers. But from that point forward the White House stopped using the military estimate and relied on the CIA estimate of 600,000 Vietcong.

All along I had wondered whether the White House had had anything to do with fixing the estimates. The military wanted to keep them low in order to display the "light at the end of the tunnel," but it had long since occurred to me that maybe the generals were under pressure from the politicians. Carver had told me a number of times that he had mentioned my OB figures to Walt Rostow of the White House. But even now I don't know whether Rostow ordered the falsification, or whether he was merely reluctant to face unpleasant facts. Accepting the higher numbers forced the same old decision: pack up or send a lot more troops.

On the evening of March 31, the question of the White House role became, in a way, irrelevant. President Johnson made his announcement that he wasn't going to run again. Whoever the next President was, I felt, needed to be told about the sorry state of American intelligence so that he could do something about it. The next morning, April 1, I went to the CIA inspector general's office and said: "Gentlemen, I've come here to file a complaint, and it involves both the research department and the director. I want to make sure that the next administration finds out what's gone on down here." On May 28 I filed formal charges and asked that they be sent to "appropriate members of the White House staff" and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. I also requested an investigation by the CIA inspector general. Helms responded by telling the inspector general to start an investigation. This took two months. The director then appointed a high-level review board to go over the inspector general's report. The review board was on its way to taking another two months when I went to the general counsel's office and talked to a Mr. Ueberhorst. I said, "Mr. Ueberhorst, I wrote a report for the White House about three months ago complaining about the CIA management, and I've been getting the runaround ever since. What I want is some legal advice. Would I be breaking any laws if I took my memo and carried it over to the White House myself?" A few days later, on September 20, 1968, the executive director of the CIA, the number-three man in the hierarchy, called me to his office: "Mr. Adams, we think well of you, but Mr. Helms says he doesn't want your memo to leave

the building." I took notes of the conversation, so my reproduction of it is almost verbatim. "This is not a legal problem but a practical one of your future within the CIA," I was told. "Because if you take that memo to the White House, it will be at your own peril, and even if you get what you want by doing so, your usefulness to the Agency will thereafter be nil." The executive director carried on this conversation for thirty-five minutes. I copied it all out until he said, "Do you have anything to say, Mr. Adams?" "Yes sir," I said, "I think I'll take this right on over to the White House, and please tell the director of my intention." I wrote a memorandum of the conversation, and sent it back up to the executive director's office with a covering letter saying, "I hope I'm quoting you correctly; please tell me if I'm not."

A short while later he called me back to his office and said, "I'm afraid there's been a misunderstanding, because the last thing in the world the director wanted to do was threaten. He has decided that this thing can go forward."

I waited until after the Presidential election. Nixon won, and the next day I called the seventh floor to ask if it was now okay to send on my memo to the White House. On November 8, 1968, Mr. Helms summoned me to his office. The first thing he said to me was "Don't take notes." To the best of my recollection, the conversation then proceeded along the following lines. He asked what was bothering me; did I think my supervisors were treating me unfairly, or weren't they promoting me fast enough? No, I said. My problem was that he caved in on the numbers right before Tet. I enlarged on the theme for about ten minutes. He listened without expression, and when I was done he asked what I would have had him do—take on the whole military? I said, that under the circumstances, that was the only thing he could have done; the military's numbers were faked. He then told me that I didn't know what things were like, that we could have told the White House that there were a million more Vietcong out there, and it wouldn't have made the slightest bit of difference in our policy. I said that we weren't the ones to decide about policy; all we should do was to send up the right numbers and let them worry. He asked me who I wanted to see, and I said that I had requested appropriate members of the White House staff and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in my memo, but, frankly, I didn't know who the appropriate members were. He asked whether Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow would be all right. I told him that was not only acceptable, it was generous, and he said he would arrange the appointments for me.

With that I was sent around to see the deputy directors. The chief of research, R. Jack Smith, asked me what the matter was, and I told him the same things I had told Helms. The Vietnam war, he said, was an extraordinarily complex affair, and the size of the enemy army was only—his exact words—"a small but significant byway of the problem." His deputy, Edward Procter, now the CIA's chief of research, remarked, "Mr. Adams, the real problem is you. You ought to look into yourself."

AFTER MAKING THESE ROUNDS, I wrote letters to Rostow and Taylor, telling them who I

was and asking that they include a member of Nixon's staff in any talks we had about the CIA's shortcomings. I forwarded the letters, through channels, to the director's office, asking his permission to send them on. Permission was denied, and that was the last I ever heard about meeting with Mr. Rostow and General Taylor.

In early December I did manage to see the executive secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, J. Patrick Coyne. He told me that a few days earlier Helms had sent over my memo, that some members of PFIAB had read it, and that they were asking me to enlarge on my views and to make any recommendations I thought were in order. Coyne encouraged me to write a full report, and in the following weeks I put together a thirty-five-page paper explaining why I had brought charges. A few days after Nixon's inauguration, in January 1969, I sent the paper to Helms's office with a request for permission to send it to the White House. Permission was denied in a letter from the deputy director, Adm. Rufus Taylor, who informed me that the CIA was a team, and that if I didn't want to accept the team's decision, then I should resign.

There I was—with nobody from Nixon's staff having heard of any of this. It was far from clear whether Nixon intended to retain the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. J. Patrick Coyne said he didn't know. He also said he didn't intend to press for the release of the thirty-five-page report. I thought I had been had.

For the first time in my career, I decided to leave official channels. This had never occurred to me before, not even when Helms had authorized the doctored numbers in the month before Tet. I had met a man named John Court, a member of the incoming staff of the National Security Council, and through him I hoped for a measure of redress. I gave him my memorandum and explained its import—including Westmoreland's deceptions before Tet—and asked him to pass it around so that at least the new administration might know what had gone on at the CIA and could take any action it thought necessary. Three weeks later Court told me that the memo had gotten around, all right, but the decision had been made not to do anything about it.

So I gave up. If the White House wasn't interested, there didn't seem to be any other place I could go. I felt I'd done as much as I possibly could do, and that was that.

ONCE AGAIN I THOUGHT about quitting the Agency. But again I decided not to, even though my career was pretty much in ruins. Not only had the deputy director just suggested that I resign, but I was now working under all kinds of new restrictions. I was no longer permitted to go to Vietnam. After the order-of-battle conference in Saigon in September 1967, Westmoreland's headquarters had informed the CIA station chief that I was persona non grata, and that they didn't want me on any military installations throughout the country. In CIA headquarters I was more or less confined to quarters, since I was no longer asked to attend any meetings at which outsiders were present. I

was even told to cut back on the lectures I was giving about the VC to CIA case officers bound for Vietnam.*

I suppose what kept me from quitting this time was that I loved the job. The numbers business was going along fairly well, or so I thought, and I was becoming increasingly fascinated with what struck me as another disturbing question. Why was it that the Vietcong always seemed to know what we were up to, while we could never find out about them except through captured documents? At the time of the Tet offensive, for example, the CIA had only a single agent in the enemy's midst, and he was low-level.

At about this time, Robert Klein joined the VC branch. He had just graduated from college, and I thought him one of the brightest and most delightful people I had ever met. We began battling back and forth the question of why the VC always knew what was going to happen next. Having written a study on the Vietcong secret police in 1967, I already knew that the Communists had a fairly large and sophisticated espionage system. But I had no idea *how* large, and, besides, there were several other enemy organizations in addition to the secret police that had infiltrated the Saigon government. Klein and I began to sort them out. The biggest one, we found, was called the Military Proselytizing Directorate, which concentrated on recruiting agents in the South Vietnamese Army and National Police. By May 1969 we felt things were beginning to fall into place, but we still hadn't answered the fundamental question of how many agents the VC had in the South Vietnamese government. I decided to do the obvious thing, which was to start looking in the captured documents for references to spies. Klein and I each got a big stack of documents, and we began going through them, one by one. Within two weeks we had references to more than 1,000 VC agents. "Jesus Christ!" I said to Klein. "A thousand agents! And before Tet the CIA only had one." Furthermore, it was clear from the documents that the thousand we'd found were only the top of a very big iceberg.

Right away I went off to tell everybody the bad news. I had begun to take a perverse pleasure in my role as the man in opposition at the Agency. The first person I spoke to was the head of the Vietnam branch of the CIA Clandestine Services. I said, "Hey, a guy called Klein and I just turned up references to over 1,000 VC agents, and from the looks of the documents the overall number might run into the tens of thousands." He said, "For God's sake, don't open that Pandora's box. We have enough troubles as it is."

The next place I tried to reach was the Board of National Estimates, which was just convening its annual meeting on the Vietnam draft. Because of the trouble I'd made the year before, and because the meeting included outsiders, I wasn't allowed to attend. By now, Klein and I had come to the very tentative conclusion, based mostly on extrapolations from documents, that the Military Proselytizing Directorate alone had

* In mid-1968 I had discovered that Agency officers sent to Vietnam received a total of only one hour's instruction on the organization and methods of operation of the Vietcong. Disturbed that they should be sent up against so formidable a foe with so little training, I had by the end of the year increased the hours from one to twenty-four. I gave most of the lectures myself.

20,000 agents in the South Vietnamese Army and government. This made it by far the biggest agent network in the history of espionage, and I was curious to know whether this was known in Saigon. I prompted a friend of mine to ask the CIA's Saigon station chief—back in Washington to give another briefing I wasn't allowed to attend—just how many Vietcong agents there were in the South Vietnamese Army. The station chief (a new one; Jorgy had long since moved) was taken aback at the question. He'd never considered it before. He said, "Well, the South Vietnamese Military Security Service has about 300 suspects under consideration. I think that about covers it." If Klein and I were anywhere near right with our estimate of 20,000, that made the station chief's figure too low by at least 6,000 percent.

New discoveries

DECIDING THAT WE DIDN'T yet know enough to make an issue of the matter, Klein and I went back to plugging the documents. The more we read, the wilder the story became. With a great deal of help from the CIA counterintelligence staff, we eventually found that Vietcong agents were running the government's National Police in the northern part of the country, that for many years the VC had controlled the counterintelligence branch of the South Vietnamese Military Security Service (which may explain why the station chief's estimate was so low), and that in several areas of Vietnam, the VC were in charge of our own Phoenix Program. Scarcely a day passed without a new discovery. The most dramatic of them concerned a Vietcong agent posing as a South Vietnamese ordinance sergeant in Da Nang. The document said that the agent had been responsible for setting off explosions at the American air base in April 1969, and destroying 40,000 tons of ammunition worth \$100 million. The explosions were so big that they attracted a Congressional investigation, but the military managed to pass them off as having been started accidentally by a grass fire.

The problem with all these reports was not that they were hidden, but that they'd never been gathered and analyzed before in a systematic manner. Although CIA men in the field were aware of VC agents, Washington had failed to study the extent of the Vietcong network.

This is exactly what Klein and I attempted in the fall of 1969. By this time we had concluded that the total number of VC agents in the South Vietnamese Army and government was in the neighborhood of 30,000. While we admitted that the agents were a mixed bag—most of them were low-level personnel hedging their bets—we nonetheless arrived at an extremely bleak overall conclusion. That was that the agents were so numerous, so easy to recruit, and so hard to catch that their existence "called into question the basic loyalty of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces." This, in turn, brought up questions about the ultimate chances for success of our new policy of turning the war over to the Vietnamese.

In late November Klein and I had just about finished the first draft of our study when we

were told that *under no circumstances* was it to leave CIA headquarters, and that, specifically, it shouldn't go to John Court of the White House staff. Meanwhile, however, I had called Court a number of times, telling him that the study existed, and that it suggested that Vietnamization probably wouldn't work. For the next two-and-a-half months, Court called the CIA front office asking for a draft of our memo on agents. Each time he was turned down.

Finally, in mid-February 1970, Court came over to the VC branch, and asked if he could have a copy of the agent memorandum. I told him he couldn't, but that I supposed it was okay if he looked at it at a nearby desk. By closing time Court had disappeared, along with the memo. I phoned him the next morning at the Executive Office Building and asked him if he had it. "Yes, I took it. Is that okay?" he said. It wasn't okay, and shortly after informing my superiors I received a letter of reprimand for releasing the memo to an "outsider." (Court, who worked for the White House, was the "outsider.") All copies of the study within the CIA—several were around being reviewed—were recalled to the Vietcong branch and put in a safe. Klein was removed from working on agents, and told that if he didn't "shape up," he'd be fired.

THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT and perhaps even Helms (I don't know) apparently were appalled by the agent memo's reaching the White House. It was embarrassing for the CIA, since we'd never let anything like that out before. To suddenly say, oh, by the way, our ally, the South Vietnamese government, is crawling with spies, might lead someone to think that maybe the Agency should have noticed them sooner. We'd been in the war, after all, for almost six years.

Court later wrote a précis of the memo and gave it to Kissinger. Kissinger gave it to Nixon. Shortly thereafter, the White House sent a directive to Helms which said, in effect: "Okay, Helms, get that damn agent paper out of the safe drawer." Some months later, the Agency coughed it up, almost intact.

Meanwhile, Klein quit. I tried to talk him out of it, but he decided to go to graduate school. He did so in September 1970, but not before leaving a letter of resignation with the CIA inspector general. Klein's letter told the complete story of the agent study, concluding with his opinion that the White House would never have learned about the Communist spies had it not been for John Court's sticky fingers.

By now my fortunes had sunk to a low ebb. For the first time in seven years, I was given an unfavorable fitness report. I was rated "marginal" at conducting research; I had lost my "balance and objectivity" on the war, and, worst of all, I was the cause of the "discontent leading to the recent resignation" of Klein. For these shortcomings I was being reassigned to a position where I would be "less directly involved in research on the war." This meant I had to leave the Vietcong branch and join a small historical staff, where I was to take up the relatively innocuous job of writing a history of the Cambodian rebels.

Once again, I considered resigning from the

CIA, but the job still had me hooked, and ever since the coup that deposed Sihanouk in March 1970 I had been wondering what was going on in Cambodia. Within a few weeks of that coup, the Communist army had begun to disappear from the southern half of South Vietnam for service next door, and I was curious to find out what it was up to. When I reported to the historical staff, I began, as usual, to collect documents. This was my main occupation for almost the next five months. I knew so little about Cambodia that I was fairly indiscriminate, and therefore grabbed just about everything I could find. By late April 1971, I had gathered several thousand reports, and had divided them into broad categories, such as "military" and "political." In early May, I began to go through the "military" reports.

One of the first of these was an interrogation report of a Vietcong staff officer who had surrendered in Cambodia in late 1970. The staff officer said he belonged to a Cambodian Communist regional command with a code name I'd never heard of: C-40. Apparently C-40 had several units attached to it, including regiments, and I'd never heard of any of these, either. And, it seemed, the units were mostly composed of Khmers, of whom C-40 had a total of 18,000. Now that appeared to me to be an awful lot of Khmer soldiers just for one area, so I decided to check it against our Cambodian order of battle. Within a month I made a startling discovery: there was *no* order of battle. All I could find was a little sheet of paper estimating the size of the Khmer Communist Army at 5,000 to 10,000 men. This sheet of paper, with exactly the same numbers, had been kicking around since early 1970.

It was the same story as our Vietcong estimate of 1966, only worse. In Vietnam we had neglected to look at three of the four parts of the Vietcong Army; in Cambodia we hadn't looked at the Khmer Communist Army at all. It later turned out that the 5,000-to-10,000 figure was based on numbers put together by a sergeant in the Royal Cambodian Army in 1969.

From then on, it was easy. Right in the same room with me was every single intelligence report on the Khmer rebels that had ever come in. Straightaway I found what the VC Army had been doing in Cambodia since Sihanouk's fall: it had put together the largest and best advisory structure in the Indochina war. Within two weeks I had discovered thirteen regiments, several dozen battalions, and a great many companies and platoons. Using exactly the same methods that I'd used on the Vietcong estimate before Tet (only now the methods were more refined), I came to the conclusion that the size of the Cambodian Communist Army was not 5,000 to 10,000 but more like 100,000 to 150,000. In other words, the U.S. government's official estimate was between ten and thirty times too low.

My memo was ready in early June, and this time I gave a copy to John Court of the White House the day before I turned it in at the Agency. This proved to have been a wise move, because when I turned it in I was told, "Under no circumstances does this go out of the room." It was the best order-of-battle paper I'd ever

done. It had about 120 footnotes, referencing about twice that many intelligence reports, and it was solid as a rock.

A week later, I was taken off the Khmer Communist Army and forbidden to work on numbers anymore. A junior analyst began reworking my memo with instructions to hold the figure below 30,000. The analyst puzzled over this for several months, and at last settled on the same method the military had used in lowering the Vietcong estimate before Tet. He marched two whole categories out of the order of battle and "scaled down" what was left. In November 1971, he wrote up a memo placing the size of the Khmer Communist Army at 15,000 to 30,000 men. The CIA published the memo, and that number became the U.S. government's official estimate.

More distortions

THE PRESENT OFFICIAL ESTIMATE of the Khmer rebels—65,000—derives from the earlier one. It is just as absurd. Until very recently the Royal Cambodian Army was estimated at over 200,000 men. We are therefore asked to believe that the insurgents, who control four-fifths of Cambodia's land and most of its people, are outnumbered by the ratio of 3 to 1. In fact, if we count *all* the rebel soldiers, including those dropped or omitted from the official estimate, the Khmer Rebel Army is probably larger than the government's—perhaps by a considerable margin.

The trouble with this kind of underestimate is not simply a miscalculation of numbers. It also distorts the meaning of the war. In Cambodia, as in the rest of Southeast Asia, the struggle is for allegiance, and the severest test of loyalty has to do with who can persuade the largest number of peasants to pick up a gun. When American intelligence downgrades the strength of the enemy army, it ignores the Communist success at organizing and recruiting people. This is why the Communists call the struggle a "people's war" and why the government found it difficult to understand.

I spent the rest of 1971 and a large part of 1972 trying to get the CIA to raise the Cambodian estimate. It was useless. The Agency was busy with other matters, and I became increasingly discouraged. The Cambodian affair seemed to me to be a repeat of the Vietnam one; the same people made the same mistakes, in precisely the same ways, and everybody was allowed to conceal his duplicity. In the fall of 1972 I decided to make one last attempt at bringing the shoddiness of American intelligence to the attention of someone, anyone who could do anything about it.

Between October 1972 and January 1973 I approached the U.S. Army inspector general, the CIA inspector general, and the Congress—all to no avail. To the Army inspector general I delivered a memorandum setting forth the details of what had happened to the VC estimate before Tet. I mentioned the possibility of General Westmoreland's complicity, which might have implicated him in three violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The memorandum asked for an investigation, but the inspector general explained that I was in the

wrong jurisdiction. Of the CIA inspector general I requested an investigation of the Cambodian estimates, but he adopted the device of neglecting to answer his mail, and no inquiry took place. In a last desperate measure—desperate because my friends at the CIA assured me that Congressional watchdog committees were a joke—I even appealed to Congress. To committees in both the House and Senate that watch over the CIA I sent a thirteen-page memorandum with names, dates, numbers, and a sequence of events. A staff assistant to the Senate Armed Services Committee thought it an interesting document, but he doubted that the Intelligence Subcommittee would take it up because it hadn't met in over a year and a half. Lucien Nedzi, the chief superintendent of the CIA in the House, also thought the document "pertinent," but he observed that the forthcoming elections obliged him to concern himself primarily with the question of busing. When I telephoned his office in late November, after the elections had come and gone, his ad-

ministrative assistant told me, in effect, "Don't call us; we'll call you."

By mid-January 1973 I had reached the end of the road. I happened to read a newspaper account of Daniel Ellsberg's trial in Los Angeles, and I noticed that the government was alleging that Ellsberg had injured the national security by releasing estimates of the enemy force in Vietnam. I looked, and damned if they weren't from the same order of battle which the military had doctored back in 1967. Imagine! Hanging a man for leaking faked numbers! In late February I went to Los Angeles to testify at the trial and told the story of how the numbers got to be so wrong. When I returned to Washington in March, the CIA once again threatened to fire me. I complained, and, as usual, the Agency backed down. After a decent interval, I quit.


One last word. Some day, when everybody has returned to his senses, I hope to go back to the CIA as an analyst. I like the work. □

THE MORAL OF THE TALE

Readers interested in the question of integrity in American government might take note of three successful bureaucrats mentioned in this chronicle. All of them acknowledged or abetted the counterfeiting of military intelligence, and all of them have risen to high places within their respective apparatus. Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, who helped to lower the U.S. Army's estimate of the Vietcong

strength, is now the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Edward Procter, who steadfastly ignored accurate intelligence, is now chief of the CIA research directorate; and William Hyland, who conceded the impossibility of contesting a political fiction, is now the head of State Department Intelligence. Their collective docility might also interest readers concerned with questions of national security.

WASHINGTON POST
27 April 1975



By JOYCE ILLIG

Company Man

PHILIP AGEE, the ex-CIA agent living in England, has finally found a publisher and filmmaker to get his book *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* out to the American public. Stonehill Publishing Company will publish the book and Emile de Antonio has purchased the film rights.

Stonehill, a small, relatively unknown New York trade house distributed by George Braziller & Co., signed a contract with Scott Meredith, Agee's literary agent, giving Agee essentially the same deal he'd turned down with Straight Arrow Books: a \$12,000 advance and a 60-40 split on the paperback sale.

Stonehill is a four-year-old company run by Jeffrey Steinberg. Steinberg is young (late 20s), enthusiastic and persistent. He was a founder of Chelsea House publishers and was hired in 1970 by Jann Wenner to start Straight Arrow Books with Alan Rinzler. He said that he didn't

last long because of personality differences with Wenner. Steinberg started Stonehill and is backed by "a consortium of European bankers."

Stonehill's current schedule for Agee's book is to ship a first printing of 30,000 copies in June for July publication. The probable price: \$12.95. Steinberg is also planning to add an index for the American edition.

"We're going to hold off on the mass market paperback sale until we've completed our legal review and can deliver a reasonably meaningful warranty," said Steinberg.

The American Civil Liberties Union has given Steinberg a letter "agreeing to provide as much legal assistance, at no cost, as we warrant." This is in case all the rumors become fact concerning government suppression of the book here and threats of libel suits.

"There will definitely be a libel and invasion of privacy review by our law firm," said Steinberg, "and there will probably be a minor number of changes in the manuscript, but I don't think we'll have trouble with Agee on them."

Scott Meredith said that Agee is prepared to warrant very little because he has no money. "In the book deal as well as the movie deal, the only warranty that

Agee is providing is the warranty that he has the right to sell these rights and that the government doesn't own them," said Meredith.

Stonehill's biggest seller is a recently published book called *The Cocaine Papers*. It's a \$12.95 volume documenting Freud's use of cocaine.

Emile de Antonio, the underground Marxist filmmaker, plans to make a fiction film of Agee's book, using different names for everyone except the author.

De Antonio, creator of the controversial and highly praised documentaries "Point of Order" (the Army-McCarthy hearings), "In the Year of the Pig" (an overview of the Vietnam war) and "Millhouse" (a satiric look at Nixon), has agreed to pay \$25,000 dollars against five per cent of the profits—the producer's gross, not the net—of the picture. Agee will receive \$7500 when he signs the contract and \$17,500 in the first day of principal photography, which has to be within a year.

Haskel Wexler has agreed to be the director of cinematography and De Antonio said that Jane Fonda has volunteered to be in it.

JOYCE ILLIG writes regularly on the publishing scene for Book World.

NEW YORK TIMES
30 April 1975

Bomb Blasts Home Of a C.I.A. Official In a Denver Suburb

DENVER, April 29 (UPI)—A pipe bomb explosion outside the suburban home of a Central Intelligence Agency official may have been caused by radicals inspired by the bombing of a bank hours earlier, or may have been the work of a "crackpot", the police said today.

The bomb exploded in front of the home of James Sommerville, a C.I.A. regional director, 30 minutes before midnight Monday, shattering windows and shredding portions of the roof on the one-story brick house in South Denver. Windows in a house next door were also broken.

Bricks were blown from the front wall and a sprinkler system inside the house were damaged, but neither Mr. Sommerville's wife, Allane, nor their 14-year-old son, asleep at the time of the blast, were hurt.

Mrs. Sommerville, who said that her husband was in Texas, added: "I know people are connecting this with his job but there's no real proof. I really can't say what happened. I was asleep at the time. The explosion woke me up."

A bomb squad detective, Fred Stevenson, said that the blast did not appear related to the explosion of a satchel of dynamite at the American National Bank in Denver 12 hours earlier. Six employees received minor injuries in that explosion. But he said that the pipe bomb, pushed against the foundation of the Sommerville home, might have been planted by radicals who got the idea from the bank explosion.

"You get one bombing and there immediately follows a rash of other," he said. "What with all the publicity in the papers about the C.I.A., it could have been a radical group. Who can say?"

The police said that they were checking with other cities in which terrorists have set off explosions to see if there was a pattern to the bombings.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
27 April 1975

Our anti-intelligence agency

President Ford has advised Americans not to go on "refighting" a war that is now finished for us. That seems good advice, but a qualification goes with it: We had better think over that war at least long enough to learn from it.

Perhaps the basic lesson to be learned is that self-deception does not work. We have heard a great deal about efforts by the Johnson and Nixon administrations to mislead the public. Less well known, but even more disastrous, were the determined and largely successful efforts of government agencies to deceive themselves.

A horrifying example appears in Harper's Magazine this month. Taken at face value, the story of Sam Adams, former chief analyst of Viet Nam affairs for the Central Intelligence Agency, shows that unwelcome facts were consistently covered up instead of reported. Accurate data on enemy strength would have faced the White House with a painful dilemma, says Mr. Adams; it would either have had to pull out of Viet Nam or throw far more men and materiel into an unpopular war. So the reports were suppressed. Our policymakers continued to make decisions on the basis of information which intelligence had reason to know was wrong.

Mr. Adams reports that in August, 1966, he found strong evidence in captured Viet Cong documents that the official estimate of V. C. strength in South Viet Nam—270,000 men—might be 200,000 too low. Mr. Adams sent this explosive information to the CIA director's office. Nothing happened; it was read and returned without questions or comment. A second memorandum simply disappeared. Mr. Adams found

it in a safe a week later, marked "indefinite hold."

Over the next six and a half years, Mr. Adams amassed hundreds of documents clearly indicating that Communist strength in Indochina was vastly greater than American officials thought. He concluded, for instance, that there were actually 600,000 Viet Cong—not 270,000—in the south; that V. C. agents were in control of the South Vietnamese Military Security Service, and in some areas were running the CIA's own "Phoenix" program of political assassination; that Communist strength in Cambodia was 10 to 30 times greater than government estimates.

Each attempt to get this information thru official channels to the White House was met with silence, inaction, or specific warnings to keep quiet. Mr. Adams managed to convey his findings to the inspectors-general of the CIA and the army and the CIA "watchdog" committees of House and Senate. Nothing happened. In 1973, after his superiors again threatened to fire him—this time for testifying in the Ellsberg trial—Mr. Adams resigned.

It appears, then, that since 1966 our intelligence establishment had access to information that could have radically changed this government's policies in Southeast Asia—policies that have now proved ruinously wrong. The information was kept quiet and the man who tried to warn government leaders of it was treated as a troublemaker.

The questions now are [1] how our intelligence system came to function as a protector and promoter of disastrous ignorance, and [2] whether it is still functioning that way. The least that should result from Mr. Adams' disclosures is a congressional inquiry to find the answers.

NATIONAL REVIEW
28 MARCH 1975

■ Talk about a responsible press. The media gave considerable play a few weeks back to Dick Gregory and Ralph Schoenman when they dug up an old and very blurred photograph taken the day of John F. Kennedy's assassination in Dallas. They claimed that two of the men in the background were Watergaters Frank Sturgis and E. Howard Hunt, and, on the basis of that, made the sweeping assertion that JFK had been the victim of a CIA assassination attempt. Both AP and CBS News refused to carry a 300-word statement by Hunt which included the sentences: "I was not in Dallas, Texas, November 22, 1963; in fact I never visited Dallas until eight years later. I did not meet Frank Sturgis until 1972, nine years after we were allegedly together in Dallas." Finally no one in sight bothered to inform the reader or listener of the antecedents of Schoenman. Ralph Schoenman was the guru who got hold of the senescent Bertrand Russell back in the Sixties and staged that war crimes tribunal in Stockholm that indicted Lyndon Johnson and the United States of America for every atrocity in the book. Schoenman was identified only as "an associate" of Dick Gregory in the assassination investigation.

THE WASHINGTONIAN
MAY, 1975

MEDIA TALK


EXCERPTED:

...Parade magazine recently ran a Personality Parade item asking if New York Times reporter Sy Hersh was ever a CIA agent, and the answer was no. But then George Lardner of the Post was told that Hersh actually did once have CIA ties. Lardner checked it out and finally called Hersh to ask him pointblank: "Boy, you finally got me." Hersh told Lardner, "I was posted to the Belgrade station in the 1950s but was dismissed for homosexual tendencies." Lardner, according to friends of Hersh, was set to run with the story until he was told it was all a put-on. Don't invite Hersh and Lardner to the same party.

Newsweek, April 28, 1975

My Turn

Peer de Silva



God Bless the CIA

An article appeared in this space a few weeks ago entitled "Abolish the CIA!" It began by describing in some considerable detail the Viet Cong bombing of the American Embassy in Saigon in 1965. I was the CIA chief of station at that time. I have a different perspective on what happened that morning and on the way Americans should be thinking about the CIA these days.

The American Embassy was indeed bombed on March 30, 1965, by a Viet Cong terrorist squad who packed an old sedan with about 350 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive and then rolled the car up under my window in the embassy. They set off a time-pencil detonator, began a fire fight with local police on the sidewalk and were blown up with them when the car detonated just a few seconds later.

One of my secretaries was killed instantly, two of my officers were permanently and totally blinded, and many others on my staff were injured to one degree or another, myself included. I was led away from the embassy, bleeding like a stuck pig because that's the way all head wounds bleed. Besides the American casualties, more than a score of innocent South Vietnamese passers-by were killed by the blast and many wounded.

GRIM PROPOSAL

This incident apparently served to provide the author of the other article with the notion that I had lied to him. He reported that the Viet Cong terrorists had finally opened his eyes and thus led him to the grim proposal that the real way to celebrate America's Bicentennial is by abolishing the CIA entirely.

I find this proposal singularly frivolous and downright dangerous. Whether one likes the notion or not, the fact remains that there are many tigers roaming loose in the world today; they are unfriendly to the United States and eagerly await the opportunity to leap upon us if the risk is not too great.

In certain quarters it has become stylish to say that the cold war never really existed but was made up by cold war warriors to justify their own predilections for adventure and thrills.

The fact is that European countries during the late 1940s, the '50s and the '60s were threatened and gravely endangered by hostile forces mainly bank-

rolled and guided by the Soviet Union and its executive intelligence arm, the KGB. There were murders, kidnappings and hundreds of other acts of violence and terror, perpetrated by the Soviet Union and its allies of Eastern Europe. Nations were dominated, threatened and overthrown, and whole peoples were thrust into a form of political society that they detested and that they fled whenever opportunity presented itself.

Those who now say that the cold war never really happened have apparently forgotten or have chosen to forget how the present Polish Communist state was established, or how the defenestration of Eduard Benes in Prague in 1948 signaled the disappearance of a democratic Czechoslovakia and the simultaneous birth of the Communist state we know today. The act of suppression was repeated by the Soviets in 1968. The Russians were saying: Once we get you, we will keep you.

MARVELOUS BRAVERY

Hungary experienced a similar trauma in 1947, but after it de-Communized itself with marvelous bravery and purity in 1956, the country was overrun by the Soviets yet again.

During all of these years in Europe there were no armies at war in the field but there were friendly intelligence services, along with the CIA, who were caught up in this not-so-silent combat.

I should point out here that my Washington-based CIA colleagues have always performed magnificently and the great value of their work has always been underrated. There were also those of us who were privileged to work in somewhat closer contact with dangerous and distinctly unfriendly opponents.

In today's world there is a large area of policy that is primarily the domain of our State Department Foreign Service, much maligned but always reliable and dedicated. Similarly, there is our military establishment in all of its branches, strong, tough, devoted, but not so well-equipped as the jungle-world of 1975 requires. These two arms, our diplomatic service and our military establishment, are, however, ill equipped to deal with the covert foreign arm of the Soviet Union, the KGB, and its allies in countries under its influence or under attack.

This is where the CIA comes in.

Our motivation for serving in the CIA

has been misrepresented as a "sport." While I regret not one minute of my service with the CIA, at home or abroad, I must say I never considered it to be a sport. There were moments of great hilarity, long periods of tedium and hard, slogging work, and occasionally moments of acute terror.

The foreign operations of the CIA must exist to carry out certain tasks in the American nation's interests that the diplomatic service cannot do and that our military establishment cannot do short of war. To think otherwise is to ignore the real world as it exists and will exist for a long time to come, and to put the safety and freedom of the American nation in real jeopardy.

Let nobody be in doubt about this: as long as the United States exists as a free nation, the Soviet Union perceives it as a threat to its existence as a system. Détente is possible up to a point, but prudence and carefulness must be ever-present considerations as we seek to find a way in which we can all inhabit this planet peacefully without major war.

UNFORGIVING HISTORY

During this continuing uproar about the CIA one can only imagine the wonderment with which the Soviet Politburo and KGB leadership must observe these antics on the American political scene. They are being offered precisely the goal they would dearly love to achieve: the abolition of the CIA. To me it is tragic that there are apparently serious and influential American voices now being raised in favor of such abolition. History has a way of making its participants pay, and sometimes pay heavily, for their errors. Further, history by and large does not offer second chances. If we should misread or misunderstand history so badly as actually to abolish the CIA, an unforgiving history will exact its penalty from all of us, and from our children.

Peer de Silva is a retired CIA officer who has served as CIA chief of station in various countries of Europe and Asia. He was CIA chief of station in Saigon from December 1963 until April 1965, when he was evacuated due to wounds received during a terrorist bombing.

WASHINGTON POST
27 April 1975

House Intelligence Unit in Quandary

Search for Director Holds Up Investigation of CIA Activities

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House Select Committee on Intelligence Operations has been in business for more than nine weeks, but its only staff member is a security director who, so far, has nothing to guard.

The arrival of top-secret documents from the Central Intelligence Agency and elsewhere in the government and the start of the House investigation have been held up by a prolonged search for someone to run it.

"We have moved rapidly ahead," quipped Rep. Don Edwards (D-Calif.), a committee member, "and after nine weeks, we have decided to hire a staff director."

The House established the committee to investigate allegations of illegal or improper activities by the CIA and other government intelligence agencies.

Four lawyers are under consideration for the directorship. Two of them—Chicago lawyer Thomas P. Sullivan and Deputy State Attorney General Kenneth P. Zauber of New Jersey—have not been interviewed.

The other two lawyers under consideration are Searle Field, a former legislative aide to Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.), and Ted Jacobs, a long-time associate of consumer advocate Ralph Nader and a counsel at the Center for the Study of Responsive Law.

Some committee members are embarrassed by the delay in selecting a director. Their frustration seems

heightened by the apparent determination of other members to wait for a candidate more to their liking.

"I'm a little unhappy with the speed with which the committee has moved," said Rep. Robert N. Giamo (D-Conn.), a key member in the seven-member Democratic majority. "The thing that bothers me is whether this is an indication of things to come." (The Democratic members will meet Monday in an effort to break the logjam over the directorship.)

Committee Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.) had hoped for near-unanimous backing for a director, but that has proved an elusive goal.

"It's still up in the air," said Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill.), the committee's ranking Republican. "I would not want to say we're close to selecting anyone."

Several candidates were considered last month for the job. One fell through, reportedly because he was being considered for a post at the Justice Department; another dropped out of consideration because he couldn't cut ties with his Washington law practice.

Overtures were made to former assistant Watergate special prosecutor Richard Ben-Veniste. He told the committee he wasn't interested.

"The selection is overdue," an aide to Nedzi said. "The trouble is, some of these lawyers they're talk-

ing about are making over \$100,000 a year." The House post is expected to pay \$36,000.

Still, the Senate committee investigating the CIA and other areas of the government's intelligence community appointed a staff director and a chief counsel within a month of being established and now has about 50 staff members.

Some Democrats on the House committee question Nedzi's determination to push the investigation.

"He should have been able to come up with a staff director in less than 2½ months," said one. "Is this what we're going to do the rest of the time? What we're really worried about is how seriously Lucien wants to push this thing."

Another concern, as one member of Congress put it, is "the fact that nobody's beating a path to our door. Is it because you can't do a good job in this area, because it's doomed to failure? Or is there a feeling among lawyers that you don't mess with these guys? And I don't mean the CIA so much. I'm talking about the FBI and the IRS. Some older lawyers have said to me, 'Are you crazy? These guys would be haunting me for the rest of my life.'"

Nedzi's appointment Feb. 19 as chairman of the committee drew criticism because he is chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence.

In a brief floor speech the next day, Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) protested

that Nedzi's appointment would add "to the pervasive public cynicism about the seriousness of Congress in this and other endeavors."

Nedzi has indicated that he considers such talk unjustified and has tried to ignore it. The new committee has kept a low profile, holding only one session.

Committee Democrats and Republicans have met separately to interview candidates for the top staff position.

Reps. David C. Treen (R-La.) and Robert W. Kasten Jr. (R-Wis.) said they are satisfied thus far with Nedzi's efforts to find a chief counsel acceptable to all.

"We're not going to get a perfect guy, let's face it," said Kasten. "But there isn't any perfect congressman, either."

There seems to be a widespread conviction among the House committee members that their investigation will be more thorough than the Senate committee's. This feeling seems to be based on the committee members' diverse political interests and the near certainty that the House committee will have the last turn at bat.

Meanwhile, the House panel's chief of security, Carl H. Sims, a retired Army officer who did similar work during the House impeachment inquiry, has kept busy with plans for burglar alarms, security sensors, and a document control system aimed at preventing information leaks. The documents themselves have not yet been requested.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
24 APRIL 1975

Real World Competition

PRESIDENT FORD, in a television interview this week, had some salient comments on the vital value of the Central Intelligence Agency to our democracy. With the hush-hush CIA under attack and probes both by Congress and the left-leaning elements of the press, it seems important to give Mr. Ford's words all the emphasis they deserve.

The President, in essence, made no apology whatsoever for the covert foreign activities of our top intelligence agency. Instead he defended its spying and anti-Communist undertakings with these words:

"I can't imagine the United States saying we would not undertake any covert activities, knowing that friends as well as foes are undertaking covert activity not only in this country but everywhere else.

"That would be like tying a President's hand be-

hind his back in the planning and execution of foreign policy.

"We cannot compete in this very real world if you are just going to tie the United States with one hand behind its back and everybody else has got two good hands to carry out their operations."

One might suppose that CIA critics and their probe pushers in Congress would understand these elementary facts. Attempting to expose or hamstring the confidential work of our most sensitive source of essential foreign information is an exercise in guaranteed self-defeat.

It is exactly the sort of endeavor that the Soviet Union and its legions of secret agents keep encouraging in every way possible. They, at least, have no illusions on how to build power — or undermine it — in the very real world of international competition today.

WASHINGTON POST
Friday, May 2, 1975

CIA Bares New Aspect Of Data Use

By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency shared information with the FBI that it had received about an American citizen from a wiretap conducted by a foreign source, according to court records.

The admission by the CIA is the first public disclosure that the agency shares electronic surveillance information that it receives from foreign countries about Americans, according to several attorneys. The foreign intelligence agency previously was known to share with the FBI information gathered abroad by its own agents and sources.

The CIA did not originally disclose even to the FBI that the information was obtained by a foreign government's wiretap, a procedure some attorneys described as "potentially deceitful." They said this might be so because in such situations Justice Department attorneys can tell courts they have no wiretap information about an individual when they actually have unwittingly received such information from the CIA.

Former CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton testified before Congress earlier this year that "any information" the CIA has on a U.S.

citizen is passed on to the FBI "on a daily basis. It's up to the FBI to determine if it is necessary."

In American federal courts, the existence of wiretap information generally must be disclosed upon request so the legality of the tap can be determined. If the Justice Department says it has no such information, the inquiry ends in most cases.

Although the CIA disclosure was filed publicly here this week, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency filed details about the incident under seal with U.S. District Judge Howard F. Corcoran and filed a claim of "secrets of state" privilege in an attempt to halt disclosure of those details.

None of those details could be learned yesterday, such where and when the tap occurred, who the U.S. citizen was or why his telephone lines were tapped or what branch of what foreign government conducted the taps.

The suit which elicited the disclosure was filed last year by the Institute for Policy Studies, a public affairs "think-tank," and three of its leaders, Marcus Raskin, Richard Barnet and Ralph Stavins. The suit charges several former top government officials—but not the CIA—with illegally tapping the telephones of the plaintiffs and the group.

The government has already admitted overhearing the plaintiffs on two different categories of FBI wiretaps, both of which the government claims are legal.

WASHINGTON POST
2 May 1975

3 Disclosure Suits Hit Security Units

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The secrecy surrounding the work of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency was challenged on a broad front yesterday.

Launching what promises to be a continuing series of lawsuits, Morton H. Halperin filed three complaints demanding disclosure of the CIA's January report to President Ford on illegal domestic activities, CIA budgetary information, and a six-year summary of NSC studies and decision memoranda.

A former NSC staff member and onetime White House aide to Henry A. Kissinger, Halperin said the information had been denied him despite formal requests under the strengthened Freedom of Information Act that went into effect Feb. 19.

The litigation was initiated as part of a project sponsored jointly by the nonprofit Center for National Security Studies here—with which Halperin is affiliated—and the American Civil Liberties Union. Halperin also is suing for damages for the wiretapping of his home telephone during the Nixon administration.

At a press conference yesterday, Halperin said the CIA has acknowledged it is subject to the new Freedom of Information Act by making a few documents public in response to his requests.

One CIA memo, which Halperin released yesterday, shows that the agency's Domestic Operations Division was set up in 1963 under instructions likening it to a CIA

"foreign field station."

"The future establishment of subordinate domestic bases is envisioned," Richard Helms, then-deputy director for CIA plans, said in the Feb. 11, 1963, memorandum.

The memo emphasized that "clandestine internal security or counterintelligence operations in the United States" as well as occasional "special activities" would be left to other units of the CIA. Helms said the essential relationship of the Domestic Operations Division to CIA headquarters would be "that of a foreign field station" with a wide variety of assignments.

Halperin said the memo "suggests something about how the CIA looks on the United States."

All details of the new division's "functions" were deleted from the two-page document provided Halperin. The CIA changed the name of the division in January, 1972, to the Foreign Resources Division.

The litigation for other documents that the CIA and NSC have refused to make public is being handled by attorneys John Shattuck, William Dobrovir, and Mark Lynch.

Halperin, acting as his own attorney, filed a fourth complaint against Secretary of State Kissinger for portions of two background briefings for reporters on the Vladivostok strategic arms limitation talks. Kissinger held the briefings last fall, and the State Department has refused to release some of the information.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
18 APRIL 1975

Glomar Sails —to Red Sub?

Long Beach, Calif., April 17 (UPI) — The Glomar Explorer, the underseas search ship built for the CIA by Howard Hughes' company, was back at sea today, presumably to try to retrieve the rest of a Russian submarine on the floor of the Pacific.

The \$400 million ship sailed from Long Beach yesterday. One report was that its companion in the recovery operation, the huge HMS-1 barge, was to be towed from its berth at Redwood City, Calif., to rendezvous with the Glomar Explorer at sea.

The submarine sank 700 miles north of Hawaii in 1968. The CIA finally acknowledged the recovery project but gave no details. Intelligence sources said that the operation succeeded in recovering a third of the craft last year.

LONDON TIMES
17 April 1975

More CIA men in Britain named

By Martin Huckerby

The names of a further six diplomats at the United States Embassy in London who are alleged to be members of the Central Intelligence Agency, were disclosed yesterday by Mr Philip Agee, the former CIA officer, and Mr Philip Kelly, a freelance journalist.

Mr Agee said the latest results of their investigations into the CIA in Britain had been passed to Mr Stanley Newens, Labour MP for Harlow, who is a leader of the group of 32 MPs who signed a House of Commons motion last month calling for the expulsion of the ten diplomats originally named as CIA men.

Mr Newens said last night that he had written to Mr Wilson, the Prime Minister, on

the subject and hoped to see him personally.

Mr Kelly, who has been producing reports on "spook spotting" for the magazine *Time Out*, said one of the six now identified was Mr George T. Walsh, formerly the CIA's head of station in Dacca, Bangladesh.

He said seven of the ten people originally named were in the embassy's political liaison section, as were three of those named yesterday—Mr Robert J. Evans, Mr John T. Kirby and Mr Jerry G. Prehn.

Mr Robert F. Hoepfl and Mr James P. Morden were said to be CIA men employed in the area telecommunications office, as well as Mr John W. Coffey, named earlier. Mr John P. Brown worked in the joint reports and research unit and Mr

Richard M. Luther worked in the political section.

Mr Kelly indicated that their method of detecting CIA men operating under diplomatic cover, by using State Department registers and other published documents, was not foolproof. One of the ten men originally named had turned out not to be a CIA man.

He said they wanted to clear the name of Mr John Reed, who was not a genuine diplomat, but was in fact an official of the United States Department of Defence offering advice to the British Government.

Mr Agee said the total number of CIA staff, including clerical and other workers, identified so far was more than 50, which made the British contingent possibly the largest in the world.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 April 1975

Washington Post
29 April 1975

WHITE HOUSE LAG ON SPY DATA SEEN

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 23—The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence charged today that "excessive delays" in turning over documents by the Ford Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency were hampering the committee's investigation.

It was the strongest complaint to date by Senator Frank Church, the committee chairman, and came only a week after Mr. Church had indicated there was an atmosphere of cooperation. The Idaho Democrat said that the committee felt there were "excessive delays by the executive branch in response to our requests for documents and materials." He warned that the "pace" of the Senate committee's investigation "should not be set by the executive agencies" and "there was no further excuse for the slow pace." He said that he and Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas, who is vice chairman of the committee, had asked for a meeting with senior White House aides to discuss the problem. He said that the committee ordered its staff to proceed with the field investigation and interrogation of officials "without waiting for the documents."

Roderick Hills, counsel to the President and the man who is coordinating relations with the committee, expressed dismay at the Senator's strong statement. He said the White House staff had done everything to cooperate with the committee. "We broke our backs getting some of this material out . . . there were A.M. several nights," he said.

War Blamed for Delay

Mr. Hills said that the processing had been hampered by the "events in Southeast Asia" last week but that an enormous amount of material had been handed over to the committee in the last few days.

He said the volume of material was also an important factor. "They wanted one set of 34 books of documents that came to your waist when it was stacked on the floor," Mr. Hills said. He also said that the White House "could not responsibly turn this material over without reading it."

The Senate committee has sent major requests for information to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Defense Intelligence Agency, but today's complaint appeared mainly aimed at the C.I.A. Mr. Church said the committee had "thing" from the agency.

Mr. Hills said that he could not understand this complaint. "The C.I.A. hasn't held up anything," he said.

Court Limits Access To U.S. Agencies' Data

By John P. MacKenzie
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously yesterday that legal memoranda circulated within and among federal agencies before they make final decisions are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

But documents explaining final agency action, as when a complaint to the National Labor Relations Board is dismissed at the staff level, must be divulged on demand, the court said.

The high court reversed decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals here that would have opened the NLRB, the U.S. Renegotiation Board, and many other administrative agencies to broad public inspection of their internal processes. The Renegotiation Board determines whether defense contractors have made excess profits.

Several sources familiar with activities behind the committee's closed doors said that its members appeared to feel "but that there was disagreement as to the cause. One group of Senators contended, these sources said, that the Administration was intentionally trying to impede the investigation. But others felt the delays were the result of "bureaucracy." One member predicted that "in the next 10 days to two weeks it would be possible to tell whether President Ford planned to resist the Congressional investigations or cooperate fully."

First Signs of a Breach

These were the first signs of a breach within the committee ranks.

Mr. Tower, who accompanied Mr. Church at today's briefing for reporters, said that he concurred fully with Mr. Church's statements, but he stressed that he saw no concerted attempt to impede the investigation.

Mr. Church said that the committee would ask for basic documents on intelligence matters from the State Department, the Department of Justice, the National Postal Service and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The mentioning of the last agency immediately raised questions among Capitol Hill observers because the commission has no known foreign intelligence gathering function or national security role.

By and large, as Mr. Church has described them, the committee's requests for documents have been to establish the legal basis for intelligence operations

The 1966 law gives members of the public the right to sue in federal court demanding government data but spells out nine categories of information that are exempted from disclosure. Yesterday's decision marked the high court's first interpretation of the exemption safeguarding internal agency memoranda.

Corporations and public interest lawyers contended that the internal documents contain vast amounts of "secret law"—legal principles understood by insiders but denied the general public—that heavily influence the way the agencies behave, and which the public is entitled to know about.

Justice Byron R. White, writing for the court, said writings discussing final agency action "are precisely the kind of agency law in which the public is so vitally interested and which Congress sought to prevent the agency from keeping secret."

But the documents about non-final action at the staff

level are "precisely the kind of predecisional deliberative advice and recommendations . . . which must remain uninhibited and thus undisclosed" to promote candid internal discussion, White added.

The exemption holds even when there is no other public explanation for an agency's action, White said. The law does not require agencies to write opinions; "it simply requires them to disclose the opinions they do write," he said.

Justice White added, "If the public interest suffers by reason of the failure (of an agency) to explain some of its decisions, the remedy is for Congress to require it to do so."

Congress last year amended the information law to give judges more power to review "national security" classifications after the high court said another of the law's exemptions did not permit courts to go behind an agency's classification stamp.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 April 1975

CIA and press

With regard to the CIA retrieval of the Soviet submarine, we strongly feel Jack Anderson was way off base in releasing the story. Granted the CIA and other agencies have abused their powers. But in a case where no civil rights, personal reputations, etc. are involved, the argument of "the public's right to know" is not valid. The government must be free to do its job and even make mistakes. Certainly the press can report and criticize. In a case of military intelligence operations involving nuclear weapons and secret coding devices, what possible need was there to disclose? As reported the Russians were unaware of the operation, and additional efforts were to be made this summer. Every news agency involved agreed to wait on publication.

Ravenna, Ohio. Mr. and Mrs. Paul E. Murray

by the various agencies and the Presidential authorizations for specific covert activities.

Postmaster Wrote Colby
WASHINGTON, April 23 (UPI)—Benjamin F. Bailar, the Postmaster General, told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee today that he had written a letter of complaint to William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, after reading in the newspapers that the C.I.A. had opened people's mail. He said Mr. Colby had replied that the practice had been stopped and would not resume.

NEW YORK TIMES
27 April 1975

C.I.A. Reported Pressing S.E.C. to Curb

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 26—The Central Intelligence Agency is exerting "extensive pressure" on the Securities and Exchange Commission to handle in total secrecy its investigation of the company that was involved in a project to recover a sunken Soviet submarine, and to keep the findings from the public, authoritative sources have disclosed.

If the S.E.C. were to agree to total secrecy in this case, this action would have the effect of limiting its investigation and would violate the Securities Exchange Act, these sources said.

Many Federal officials and Congressional sources privately believe that the handling of the secret C.I.A. contract with Howard R. Hughes, the billionaire industrialist, and the sub-contractor, Global Marine, Inc., of Los Angeles, poses a broad question of whether private companies conducting covert operations for the C.I.A. can, in the interest of national security, be excused from complying with United States regulatory laws.

The Global Marine case has apparently become a behind-the-scenes battleground on this issue. Ray D. Garrett Jr., chairman of the S.E.C., and other high S.E.C. officials refused to comment on whether they had discussed the Global Marine case with C.I.A. officials. Other S.E.C. officials, moreover, said that they had been "ordered" not to discuss whether they had been in contact with the C.I.A.

No Response by Company

Two attempts were made to reach officials of Global Marine to discuss the S.E.C. inquiry but as of last night no company spokesman had responded.

A spokesman for the C.I.A. declined to comment on the allegation that the agency was putting pressure on the S.E.C.

Other sources within the S.E.C. and well-informed Capitol Hill aides said that, since the disclosure of Global Marine's construction of a ship, the Glomar Explorer, to recover the Soviet submarine, the C.I.A. has put pressure on the S.E.C. to keep details of its investigation secret from the public and to limit any action it might take against Global Marine. The criteria the C.I.A. use, one well-placed source said, are that needs of national security supersede domestic regulatory rules.

"We are in danger here of diluting the credibility of the regulatory system," said one former S.E.C. lawyer who practices in Washington. He explained that a company was required to report its operations to the S.E.C. so that a potential investor could decide, with some accuracy, whether the company's stock was a safe investment.

He said, that the purchasers of Global Marine's stock before

last month would not have known that a major part of the company's operation might involve it in a confrontation with the Soviet Navy.

What has perplexed several S.E.C. officials and aides on Capitol Hill is that Global Marine did not avail itself of sections of the Securities Exchange Act that set out specific ways secret Government work can be treated in S.E.C. filings without making the details public.

The act states: "Any requirement to the contrary notwithstanding, no registration statement, prospectus, or other documents filed with the commission or used in connection with the offering or sale of any securities shall contain any documents or information which, pursuant to Executive order, has been classified by an appropriate department or agency of the United States for protection in the interests of national defense or foreign policy."

But the regulation goes on to state, "Where a document or information is omitted pursuant to [the above paragraph] of this section, there shall be filed, in lieu of such document or information, a statement from an appropriate department or agency of the United States to the effect that such document or information has been classified or that the status thereof is awaiting determination."

No record is kept at the S.E.C. of how many corporations avail themselves of this protection. Ralph Hocker, who has been with the S.E.C. for 35 years and handles requests by companies for "confidential treatment" of their cases, said the clause was often used during World War II and the Korean war. He said recently a "guess" would be that 20 to 30 companies a year make this type of filing for their Government contracts.

If this system is followed, however, there would be a letter or memorandum from the C.I.A. kept in Global Marine's file confirming that it did secret work, and this letter would be a public record. There is no such letter or memorandum.

If there were, a potential investor reviewing Global Marine would at least know that the company had some sort of dealing with the C.I.A. By the same token, foreign intelligence agencies could easily learn that this worldwide oceanic and petroleum research company was doing something or developing something for the C.I.A.

One S.E.C. source also pointed out that the commission now had no way of knowing how many other companies working for the C.I.A. might have made no mention of their connection in their filings.

"The question of a potential liability from this kind of covert work is clear," said one lawyer who practices before the S.E.C. "If a private company gets into trouble abroad

for its connections with the agency, and has its plants closed or some other sanction taken against it, the loss is going to cost all the investors."

If stockholders knew their company might be doing secret work abroad for the C.I.A., they could at least raise the issue at a stockholders' meeting, this source said. If they disagreed with this use of company assets, they could file a stockholders' suit, he said.

Global Marine is a public company whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. As a result, it must make periodic reports to the S.E.C., including one in which it describes its operations. Before the disclosure that the ship Glomar Explorer was used in an attempt to raise the Soviet submarine, Global Marine filed statements with the S.E.C. indicating that the ship was constructed for Mr. Hughes's Summa Corporation for the purpose of undersea mineral development.

On Monday, March 31, the S.E.C. issued a press release in which it said, "As a result of information recently reported in the media concerning Global Marine, Inc., (G.M.I.), Glomar Explorer project and undisclosed interests therein, the Securities and Exchange Commission's staff commenced an investigation on or about March 19, 1975."

The release continued by saying, "No information has been developed which is inconsistent with the financial figures contained in G.M.I.'s results of operations and statement of its financial position. However, certain textual disclosures in G.M.I.'s filings with respect to interests in and activities of the project are, in the opinion of the commission's staff, inaccurate and incomplete due to the classified aspects."

The release summed up by saying, "under all of the circumstances, the effect of the project on G.M.I.'s ability to engage profitably in the business of its oceanic division and on the balance of the company is not determined at this time."

Global Marine shortly there-

after filed amended documents with the S.E.C. that included the commission's press release verbatim, a notation that it was cooperating with the commission in the inquiry and this sentence following a description of the Glomar Explorer's operations:

"Certain other information about the program cannot be discussed by the company be-

cause such information has been classified by an agency of the United States Government."

As a matter of routine, S.E.C. officials never comment on investigations that are not completed. But the outcome of other cases where a company has failed to make a full disclosure can result in the company's making a voluntary amendment to the filings and occasionally in the commission's getting a Federal court order against further inaccurate or incomplete filings being made by that company.

It is unclear what a Federal court order might mean in the case of Global Marine, but several lawyers who practice on S.E.C. matters suggest it might set a precedent on whether companies can omit material from their filings on the ground of national security.

According to news accounts published last month, privately confirmed by Government officials, a Soviet submarine sank in the Pacific in 1968 carrying missiles, code books and other items that United States intelligence experts felt would be valuable to obtain. When it became apparent that the Soviet Navy could not locate its submarine, the C.I.A. secretly contracted with Mr. Hughes to build and outfit a ship capable of lifting the giant submarine from extreme depths.

Mr. Hughes's Summa Corporation, which is not registered with the S.E.C. and does not sell stock to the public, subcontracted the design and construction of the vessel, called the Glomar Explorer, to Global Marine. One attempt to raise the submarine was made last summer and another is planned, according to news accounts.

Global Marine Inquiry

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 5 MAY 1975

CIA officials are complaining they will have to deal—for at least two years—with eight different congressional committees investigating the intelligence agency's activities. One result of the probes, says a man now leaving the agency: "Morale within CIA is at a low level, with many younger officers in particular unhappy at being part of an organization that seems discredited among the American people."

NEWSDAY
20 APRIL 1975

Ideas

NEWSDAY'S JOURNAL OF OPINION/APRIL 20, 1975

CIA, the U.S. Fall-Guy By Harry Rositzke

For 30 years the Central Intelligence Agency has been carrying out secret operations abroad. Most of them were intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, its main business, that rarely came into public view. Others were covert-action operations, fewer but on a larger scale, that time and again hit the front pages—a coup in Iran, invasions of Guatemala and Cuba, a “secret army” in Laos, intervention in Chilean politics. And now the CIA faces charges of domestic spying and assassination plots.

Does all this come about because the CIA is a free-wheeling agency operating on its own? Can its director decide what his secret operators will do? If not, who decides what the CIA will do?

Some of these publicized operations have been straight intelligence projects aimed at Soviet military targets. The U-2 high-altitude flights of the late '50s were designed to photograph strategic military and missile sites within the Soviet Union as a much more efficient alternative to sending in secret agents. The U-2 project was personally approved by President Eisenhower and involved the close collaboration of the U.S. Air Force.

The CIA was assigned this sensitive project rather than the Air Force because it required total secrecy—from the designing and production of a special aircraft and the hiring of pilots to the arrangements with foreign governments for the secure use of secret airfields. The U-2 flights provided invaluable coverage of Soviet terrain for almost four years before one was finally shot down.

The more recent project to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine in the Pacific was a natural mission for the U.S. Navy, but again the requirement for secrecy in the planning and building of the Glomar Explorer and the diplomatic delicacy of its mission led the National Security Council to assign the project to the CIA.

In both cases the policy decision to carry out these operations was made at the highest level in Washington, and the CIA was designated as the instrument.

The same procedure holds for as-

signing secret action missions to the CIA.

In the fall of 1948, a year after it was founded as an intelligence agency, the CIA was given an entirely new assignment by the National Security Council: to carry out secret political, paramilitary, and psychological warfare operations against the Soviet “enemy.” With that assignment CIA became the “third arm” of American foreign policy, a secret instrument for carrying out White House directives that the Departments of State and Defense could not or would not carry out through open diplomacy or open military action. Every President from Truman to Nixon has used it.

The earliest action tasks of the CIA in the late '40s and early '50s focused on Europe. With the Cold War heated up by the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and the threat of a Soviet invasion of western Europe, CIA went to work on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Inside the Soviet orbit, arms, supplies, and money were airdropped into Poland and the western Ukraine in order to help the local resistance groups stay alive and—in the event of an invasion—retard the advance of Soviet troops. An abortive attempt was made to take Albania out of the Soviet bloc by sending in armed teams to organize anti-Communist elements and provoke a revolt. In none of these cases did the White House wish to use the official alternative of sending in American troops.

CIA's secret operations in Western Europe, far less dangerous and much more extensive, were in effect a covert annex to the Marshall Plan for stabilizing Europe. Subsidies were given to democratic parties and labor unions to help them fight the heavily subsidized Communist parties. Democratic editors and publications were given direct support. Anti-Soviet emigres were organized as part of a large-scale propaganda campaign, including the staffing of two radio systems, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation (now Radio Liberty), for broadcasts into the Soviet orbit. International front organizations were set up to

give students, teachers, women, and labor unions an alternative to joining the well-entrenched Communist Internationals.

All these activities required the support of private American organizations here at home to channel funds and maintain direct contacts with their European brethren. National committees were founded, dummy foundations set up, and established organizations like the National Student Association and various church groups were enlisted to help out in this vast enterprise—an enterprise, needless to say, sponsored by the White House and the Secretary of State.

The same use of the CIA featured the covert operations of the '50s and '60s outside Europe.

A President authorized the 1953 coup in Iran that unseated Premier Mossadegh's regime and restored the shah to power.

A President authorized the 1954 invasion of Guatemala to forestall the importation of Soviet arms into the Western Hemisphere.

Two Presidents authorized the invasion of Cuba that ended in the bloody Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Three Presidents authorized the support of the democratic forces in Chile both before and after the Marxist government of Salvador Allende was voted into power.

In all these and other cases the CIA played its role as the secret arm of American foreign policy when the White House did not want to act officially and openly. Had the Castro regime been seen as a sufficiently serious threat to our security, the invasion of Cuba could have been carried out by the Marines (like the intervention in the Dominican Republic)—if the President had wanted to. President Nixon could have confined his anti-Allende pol-

icy in Chile to open diplomacy and open economic warfare—if he had wanted to.

It is perhaps too early to say that many of CIA's failures in covert operations should be attributed to the overall failures of American foreign policy in the past 15 years. The all-out effort to "contain" the Soviet Union, to fight the advance of Soviet influence in the Middle East, southern Asia, and Indochina, has failed miserably. The fault, historians will say, was that of the policymakers, yet the men who executed these policies—in the Department of State, in the Pentagon, in the CIA—cannot avoid some share of the blame.

How much of the blame should be assigned to the CIA?

It should be blamed only for faulty execution, not for the efficient carrying out of bad policies. In the worst covert disaster, the Bay of Pigs, the CIA must share the blame with the White House, the secretary of state, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Yet the CIA is bound to be the fall guy for every covert operation that misfires or is exposed. A senior general, discussing a joint project with the CIA, posed one question at the end: "Who do you hang?" The answer has always been, from the press and the public, "Hang the CIA."

The reasons are not hard to find. Since covert operations are mounted to avoid official responsibility, it is the normal practice for governments (in Washington, Paris, or Moscow) to disregard or disavow them when they are exposed. In only two cases has an American President personally and publicly accepted the responsibility for covert ventures: President Eisenhower for the U-2 incident, President Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs. It is part of the CIA director's job to be the fall guy for his boss.

There is another specifically American reason. In our society the prejudice against secrecy runs deep, and it was deepened by Watergate. As the secret agency of government, the CIA has become a natural target for both Congress and the press, and even its legitimate activities are exposed as somehow evil—contacts with American companies or universities, efforts to recruit foreigners within the U.S., an unclassified study of transportation sys-

tems.

What is secret must be sinister. Assassinations, sabotage, arson, wholesale break-ins, "massive" domestic spying, subverting American police departments, killing Presidents—there is no limit to our imagination in facing a dark wall of secrecy.

The CIA has also become a fall guy within the Washington bureaucracy. Many diplomats in the Department of State resent the activities of an agency that might embarrass them and that has contrived to give the U.S. a bad name overseas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation opposed the creation of another intelligence agency in the first place and bitterly resented having to relinquish its wartime responsibility for operations in South America. Sniping at the CIA within other elements of the "intelligence community" is a luncheon sport. CIA operators will never win a popularity contest even among their intelligence colleagues.

The CIA is left out in the cold even at higher levels.

A senior White House official exhorts the CIA Director to get more deeply into student and labor organizations in Area X. "Will you stand behind us?" Reply: "You're on your own if anything blows."

In the case of Chile the CIA got it both ways from the policy level. "Why didn't the CIA forecast Allende's election victory?" It did, but the top men did not read its reports carefully enough. "Why didn't the CIA do more to forestall Allende's election?" It did what it had been instructed to do.

The secret arm cannot win against the policymaker's muscle.

The main threat to the security of America's secret operations comes from the American Congress, especially now that it is beginning to exert its authority against the "imperial" executive. Whatever the deficiencies of "oversight" may have been in the past, those members of Congress who have not been in on the CIA director's briefings often resent their being kept in ignorance. The otherwise secret operation in Chile, for example, was "blown" by a member of Congress who read CIA Director Colby's report to his oversight committee and chose on his own initiative to give it to the press. Those who did not know about the Soviet submarine project

were the loudest in protesting its cost or that it was only a partial success.

More of the same laxness can be expected from politically self-serving leaks during the current hearings of the Senate and House special committees on intelligence. If their members do not exercise a high degree of self-discipline, the end of America's secret operations will be in sight. Secrecy and politics do not mix, and that is why the European democracies respect the need of the executive to keep his secret operations secret.

For many critics the clinching argument against secret operations is their baneful influence on the American image abroad. CIA, it is true, has become the whipping boy for Soviet and Communist propaganda in the developing world. It is a rare coup, assassination, or repressive action anywhere around the globe that has not been ascribed to CIA. The Soviet party newspaper Pravda only

recently accused the CIA of playing a part in the assassination of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

It is a simple fact that even if the President decided to stop all covert operations tomorrow, "CIA" would remain alive and well abroad for decades as the fall guy for the acts and non-acts of the Global Policeman.

What will be lost if the U.S. gives up on its secret-action operations? Possibly a great deal—even if the policy-makers come up with a better foreign policy than just global anti-communism. That policy has not yet been worked out; but even with a new and more effective foreign policy, situations still could arise when a vital national interest could require that the CIA be used—rarely and discreetly.

To ban secret-action operations by congressional fiat simply takes away from the President one option for effective action in the uncertain world ahead. That task will require all the tools we have.

Harry Rositzke worked in secret operations with the Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Agency for 27 years until his retirement in 1970. He now raises calves on a farm near Middleburg, Va.

WASHINGTON POST
12 APRIL 1975

'CIA Diary' Check

By William Gildea

Two Customs Service agents showed up yesterday at Discount Book Shop and Sidney Kramer Books just hours after a newspaper article reported the stores were selling "Inside the Company: CIA Diary," the controversial book by former agent Philip Agee.

It is illegal to import foreign-made books in English by American authors or foreigners living in the United States if copyright is claimed on the material, according to Customs. The paperbacks were marked "not for sale in the U.S.A."

A Customs official said yesterday the department wanted "to verify the place of manufacture . . . to see if they were manufactured in Canada and if they were they'd be seized."

"Yeah, two guys came in here, a little guy and a big guy," said Jim Tenney of Kramer Books. "They were very friendly. They said 'We're not here to hassle you.'"

"They were very nice," said Bob Bialek, president of Discount Books. "It was more of an inquiry."

The question of possible seizure apparently became academic because both Tenney and Bialek reported they were sold out in a crush of business yesterday before the agents arrived.

About 700 books were sold. Discount said it wasn't getting any more, but Tenney of Kramer's said "hopefully" it will have more copies.

INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

1 APRIL 1975

New information on President Kennedy's assassination

Recent information throwing new light on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and Lee Harvey Oswald's contact with a Soviet KGB Department V (Assassination & Sabotage) official shortly before Kennedy's death has been received by several Western intelligence agencies. This information has been deliberately withheld from the public so as not to interfere with the Kissinger policy of détente and other efforts to improve relations with Russia.

The source of the new information is KGB Department V defector, Oleg Adolfovich Lyalin, who disclosed this knowledge during lengthy interrogation by British Intelligence, which resulted in the immediate expulsion of 105 Soviet agents from England. The significance of Lyalin's disclosures connecting Lee Harvey Oswald with KGB Department V was not realised until much later when his secret data was analysed and then integrated with existing intelligence on the Kennedy assassination.

KGB Department V

KGB Department V is the ultra-secret section of Soviet Intelligence which has the prime responsibility for assassinations and sabotage. It is in existence now, and was in existence during the period of the Kennedy assassination. Despite consistent Russian denials, select assassination has been a covert policy of the Soviet Union since its conception. Upon the defection of Lyalin, KGB Chairman, Yuri Andropov, recalled all KGB Department V officers from overseas posts in justified fear that their identities and operations would be compromised.

One of the first KGB Department V officers to be personally recalled from his post was Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov, who was serving under cover as the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. Colonel Jorge Obregon Lima, chief of the secret police in Mexico City, knew of some clandestine activities by Kostikov and linked the Soviet embassy with the urban guerrilla movement in Mexico, which was attempting to upset social reform programmes being carried out under President Luis Echeverria. The CIA knew that Kostikov was a KGB official but did not know he was linked with Department V until after his recall to Moscow. Kostikov also maintained KGB liaison with covert Cuban GDI (General Directorate of Intelligence) operations in Mexico and the United States. Castro agents have specialised in various terrorist activities in those countries. It is also reported that Kostikov supervised the direction of two KGB external echelon-type espionage networks operating from within Mexico near the American border, which sent agents into the US and received intelligence data collected in America.

Kostikov and Oswald

On 27 September 1963, approximately eight weeks before the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Lee Harvey Oswald contacted KGB official, Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov, at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City under the pretext of obtaining a visa. During the same trip, he contacted Cuban GDI officials at the Cuban embassy. He returned to Dallas on 3 October 1963. Oswald, an admitted Communist active with the Castro "Fair Play for Cuba Committee", assassinated President Kennedy on 22 November 1963, and seriously wounded Texas Governor John B. Connally, Jr. Earlier, on 10 April 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald attempted to assassinate retired US Army Major General Edwin A. Walker who was noted for his anti-Communist convictions.

Immediately following the assassination, and prior to the capture of Oswald, pro-Soviet officials in the US State Department and the "Voice of America" radio station placed the blame on "right wing extremists" in Dallas, allegedly under the influence of General Walker. Although this ploy collapsed with Oswald's apprehension, the Communist element in the United States and abroad has continually attempted to disown Oswald and shift the assassination blame to the American right wing, particularly the CIA (which, of course, cannot be considered "right wing" except by the Marxist element).

The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F.

Dobrynin, turned over to US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on 30 November 1963, a sheaf of documents from the USSR's consular files on Oswald. The papers pertained to Oswald's prolonged stay in Russia and his "attempts to get visas to go there again". Dobrynin's documents mentioned Kostikov but failed to link him with the KGB. They also failed to link Oswald's full contacts with the KGB and MVD while a resident of Minsk, Russia. Following the assassination, Kostikov remained at his KGB post in Mexico City, since his removal might hint at possible guilt of KGB or GDI conspiracy. Kostikov is a heavy drinker and was arrested by Mexican police in December 1968, after he threatened to shoot two Mexican PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos) engineers while drunk. The CIA had earlier warned the FBI of Oswald's contact with Kostikov in Mexico City, but it did not then know of Kostikov's assignment in Department V. Had that fact been known at the time, John F. Kennedy might be alive today.

Following the assassination, US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, "exonerated" Moscow from having anything to do with Kennedy's assassination. This was partially based on Ambassador Dobrynin's "cooperation" which was described as "unprecedented". To further its deception regarding Oswald's connection with the KGB, and to help the cover-up operations of its friends in America, Moscow arranged for the "defection" of KGB Major Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko to the United States through Switzerland in 1964. KGB "defector", Nosenko, carried a false story clearing the KGB of any conspiratorial contacts with Oswald. In his lengthy "revelations", all of which were already known to Western intelligence, Nosenko failed to report that Kostikov was a KGB Department V officer—a fact which he did not know. Nosenko claimed to be a defector of KGB Department VII (American section), which handled Oswald's examination in 1959. The "information" supplied by Nosenko confirmed that supplied to Dean Rusk by Dobrynin. Nosenko went into great detail on how the KGB was "horrified" at Kennedy's assassination. Nosenko also spread "information" on other genuine defectors from Soviet-controlled intelligence and security agencies. Moscow timed Nosenko's "defection" to fit in with the investigations of the Warren Commission, whose report was issued to President Johnson on 24 September 1964.

Oswald in Minsk

Oswald's full contacts with the KGB have yet to be disclosed. It is known that Moscow and the KGB are desperately attempting to disavow all connections between Oswald and KGB Department V, especially in light of the revelations of Oleg Lyalin, who provided data on the direct link between Oswald and the KGB assassination arm. It is believed that the February 1975 execution by a KGB firing squad of "traitor" V. G. Kalinin was in connection with further leaks concerning the activities of KGB Department V (Assassination & Sabotage). That Department is now responsible for the potential employment of man-portable atomic demolition munitions (ADM) for carrying out wartime sabotage missions. Kalinin was tried by a secret court and found guilty of "transmitting state and military secrets to foreign agents".

It is claimed by KGB agent, Nosenko, and others that Oswald received two KGB interrogations while in Russia and that he further underwent psychiatric examinations by Soviet medical personnel. What is deliberately played down by the Soviets is that Oswald was a member of a KGB-sponsored rifle marksmanship club while in Minsk and that the girl he was courting (and later married), Marina Prusakov, served as a KGB informant who provided surveillance reports on Oswald. At the time, Marina was living with her uncle, MVD Colonel Ilya Prusakov. Oswald was considered loyal to the international Communist cause and his return to America was expedited by an American employee in the US embassy in Moscow who had KGB contacts. Further information is expected to emerge on this matter in the near future. Kostikov holds the key concerning Moscow's full involvement in President Kennedy's assassination.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 April 1975

Q and A

Jim Garrison And His War With the CIA

Earling Carothers (Jim) Garrison gained national attention in 1967 when as district attorney of New Orleans he claimed President John F. Kennedy was assassinated as part of a conspiracy. In the years that followed, Garrison was indicted as a bribe taker and a federal income tax evader, but was acquitted on both charges. He served 12 years as district attorney before losing the office in 1973. Garrison was interviewed in New Orleans by Washington Star Staff Writer Allan Frank.

Question: Since 1967, you've said that the Central Intelligence Agency has been engaged in large-scale domestic espionage operations. Have you been surprised by any of the recent stories about the CIA?

Garrison: No, nothing has surprised me. I felt ultimately it would come to the surface, but not so soon. At this point, it is safe to predict that they are going to find increasingly that their operation of domestic activities is going to surface as a major source of trouble. I think they are going to find that the domestic department was capsulated from the rest of the agency. Being capsulated makes it much harder for the rest of the agency to control. Where you have an agency that does not have the legal right to operate domestically, that part of the agency which is nevertheless engaged in domestic operations necessarily will be the most covert part of the agency.

Q: Do you believe that the CIA has been involved in domestic assassinations?

A: At no time did I even try to communicate that it was the CIA as a structure involved in the assassinations, but it was elements within the agency. Anyone who has any understanding of the agency and its compartmentalization would have to understand that John McCone — director of the Agency when President Kennedy was shot — has nothing whatsoever to do with the assassination and probably was the most surprised man in the world at all this.

Q: How many assassinations are you talking about?

A: I don't think it is possible for any individual to estimate without the results of a broad-scale inquiry. There might be a great number of individuals who were not well known but who were in the way of domestic operations objectives. If they were in the way, they would have been eliminated. To be responsible in your evaluation, all you can do is speak where some degree of hard data has become available, the murder of

John Kennedy, the murder of Robert Kennedy, the murder of Martin Luther King. Each of them bears consistent earmarks of the involvement of government intelligence operations or men somehow associated with government intelligence activities. For example, by Nov. 22 (1963 when John Kennedy was shot), you have a pre-existing structure, an ad hoc group made up of a complex of individuals ranging from those still actively connected with the CIA to those whose connections were in the past to those who had one foot in the door and one foot out. That's why you have to consider it as an ad hoc group. The point is that having worked together on the Bay of Pigs invasion, the group as a whole has a homogeneous quality. It becomes irrelevant that some men may no longer be with the agency and some are. The unifying factor was their associations which grew out of their agency relationships.

Q: But are "agency relationships" the same thing as a conspiracy to kill? Is there no possibility of coincidence?

A: When you look at the assassination of Jack Kennedy, you see the relationships I'm talking about. Guy Bannister had one foot in the door and one foot out. David Ferrie was a contract employee of the CIA. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, who had been deputy director of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs and had been forced out by Kennedy, was from Dallas. His brother was the mayor of Dallas at the time of the assassination, at the time of the parade. His grandfather was the sheriff of Dallas; his father was the sheriff, then became mayor of Dallas. In other words, it's three generations of control by the Cabells in Dallas. The Cabell administration changed the parade route the day before the assassination. That's why there was total cooperation in the assassination by Dallas law enforcement agencies. In terms of reasonable probability, Gen. Cabell has to be the highest ranking man to surface so far in connection with the assassination. It can't be regarded as just coincidence. It's an intellectual conclusion, he didn't come to me and confess. We arrested two men back in the 1960s and both were CIA-connected. One was David Ferrie, one was Clay Shaw. That's all we arrested. Now here we have on Dec. 21, 1973 a press release from Victor Marchetti which states that Clay Shaw was CIA. Would you call that a coincidence? It is not possible in terms of probability for me to be saying in 1967 when I was saying it publicly as a matter of record that the Central Intelligence Agency, or part of the Central Intelligence Agency, was involved in the assassination (of John Kennedy) and at the same time we had grabbed Ferrie and we had grabbed Shaw and were seeking to convict Shaw for his involvement. It is not possible for me to have been wrong and then for Shaw and Ferrie to turn out to be members of the CIA. It would demand too much coincidence.

Q: When you bring forward these views, are you still greeted as a crackpot?

A: Well, when I first started talking about these things in 1967, the national press largely treated me as if I was a crackpot, a publicity seeker. The reaction was always: That's an outrageous conclusion. Now the climate is different. People are prepared to deal with what was once dismissed as outrageous. What I guess I failed to communicate was my view that it wasn't the government but individuals who were behind this. I guess that's why the government closed its ranks so closely.

Q: What happens now?

A: Well, first off, I'm not going public, not granting a lot of interviews although people are calling me all the time. Now people — cabdrivers to lawyers — are stopping me on the street and saying, "You're right. You said it first."

Q: Do you see any similarities between Watergate and the assassination?

A: Yes, above all, the Kennedy scenario, like the subsequent scenarios for Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, was an intelligence scenario, replete with false sponsors, obstacles, red herrings and scapegoats. There is always the well-established scapegoat whom the public is allowed to have only a brief view of before he's snatched away forever.

Q: Do you have any evidence that CIA employees were involved in the shootings of Robert F. Kennedy or Martin Luther King?

A: I did not have occasion to investigate those assassinations. That's why I limit myself to the observation that the pattern of an intelligence operation in every instance is most systematic and obvious as is the pattern subsequent to each assassination of coverup and concealment of the federal government.

Q: What did you think about the shooting of George Wallace?

A: The shooting of Wallace indicated that Nixon was descending and McGovern was rising. In the Gallup poll before the shooting, Nixon was down to 44 percent and McGovern had risen to 41 percent. Wallace had the swing vote. A 2 percent drop by Nixon and a 2 percent rise makes McGovern president of the United States. So what happens? Wallace gets crippled and removed from the race and his 13 percent support naturally goes to the conservative candidate — that shooting was Nixon's landslide. I don't have any detailed data on the George Wallace case except that it contains to some degree evidence of the intelligence format. As an example, you have "The Diary" of the scapegoat which frequently seems to surface in domestic intelligence assassinations. These diaries are essentially phony and serve the function of misleading anyone interested in a serious inquiry. You have the Lee Harvey Oswald "Diary" and the Sirhan Sirhan "Diary" and Arthur Bremer's "Diary."

Q: And James Earl Ray?

A: In James Earl Ray's case, there's no diary but other patterns which are offsetting. For instance, his exotic travels — Mexico, Canada, England, Portugal. That's rather a lot for a drifter, isn't it? And you have the radio reports of the white Mustang — the sort of things that are likely to have been planted to preoccupy investigators, while the man who actually accomplished the assassination probably was departing by an unmarked government plane.

Q: But what's the point, what's behind it?

A: Assassinations actually are very simple, they're just made to look complex. Jack Kennedy was an old-fashioned ambush. They complicate the situation. It makes the people dizzy and they throw up their hands. It's now well established with no question whatsoever remaining that Robert Kennedy was shot only in the back. The autopsy — as well as the grand jury testimony of coroner Noguchi — shows that Kennedy was killed by a pistol shot a few inches behind his right ear, yet the only man arrested and serving time was a man who was standing well in front of him and missed Robert Kennedy completely with his shots. There's no widespread curiosity, no serious concern about the fact that the murderer of Robert Kennedy is free and in the

streets today. As long as a scapegoat is grabbed that satisfies public curiosity, at least in the United States of today. Most people don't mind at all that the actual assassins are allowed to go free. It's part of the national isolation from reality. It's a basic affliction of the country today which previously developed out of the cold war and the overwhelming complexity of it.

Q: Do you think Lyndon Johnson had anything to do with the coverup you talk about?

A: I don't like to speculate but you can come up with informed speculation that Johnson was of such character that it would have been unnecessary to consult with him. The men handling the assassination would know in advance that they could count on him to conceal the intelligence involvement because Johnson had never indicated any hesitation in lying or fooling the people whenever it suited his purposes. Once you understand that intelligence operatives act on a need-to-know basis, it becomes perceivable as a probability that it was not necessary that Johnson know because they could count on his co-operation in any case. In the final analysis, what's important is not whether he knew before but the obvious fact that he had to have known afterward and that he did

everything possible to initiate the coverup and protection of the assassins who made him president.

Q: How important do you think Gerald Ford's role on the Warren Commission is to his current role as President?

A: Well, I guess you want an on-the-record answer. I'll put it this way: I could not regard it as completely irrelevant.

Q: Do you expect any of what you see as the involvement of Shaw and Oswald with the CIA to come out this summer during the congressional hearings?

A: Yes, I do. I know that by now a number of competent critics of the government coverup have become well aware of Shaw and Oswald's involvement with the CIA. But you must remember that Oswald was a victim, just like Jack Kennedy. While Oswald worked for the CIA as a low level employe, he was not a part of the assassination. They knew him, he knew them. That's why they were able to use him, knowing he had worked for the government in Russia for 30 months. They knew he was a natural patsie. They're still thinking of Lee Oswald leaning out of the depository window.

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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PROGRAM	CBS Morning News	STATION	WTOP TV CBS Network
DATE	April 25, 1975 7:00 AM	CITY	Washington, D.C.

NEW ROUND OF SPECULATION ON KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

By
Daniel Schorr

HUGHES RUDD: There's a new round of speculation here about the Central Intelligence Agency and the John Kennedy assassination. Not that the agency knew about that, but speculation that the CIA knew something about plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and that there may have been some Castro link to the Kennedy murder.

Vice President Rockefeller's CIA panel is investigating as Daniel Schorr reports.

DANIEL SCHORR: It begins to appear that in the Kennedy assassination as in the Watergate breakin, the CIA played its cause a little too close to its chest, hiding its knowledge of related matters for fear of being linked to the central events.

On Watergate, the agency discourages personnel from telling the FBI about the earlier help to Howard Hunt that the White House had requested; those wigs and the spy gear.

In the Kennedy assassination, the Rockefeller Commission is now hot after the CIA for information it withheld from the Warren Commission: Not about renewed theories of CIA involvement in the Dallas murder, which are not taken seriously, but about the

CIA's role in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. During the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and also as late as 1963, just months before the Kennedy assassination.

There is new information that ransomed Bay of Pigs veterans were recruited anew by the CIA for missions to Cuba. And Mafia types were reportedly encouraged to send assassination teams to Havana.

Richard Bissell, the retired CIA deputy who managed Bay of Pigs, has been before the Rockefeller Panel this week. CIA sources say the agency didn't tell the Warren Commission about anti-Castro activities because they didn't seem relevant. But Rockefeller Commission sources say that these activities could shed a new light on the never-explained visit of Lee Oswald to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico before the Kennedy murder.

President Johnson, who learned about CIA plots against Castro from the FBI, of all places, he was convinced the Dallas assassination resulted from Castro's belief that President Kennedy was out to get him. That according to Joseph Califano, Mr. Johnson's Chief-of-Staff.

The Castro reprisal idea may or may not hold water. But what the CIA's being criticized for is withholding information to protect itself that could have helped the investigation.

Daniel Schorr, CBS News, Washington.

WASHINGTON POST
29 April 1975

Helms Denies Assassination Plots by CIA

By William Greider

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms angrily denied yesterday that the agency was responsible for any foreign assassinations and vented his personal bitterness toward a CBS television correspondent.

Helms, now U. S. ambassador to Iran, displayed his strong resentment when he emerged from 3½ hours of private questioning by the Rockefeller Commission, which is investigating alleged domestic transgressions by the CIA.

CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr, who has broadcast several stories on CIA involvement with assassination plots, was waiting outside the hearing room with other reporters.

When Schorr extended his hand, Helms brushed him aside and uttered several insults, "son-of-a-bitch", "killer Schorr" and a sexual epithet.

Standing before TV cameras a few moments later, Helms made it clear that he found the subject of assassinations the main irritant. When Schorr asked if the commission had questioned him about those allegations, Helms replied:

"I must say, Mr. Schorr, I don't like what you said on some of your broadcasts on this subject. I don't think it was fair and I don't think it was right. As far as I know, the CIA was never responsible for assassinating any foreign leader."

Schorr did not report that the CIA had carried out assassinations of foreign leaders, but that the White House was concerned about possible agency involvement in assassination plots.

Another reporter asked if there had been any discussions within the CIA of launching an assassination attempt. Helms' oblique reply suggested that there had.

"I don't know whether I stopped beating my wife or you stopped beating your wife," Helms snapped. "In government, there are always discussions of everything under the sun."

"Of assassinations?" the reporter asked again.

"Of everything under the sun!" Helms repeated emphatically.

"You didn't answer my question," the reporter said.

"I'm not trying to answer your question," Helms replied.

Yesterday was Helms' third and longest appearance before the eight-member commission chaired by Vice President Rockefeller. He was also questioned in private for two days last week by the commission's investigative staff.

The interrogation, he said, covered a variety of subjects, including the allegations of il-

legal domestic spying by the CIA, which are the main focus of the commission's inquiry.

The current CIA director, William E. Colby, also testified yesterday for three hours following Helms, but declined to answer any questions from reporters. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who oversees the CIA as the President's national security adviser, is scheduled to appear before the group before it completes its investigation and prepares a final report.

Helms' denial to reporters did not necessarily rule out the possibility that the CIA had actively considered launching assassination attempts or that the agency had launched an attempt that was not successful, such as the alleged attempts to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

When reporters pressed him further, Helms replied:

"I do not know of any foreign leader that was ever assassinated by the CIA. That's a very simple, direct statement. It's my honest belief and conviction."

Were there "discussions of assassination?"

"But this government discusses every conceivable matter over the years of every kind of context," Helms protested. "I can't for the life of me understand why it is a matter of great interest to the American public that two men may have sat in the State Department or the Defense Department or somewhere and discussed things that may be unacceptable to the American public."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

28 APR 1975

CIA declines to identify translators

Washington

The Central Intelligence Agency has turned down a request to release names of freelance translators employed by the CIA-administered Joint Publications Research Service, a CIA spokesman confirmed Saturday night.

The information had been sought by a Russian-language translator in trying to expand the membership of a translators' guild.

The CIA spokesman said the agency was firmly opposed to releasing names or other information about the translators because many of them have family members in Communist countries who could be jeopardized if it were known their American relatives were working for JPRS.

East Asia

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
8 April 1975

LESSONS OF A POLITICAL WITHDRAWAL

A "CAN'T win, can lose" strategy in Vietnam is leading to the replacement of Western by Communist influence throughout South-East Asia. The continuance of such a strategy elsewhere, particularly in Europe, could be disastrous for the survival of the open societies.

Should all Indo-China come under the dominant influence of the Communist Government in Hanoi, this may not much matter in the sense that such an event would directly and appreciably increase the power of Russia or China. But what is of great import is that such a result would have been brought about by the defeat of the United States without the direct intervention of either of the leading Communist Powers. The débâcle in Vietnam is the outcome of an unsound strategy, to some extent forced on the Americans by their European allies, and now adopted as their own. To adopt a purely defensive strategy puts a great strain on morale; to leave the initiative entirely to the enemy requires superior strength overall.

Today the open societies of the West are, under internal and external attack by militant Marxism and menaced by Russia's ideological imperialism. The local wars in Korea and Vietnam form part of this pattern of conflict, which may be called World War III, but are exceptional in having directly involved the United States and some of her allies in the fighting. In general, this world-wide conflict is being fought out in the political, economic and psychological fields, though wars by proxy play an important part and the overall balance of military power between the contestants is crucial.

Against this background, how significant are the defeats in Vietnam? The importance of the present débâcle stems from America having fully engaged her prestige on the side of South Vietnam and been defeated without the direct intervention of either Russia or China.

President Ford has tried to shore up America's credibility as the leader of the West by warning her adversaries that events in South Vietnam should not be taken to imply that America has lost the will or desire to stand up for freedom in any place in the world. To Nato and other allies he has pledged that America will stand by her commitments.

Under the American constitution, what are such pledges now worth? For the first time since the Second World War, power has flowed back to Congress from the Presidency. Today the President's word carries no more weight than did Woodrow

Vietnam—it's the West in retreat

By Brig. W. F. K. THOMPSON

Wilson's when Congress repudiated the League of Nations. This is the measure of the damage done in Vietnam.

This defeat of the United States must lead to a further decline of Western influence throughout South-East Asia, where Russia and China will compete to fill the vacuum. This undoubtedly is one of the purposes behind Russia's maritime expansion east of Suez.

The "domino theory" is no theory but an expression of the fact that a shift in the balance of power has far-reaching repercussions. To win hearts is very nice, but what matters is men's minds and nothing wins minds like success or loses them more rapidly than failure.

The underlying cause of America's discomfiture in Vietnam is the "no win" strategy she shares with her Western allies. One aspect of this is the tacit agreement that once an area falls under Communist control, no matter by what means, it should so remain.

In Korea the Allies denied themselves the aim of victory but at least they did not lose. This was because there was only a short frontier to defend, each flank of which rested on the sea, while they also dominated the sea and air.

In Vietnam, strategy was also defensive. North Vietnam was not invaded nor did the United States attempt to destroy the North Vietnamese economy nor aim to overthrow the Hanoi Government. On the other hand, the overthrow of the Saigon Government has been the continual aim of Hanoi, for which purpose the North Vietnamese armies invaded the south.

Painful dilemma

The American forces withdrew, the North Vietnamese were allowed to remain in the areas of South Vietnam they had then occupied. The North took every opportunity to improve military positions and pin down the South Vietnamese forces in local fighting while, regardless of the cease-fire agreements, they prepared their new offensive without let or hindrance.

Congress, on the other hand, ensured that the South Vietnamese could not take effective counter-action by not allowing the

American President either to replace military equipment within the terms of the cease-fire or to honour Mr Kissinger's commitment that America would not sit idly by in the face of grave violations of the cease-fire.

President Ford has attacked President Thieu for "ordering a poorly planned and unnecessary withdrawal." Poorly planned it certainly was, but unnecessary?

Thieu faced a painful dilemma. His forces in the northern provinces were stretched over a very wide front with little depth or power of manoeuvre. Deprived by Congress of the ability to take the initiative, they faced a numerically superior enemy having no regard to the cease-fire.

Militarily, I believe that circumstances dictated the timely withdrawal to cover the vital Saigon and Delta areas. Politically this was clearly unacceptable. In consequence, the decision was taken too late and in the event it would have been better to have stood and fought in the north whatever the outcome.

In Europe and elsewhere a continuation in all fields of the West's defensive strategy must prove equally disastrous. Russia has not relinquished one iota of her determination to become the dominant Power throughout Eurasia by every means short of, at present, a direct military confrontation with the United States.

During the "cold war" Nato aimed to contain Russia's efforts to destroy the open societies by all means short of war. By "détente" Russia hopes that the West will bring about its own destruction. Let us take a brief look at two European situations of current concern, the Mediterranean and the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

Nato's southern flank is dangerously unstable from Portugal to Turkey, as is the Middle East. On the death of Tito a most serious situation could arise in Yugoslavia which Russia must be expected to exploit. Has Nato contingency plans to deal with this situation?

That the Nato council no more than regretted Britain's singularly ill-timed and politically irrespon-

sible announcement for the virtual withdrawal from the Mediterranean suggests that this also will be treated as a "can't win, can lose" situation when it arises.

Through CSCE Russia seeks recognition of the addition to her empire of 182,400 square miles of territory and 24 million non-Russian people as the result of war, and an acknowledgment of the permanence of her Protectorate over a further 393,547 square miles and 91.7 million peoples in Eastern

Europe. In exchange she offers virtually nothing.

Nato seeks agreement to the grant of genuine freedom of movement of people and ideas between East and West. These demands the Russians regard as interference in their internal affairs. The concessions they have so far offered are paltry, for the fact is that such freedom would undermine and destroy their authoritarian régime.

Russia wants an early Summit as a propaganda platform marking the

conclusion of CSCE. The Allies need no summit and the Russian demand should be resisted unless the West's demands on freedom of movement are fully met.

Against the background of the nuclear balance of terror, local interests as in Korea and Vietnam are often overridden by factors affecting super-Power relationships. All lesser Powers should remember that "when elephants make love (or war) grass gets trampled."

BALTIMORE SUN
1 May 1975

Ho Chi Minh's successors

The Communist leaders of North Vietnam rank as some of the most singularly dedicated men of the Twentieth Century.

For 50 years, they have been struggling for an independent, socialist Vietnam. They have fought the French, the Japanese, the French again, the Americans and finally the Saigon government. Their dedication, the key to their success, has led some outsiders, unable to understand it, to call them fanatics. But Hanoi's leaders are simply men who see limited value in compromise when they are certain that ultimate victory will be theirs.

The men at the top in Hanoi now have differed among themselves, sometimes seriously, on various policies and tactics in the 20 years they have been in power, but there have been no substantial differences on long-term goals.

The current Hanoi leadership is made up of the top aides of the late Ho Chi Minh, the legendary Vietnamese revolutionary who died five years ago.

To the outside world, it seems to be a gray directorate, without color or personality, a ruling collegium without a star.

This is deliberate, the result of submerging the quite different personalities, outlooks and approaches of the top members of the leadership for the sake of unity. Beneath the surface, there are undoubted tensions and conflicts, but the unity of purpose is far stronger than these.

The first among equals in Hanoi for more than four years now has been Le Duan, the 67-year-old first secretary of the Lao Dong (Workers) party since 1960.

Born in what is now South Vietnam, Le Duan led the Viet Minh struggle against the French in southern Vietnam in the late 1940's and early 1950's and founded what grew into the Viet Cong, the Communist-led underground

movement against the Saigon government.

He has the reputation of a pragmatist, a man who has avoided doctrinaire positions and not hesitated to push for policy changes to cope with new situations.

Mr. Duan, for example, was long identified with the "big war" theory that led to the costly 1968 Tet offensive. When that failed to produce "victory in a relatively short time" as expected, Mr. Duan won support for a "North first" policy that waited out the American withdrawal with "protracted war" and a lower level of fighting.

Similarly, he has argued that material incentives are necessary to speed industrialization in North Vietnam, and has acknowledged that private plots for the collectivized farmers are a vital element in the country's food production, even suggesting that they should be increased somewhat.

Since the death of Ho Chi Minh in the autumn of 1969, Mr. Duan has consolidated his position within the leadership, outmaneuvering his principal rival, Truong Chinh, the chairman of the National Assembly and generally ranked as No. 2 in Hanoi's political hierarchy.

When Mr. Duan was supporting the "big war" theory, Mr. Chinh was supporting that of "protracted warfare," arguing that victory inevitably would come, whether in 5, 10 or 15 years, and that greater stress should be laid on the political rather than the military aspect of the struggle.

While Mr. Duan has argued for emphasis on industrialization in the country's future economic development, Mr. Chinh has pushed development on the basis of the country's agriculture.

Michael Parks, chief of The Sun's Moscow Bureau, covered Southeast Asia from 1970 to 1972. He visited Hanoi early in 1974. Here are his reports on the Hanoi leadership and the leadership of the Viet Cong.

Le Duan is closely identified with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet struggle and Truong Chinh (whose adopted name means Long March, referring to the struggle of the Chinese Communists) is even more closely identified with China.

Mr. Duan's views have generally predominated in the compromises worked out by the collective leadership in Hanoi on these and other disputes as it has dealt with specific issues.

Neither man has pushed the leadership to adopt his position in toto, according to authoritative North Vietnamese sources, and the ruling political bureau of the Lao Dong party much prefers to deal with specific issues, rather than engage in broader, philosophical discussions.

Mr. Chinh, who is the same age as Mr. Duan, is the party's chief ideologist as well as chairman of the National Assembly. He has developed a reputation as a militant hardliner on most issues because of this, with insistent calls for a purity of ideology.

Round-faced and balding, Mr. Chinh was responsible for the country's bloody agrarian reforms in the mid-1950's. In trying to establish Chinese-style collectivization of peasants, he ordered mass evictions from their traditional farmlands and the execution of thousands of landlords, often just marginally wealthier peasants.

In the end, the scheme was radically modified, and Mr. Chinh was dismissed as the Lao Dong party's general secretary, confessing to "serious mistakes" and "leftist deviationism."

He undoubtedly was the most hated man in North Vietnam then, and Ho himself said it would take years to undo the damage Truong Chinh had done to the cause of socialism in the North.

But always a scambler, Mr. Chinh clawed his way back to the top as chairman of the National Assembly's

Standing Committee, one of the top jobs in the government.

"He is as tough as they come," says an East European diplomat who knew him 30 years ago when he was in exile in China. "He is what Americans would call a real street fighter."

The man who moderates these top-level disputes is believed by diplomats in Hanoi and Western analysts to be Premier Pham Van Dong, also 67, who runs the country on a day-to-day basis.

Ho called Premier Dong "my other self," and among ordinary North Vietnamese he is still regarded as "the best nephew" of "Uncle Ho."

Mr. Dong met Ho while exiled in China in 1925 for revolutionary activity against the French. Ho sent him back to organize an underground Communist movement in the Hanoi region; the French jailed him for seven years, but the prison term only confirmed his commitment to revolution.

Mr. Dong worked for several years in Hanoi, took part in a Communist-led uprising in 1939 against the French and, when it failed, fled to China with other Communist party members.

When President Ho proclaimed Vietnam's independence in 1945 and named the first Viet Minh government, Mr. Dong was the finance minister. Ten years later, after an impressive performance as head of the Viet Minh delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference ending the first Indochina war, he was named prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Premier Dong is known as an extremely sensitive man for whom the prolonged fighting in Vietnam and the prospect of a truly civil war between Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese was a great personal burden.

"Every morning I think," he told a diplomat in Hanoi last year, "Here begins another day when Vietnamese will kill other Vietnamese, and for what? There must be a better way."

Premier Dong has tried to steer a careful course through the Sino-Soviet dispute and the ideological controversies that have embroiled others in the leadership, but he has become known in international Communist circles as pro-Soviet.

The fourth top aide that President Ho left in the ruling collegium is Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, 63, the architect of the Viet Minh victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

General Giap, a deputy premier and defense minister, has been little seen in the past three or four years. Persistent reports, some from Moscow and others from Hanoi, have said he is suffering from cancer, possibly Hodgkins disease, which attacks the lymphatic system.

But Soviet sources in Moscow said he recently attended a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi and looked well; his voice, they said, was once again strong and resonant, and he appeared to be far stronger than a year ago when he attended ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of the Dien Bien Phu victory.

General Giap's political standing is also unclear. He appeared to have been shunted aside four years ago as the undisputed military planner and strategist, with Le Duan and other politicians playing a bigger role.

General Giap was blamed for poor planning in the fail-

ure of the 1968 Tet offensive, and Communist sources report he has been the victim of a whispering campaign in Hanoi for more than five years.

Some American analysts have pronounced the Communist victories in the South to be General Giap's handiwork, but they are more likely the result of a strategy devised by the political leadership, which was carried out by the Army, and, of course, the general collapse of the Saigon Army.

The second rank of North Vietnam's leaders includes General Giap's de facto successor, Gen. Van Tien Dung, who is chief of the North Vietnamese general staff and was elected to the party's Politburo in 1972. He is 58 years old and is known for his mastery of planning and technical detail, rather than as a strategist like General Giap.

The other second-rank leaders include Le Thanh Nghi, a deputy premier who has been put in charge of rebuilding North Vietnam's economy; Le Duc Tho, the party secretary who negotiated the 1972 Paris agreement, and Nguyen Duy Trinh, the foreign minister.

Almost all these men, however, were born between the relatively short period of 1905 and 1912, and Hanoi has been putting off the problem of rejuvenating its leadership until the struggle in the South was completed—or old age and poor health made it essential.

One younger official who has been moving up rapidly in the last five years has been Do Muoi, a member of the party's policy-making Central Committee who has been working as Mr. Nghi's deputy for heavy industry, and now is a vice premier as well.

The president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is Ton Duc Thang, 86, infirm but re-elected to another term recently. He succeeded President Ho in 1969.

A Southerner by birth, Mr. Thang was a fiery nationalist in his youth, helped lead a Communist mutiny on a French warship in the Black Sea to put down the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and later worked to get non-Communist support for the Viet Minh struggle against the French.

President Thang's re-election indicated that Hanoi was, five years after Ho's death, still not willing to tackle the problem of naming a single successor and plans to stick to its collegial rule.

The North Vietnamese leadership, despite Communist victories in the South, still face considerable problems:

A program to consolidate their victories in the South, establishing a new political, social and economic order there; the task of reconstructing the North's still war-shattered economy and choosing a course of economic development allowing for both industrial and agricultural

growth; reorientation of the party to deal with the changed situation and the selection of a new generation of leaders, and continued preservation of Vietnam's interests in the crossfire of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

All North Vietnam's present and likely future leaders are as much nationalists as Communists, far more interested in establishing socialist rule in an independent and unified Vietnam than in the international Communist movement and world revolution.

This philosophy will doubtless continue to serve as a uniting force among the various factions in Hanoi, and the top leaders continue to warn against any deviation from this principle.

"Certainly there are family squabbles, disagreements over individual questions," said a Communist diplomat with long service in Hanoi, but the personality conflicts and the philosophic differences have not led and will not lead to any factional feuding, purges, ideological schisms or the like.

"Victory in the South may release a great deal of the pressure for unity, and that will bring out more disagreements. But the forces that have kept these men together and pursuing the same goal so long will not let them relax now."

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

Text of Saigon Reds' Policy Statement

Special to The New York Times
PARIS, April 30—Following is the text of a statement made today on behalf of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and issued in translation by its representative in Paris, Dinh Ba Thi.

The long war of resistance of the Vietnamese people against the American aggression for its independence and its freedom has just ended victoriously. The population of the People's Liberation Armed Forces of South Vietnam, supported and staunchly helped by their brothers in the North, have brought the uprising and attacks against the war repressive machine set up by the U.S. in South Vietnam to a successful end.

The capital of South Vietnam, Saigon, was liberated. The U.S. aggressors were compelled to pull out. The puppet administration in Saigon as a whole, which is a tool of the U.S. neocolonialist policy,

has fully collapsed. This is a complete bankruptcy of the strategy of neocolonialist aggression carried out by the U.S. for more than a decade.

Henceforth, South Vietnam is free and independent. The sacred testament of our beloved President Ho Chi Minh is realized. This is a victory of historic significance for the South Vietnamese population and for the Vietnamese nation as a whole. It is at the same time a just victory of the cause of peace, national independence and justice of the peoples over the world.

In this eventful day, I want to reaffirm that the policy of the P.R.G. has always been and will be a policy of great union and national concord. Yesterday, the P.R.G. rallied with this policy all strata of the population with a view to achieving the struggle of the population for its legitimate aspirations for peace, independence, democracy and na-

tional concord.

Foreigners Protected

Today and tomorrow, it will mobilize with this policy all forces in order to build, in recovered peace, a peaceful, independent, democratic, neutral and prosperous South Vietnam and to progress toward peaceful reunification of Vietnam.

This policy of great union and national concord of the P.R.G. specially aims at erasing hatred and divisions and offering a place and a role to all inhabitants irrespective of their past in the tremendous task of reconstruction and building.

With regard to foreigners present in South Vietnam, according to the 10-point policy of the P.R.G., their lives and property are protected but they are asked to respect the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam and to observe the policies of the revolutionary power.

In international affairs, South Vietnam will carry out a foreign policy of peace and nonalignment. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached.

Allow me, in the name of the P.R.G. and the people of South Vietnam, to express our warm thanks to all socialist countries of national independence and all peace and justice-loving peoples, including the American people who have supported and just struggle.

The victory gained today is also theirs. We are convinced that they will continue to support and help our people in the building and reconstruction of our country.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

Thieu Aide Discloses Promises Of Force by Nixon to Back Pact

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 30—A former Saigon Cabinet official made public today letters from President Richard M. Nixon that promised the Saigon Government in 1972 and 1973 that the United States would "take swift and severe retaliatory action" and would "respond with full force" if North Vietnam violated the Paris cease-fire accords.

This was the first disclosure of any of the correspondence between Mr. Nixon and former President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam.

The contents of the letters made public by Nguyen Tien Hung, former Minister of Planning, seemed more specific about the possible use of American retaliatory military force than the White House indicated initially earlier this month when the matter of "secret assurances" to Saigon first became an issue.

Coincidental with Mr. Hung's disclosures, at a crowded news conference in the Mayflower Hotel, President Ford formally refused to give Congress copies of the Nixon-Thieu correspondence on the ground of diplomatic confidentiality.

Mr. Ford was asked by Senator John J. Sparkman, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to supply the documents after Senator Henry M. Jackson charged that "secret agreements" had been made by the Nixon Administration.

The White House, which said the documents appeared authentic, asserted as it has all this month that no secret agreements had been made and that any assurances by Mr. Nixon did not differ in substance from what Mr. Nixon and others were saying publicly at the time.

"I've read them and I'm convinced that what we said at the time holds today," Ron Nessen, the White House press secretary, said, "at the time" meaning earlier this month. "Nothing that was said to Thieu privately differs in sub-

stance from what was said publicly."

Mr. Nessen seemed annoyed by the newsmen's fascination with the documents and their speculation whether confidential assurances were made that were not known to the public. He asked, "Why are toying with semantics at this late date?"

But the disclosures indicated that Mr. Nixon, in an effort to enlist Mr. Thieu's support for the Paris cease-fire accords being negotiated in the last three months of 1972 and in January, 1973, brought strong pressure to bear on Saigon and made far-reaching promises not disclosed to Congress or the American public at the time.

Mr. Hung, who is 40 years old and has a University of Virginia doctorate in economics, released the texts of letters from Mr. Nixon to Mr. Thieu, on White House stationery, dated Nov. 14, 1972, and Jan. 5, 1973. He also quoted from letters but did not provide their full texts. Those letters were dated Jan. 17 and Jan. 20, 1973.

He told the newsmen that he had had the letters in his possession for "some time," and had them when he came to this country two weeks ago on an aid mission. Mr. Hung said he was making the letters public without Mr. Thieu's knowledge "at the dictates of my conscience."

"It is my deep conviction that my discussion with you today is not only in the interest of the people of Vietnam, but in the long run, it is very much in the interest of the people of America," he said in a statement he had typed out beforehand, "for there cannot be the future without the past and present."

"The credibility of America in the future, which on occasions will be the decisive factor in matters of war and peace, will have to be taken seriously if American foreign policy is to be effective," he said.

The Nixon letters were written against a background of strong doubts and skepticisms expressed by Mr. Thieu to Henry A. Kissinger, at the time serving as Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, about the terms of the cease-fire accords,

then being negotiated in Paris by Mr. Kissinger with Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's representative.

What Worried Thieu

Mr. Thieu was particularly worried about the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam and the lack of guarantees that the accord would be enforced. The Paris talks were to resume on Nov. 20, and Mr. Nixon, on Nov. 14, 1972, wrote to Mr. Thieu, urging him not to worry about particular points in the agreement.

"But far more important than what we say in the agreement of this issue—the presence of the North Vietnamese troops—is what we do in the event the enemy renews its aggression," Mr. Nixon wrote. "You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action."

"Above all," Mr. Nixon wrote, "we must bear in mind what will really maintain the agreement."

"I repeat my personal assurances to you," he went on, "that the United States will react very strongly and rapidly to any violation of the agreement."

Mr. Nixon warned, however, that to be able to do this effectively, "it is essential that I have public support and that your government does not emerge as the obstacle to a peace which American public opinion now universally desires."

The Jan. 5, 1973, letter was written shortly after the end of the heavy American Christmas bombing of Hanoi, which followed a breakdown in December in the Kissinger-Tho talks. The negotiations resumed Jan. 8.

Mr. Nixon's tone was tougher toward Mr. Thieu, but included again a promise of retaliation.

Mr. Nixon again rejected Mr. Thieu's concern about North Vietnamese troops on his territory and warned of "the gravest consequences" if Mr. Thieu's government "chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States."

Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the postwar settlement period and that we will

respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam," Mr. Nixon wrote.

"Full force," Mr. Hung said, was interpreted by high Saigon officials as meaning actions similar to the heavy bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong harbor in May, 1972, and the Christmas bombing.

On Jan. 17, Mr. Hung said, Mr. Nixon sent a letter in which he promised to send Vice President Spiro T. Agnew to Saigon after the signing, to reaffirm, publicly, American guarantees. Mr. Agnew went, but his trip was little publicized. In that letter, Mr. Nixon also repeated his assurances that Mr. Thieu had little to worry about from North Vietnamese forces.

On Jan. 20, when the negotiations were virtually over, Mr. Nixon sent what Mr. Hung characterized as "an ultimatum" to Mr. Thieu: "As I have told you, we will initial the agreement on January 23. I must know now whether you are prepared to join us on this course, and I must have your answer by 1200 Washington time, January 21, 1973."

"The pressures, together with the assurances," said Mr. Hung today, "successfully forced President Thieu to agree to sign the agreement on Jan. 27, 1973." Mr. Hung was a personal assistant to Mr. Thieu in 1973.

Mr. Nixon's first public threat to use force against Hanoi came in his news conference of March 15, 1973. Alarmed by reports of stepped-up North Vietnamese infiltration into the south beyond the rate allowed in the accords, Mr. Nixon said:

"We have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and of what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire. I would only suggest that based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expression of concern, when they are made, with regard to a violation. That is all I will say about it."

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

Texts of Letters Made Public by an Ex-Saigon Official

WASHINGTON, April 30—Following are the texts of letters made public here today by Nguyen Tien Hung, former Minister of Planning in Saigon, who said they were sent by President Richard M. Nixon to President Nguyen Van Thieu before the Paris cease-fire agreements.

First Letter

November 14, 1972

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to learn from General Haig that you held useful and constructive discussions with him in Saigon in preparation for Dr. Kissinger's forthcoming meeting with North Vietnam's negotiators in Paris.

After studying your letter of November 11 with great care I have concluded that we have made substantial progress towards reaching a common understanding on many of the important issues before us. You can be sure that we will pursue the proposed changes in the draft agreement that General Haig discussed with you with the utmost firmness and that, as these discussions proceed, we shall keep you fully informed through your Ambassador to the Paris conference on Vietnam who will be briefed daily by Dr. Kissinger.

I understand from your letter and from General Haig's personal report that your principal remaining concern with respect to the draft agreement is the status of North Vietnamese forces now in South Vietnam. As General Haig explained to you, it is our intention to deal with this problem first by seeking to insert a reference to respect for the demilitarized zone in the proposed agreement and, second, by proposing a clause which provides for the reduction and demobilization of forces on both sides in South Vietnam on a one-to-one basis and to have demobilized personnel return to their homes.

Extra Clauses Proposed

Upon reviewing this proposed language, it is my conviction that such a provision can go a long way toward dealing with your concern with respect to North Vietnamese forces. General Haig tells me, however, that you are also seriously concerned about the timing and verification of such reductions. In light of this, I have asked Dr. Kissinger to convey to you, through Ambassador Bunker, some additional clauses we would propose adding to the agreement dealing with each of these points. In addition, I have asked that Dr. Kissinger send you the other technical and less important substantive

changes which General Haig did not have the opportunity to discuss with you because they had not yet been fully developed in Washington. With these proposed modifications, I think you will agree that we have done everything we can to improve the existing draft while remaining within its general framework.

You also raise in your letter the question of participation by other Asian countries in the international conference. As you know, the presently contemplated composition are the permanent of the I.C.C.S., the parties to the Paris conference on Vietnam, and the Secretary General of the United Nations. We seriously considered Cambodian and Laotian participation but decided that these would be unnecessary complications with respect to representation. We do not, however, exclude the possibility of delegations from these countries participating in an observer status at the invitation of the conference.

As for Japan, this question was raised earlier in our negotiations with Hanoi and set aside because of their strenuous objections to any Japanese role in guaranteeing the settlement and also because it inevitably raises the possibility of Indian participation. I have, however, asked that Dr. Kissinger raise this matter again in Paris and he will inform your representative what progress we make on this. What we must recognize as a practical matter is that participation of Japan is very likely to lead to the participation of India. We would appreciate hearing your preference on whether it is better to include both countries or neither of them.

Make-Up of Control Unit

Finally, in respect to the composition of the I.C.C.S. I must say in all candor that I do not share your view that its contemplated membership is unbalanced. I am hopeful that it will prove to be a useful mechanism in detecting and reporting violations of the agreement. In any event, what we both must recognize is that the supervisory mechanism in itself is in no measure as important as our own firm determination to see to it that the agreement works and our vigilance with respect to the prospect of its violation.

I will not repeat here all that I said to you in my letter of Nov. 8, but I do wish to reaffirm its essential content and stress again my determination to work toward an early agreement along the lines of the schedule which General Haig explained to you. I must explain in all frankness that

while we will do our very best to secure the changes in the agreement which General Haig discussed with you and those additional ones which Ambassador Bunker will bring you, we cannot expect to secure them all. For example, it is unrealistic to assume that we will be able to secure the absolute assurances which you would hope to have on the troop issue.

But far more important than what we say in the agreement on this issue is what we do in the event the enemy renews its aggression. You have my absolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action.

I believe the existing agreement to be an essentially sound one which should become even more so if we succeed in obtaining some of the changes we have discussed. Our best assurance of success is to move into this new situation with confidence and cooperation.

With this attitude and the inherent strength of your government and army on the ground in South Vietnam, I am confident this agreement will be a successful one.

Nixon Stresses Urgency

If, on the other hand, we are unable to agree on the course that I have outlined, it is difficult for me to see how we will be able to continue our common effort towards securing a just and honorable peace. As General Haig told you I would with great reluctance be forced to consider other alternatives. For this reason, it is essential that we have your agreement as we proceed into our next meeting with Hanoi's negotiators. And I strongly urge you and your advisers to work promptly with Ambassador Bunker and our mission in Saigon on the many practical problems which will face us in implementing the agreement. I cannot overemphasize the urgency of the task at hand nor my unalterable determination to proceed along the course which we have outlined.

Above all we must bear in mind what will really maintain the agreement. It is not any particular clause in the agreement but our joint willingness to maintain its clauses. I repeat my personal assurances to you that the United States will react very strongly and rapidly to any violation of the agreement. But in order to do this effectively it is essential that I have public support and that your government does not emerge as the obstacle to a peace which

American public opinion now universally desires. It is for this reason that I am pressing for the acceptance of an agreement which I am convinced is honorable and fair and which can be made essentially secure by our joint determination.

Mrs. Nixon joins me in extending our warmest personal regards to Madame Thieu and to you. We look forward to seeing you again at our home in California once the just peace we have both fought for so long is finally achieved.

Sincerely,
Richard Nixon

His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of
Vietnam
Saigon.

Second Letter

January 5, 1973

Dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 20, 1972.

There is nothing substantial that I can add to my many previous messages, including my December 17 letter, which clearly stated my opinions and intentions. With respect to the question of North Vietnamese troops, we will again present your views to the Communists as we have done vigorously at every other opportunity in the negotiations. The result is certain to be once more the rejection of our position. We have explained to you repeatedly why we believe the problem of North Vietnamese troops is manageable under the agreement, and I see no reason to repeat all the arguments.

We will proceed next week in Paris along the lines that General Haig explained to you. Accordingly, if the North Vietnamese meet our concerns on the two outstanding substantive issues in the agreement, concerning the DMZ and the method of signing and if we can arrange acceptable supervisory machinery, we will proceed to conclude the settlement. The gravest consequence would then ensue if your government chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States. As I said in my December 17 letter, "I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster—to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative."

As we enter this new round of talks, I hope that our countries will now show a united front. It is imperative for our common objectives that your Government take

no further actions that complicate our task and would make more difficult the acceptance of the settlement by all parties. We will keep you informed of the negotiations in Paris through daily briefings of Ambassador Lam. I can only repeat what I have so often said: The best

guarantee for the survival of South Vietnam is the unity of our two countries which would be gravely jeopardized if you persist in your present course. The actions of our Congress since its return have clearly borne out the many warnings we have made.

Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam. So once more I conclude with an appeal to

you to close ranks with us.
Sincerely,
RICHARD NIXON
His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of
Vietnam
Saigon.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 MAY 1975

Communist capitals cheer fall of Saigon; other reaction mixed

Compiled from dispatches around the world

Moscow and Peking are cheering the fall of Saigon, but the Russians are being restrained in what they say about the United States.

In East and Southeast Asia there is a tendency to come to terms promptly with the new situation in Indo-China.

Thailand will recognize the new government in South Vietnam, Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan said.

Thailand has already recognized the Royal National Union government of Cambodia and hopes to establish contacts with North Vietnam.

The Indian Parliament greeted the Communist-led victory in Vietnam with cheers and applause.

But there was no formal government reaction. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is in Jamaica for the Commonwealth summit conference.

Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo welcomed the end of the fighting and expressed the hope that both sides would come to an understanding so that the Vietnamese could live in peace again.

Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa said Saigon's decision to surrender was a wise one if it averted large-scale bloodshed.

Japan would consider recognizing a new administration in South Vietnam if it was found to have secured effective control of the country, he said.

South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo said the lesson of the communist take-over in Cambodia and Vietnam was that nations should be strong and self-reliant.

"We could see in Phnom Penh, in Saigon, that without having any strength there are no negotiations, no compromise, only surrender," Mr. Kim said.

In Peking, Vietnamese and communist diplomats danced and sang to the stutter of firecrackers as news came in of Saigon's surrender.

Dark-suited officials of Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) rushed into the courtyard of their embassy shouting the news. Soon the street outside was full of communist envoys singing and chanting.

Albanian diplomats embraced the Vietnam-

ese. Even the usually dour Chinese Embassy guards put down their guns and began to clap.

There was no immediate reaction to the latest developments from the Chinese Government except for an official statement congratulating the Viet Cong on their victory.

In Moscow, the Soviet news agency Tass in its first commentary on the communist-led victory in Vietnam said: "The struggle that lasted for nearly 30 years has been crowned with success.

World comment, Tass continued, viewed the victory as "quite logical" and saw "the fall of the rotten puppet regime in Saigon [as] inevitable."

The Tass commentary itself mentioned the United States only obliquely, referring to the "utter bankruptcy of the policy aimed at maintaining anti-popular dictatorial regimes." It quoted the PRG representative in Paris, however, on "the inevitability of the downfall of the Saigon administration and U.S. neocolonialist regime in South Vietnam."

In London, editorial reaction to the total collapse and surrender of the South Vietnamese ranged from despondency in right-wing publications to celebration on the Left.

The conservative Daily Telegraph's editorial said, "It is world communism's biggest victory, the free world's biggest defeat. Every country in Asia is now making its adjustments.

"What about European members of NATO? Can they go on as if nothing has happened?"

The liberal Guardian said that the Vietnamese "need no longer fear the mortars in the woods or the gunships in the sky and can begin to nurse their tortured country back to health."

In Israel the afternoon newspaper Yediot Aharonot said the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia recalled the Nazi victories in Europe in the 1930s.

"Has the West learned anything from history, from their sell-out of Czechoslovakia while the Nazis advanced?" the paper asked.

Arab commentators saw the loss of South Vietnam as a permanent strategic defeat for the United States. Many columnists in Beirut, Lebanon, predicted the United States would try to compensate in the Middle East for lost influence in Southeast Asia.

WASHINGTON POST
30 April 1975

Kenneth Crawford

'The Dominoes Are in Fact Falling'

The domino theory, we have long been assured, is nonsense — merely a subterfuge for adventuring in Indochina. If that is so, what is happening in Thailand, the Philippines and Laos must be illusory. For those three countries already seem to be tumbling out of the free-world orbit into the authoritarian socialist orbit.

Unless President Marcos of the Philippines doesn't mean what he is saying, his country is leaning hard to the left out of the perceived necessity of getting on with China and its friends. In Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao controls three quarters of the country and is about to take over the other quarter. And the Thais, always sensitive to the political wind and given to bending with it, are preparing to adjust to the reality of gusts from Hanoi and Peking. Less overt stirrings are detectable in other Asian countries.

On the other side of the world, in Portugal, there is no direct evidence as yet that the debacle in Vietnam and Cambodia has had any effect. But if the United States is deprived of its base in the Azores and the Soviet

The writer is a former columnist for Newsweek.

navy moves into Portuguese ports, it will not be because the Portuguese have overlooked events in the Far East.

There can be no doubt that American prestige is taking a beating around the world — and at a time when interdependence of nations is more than ever a fact of life for all the earth's inhabitants.

It may not make much difference to us that our defeat is contributing to the entertainment of our French allies. Vietnam has proved to them that the Yanks, for all their pretensions, are no more gallant than anybody else, notably the French, when it comes to the crunch. India, judging from the comments of some of its officials, also is pleased by America's discomfiture. We haven't done anything much for the Indians lately.

Up to now Soviet officials have been more restrained than the rest of the world in their talk, or lack of it, about

Vietnam. Russia has not celebrated its share in the victory, presumably out of deference for detente. But it has approached Israel with a proposition: if Israel will withdraw to its old frontiers its security will be guaranteed by the U.S.S.R. The implication is that America has proved itself unreliable and that Israel should look to a reliable nation for security.

We are hearing much these days from those who knew all along that we were playing a losing hand in Vietnam and Cambodia. They told us so. They did indeed. Some of the same people are less talkative about their certainty that the other dominoes would be unaffected. The dominoes are in fact falling and the end is not yet in sight. The clatter is no illusion.

Nobody can now foresee the ultimate consequences of America's humiliation. President Ford can admonish the country and the world to forget Vietnam and look to the future. Others can join him, as they already are. It will be futile. Public memory is short but it is not that short. Losing a war is never less than a traumatic experience. And we have no de Gaulle to restore national pride by glorious posturing. It wouldn't work here anyway.

For the moment the American public seems to feel nothing but relief at getting Vietnam off its back. More than 80 per cent, according to the pollsters, opposed even the use of marines to evacuate this country's close Vietnamese friends from Saigon. It is difficult to believe that such indifference will last. It won't if a wholesale purge of friends left behind takes place and if news of it leaks out. We are not that callous.

That there will be a spate of executions seems inevitable. When Hue fell in the offensive previous to the last one, some 3,000 bodies of local officials, teachers, intellectuals and others who had sided with Saigon were found in mass graves, bound and shot. It was estimated that a total of 5,000 or more had been dealt with in that way. An invader that does this in relatively neutral Hue is not likely to control himself when he reaches the enemy citadel of Saigon. With Western reporters out of the country, however, the outside world may never know Saigon's true fate.

This country's present complacency is encouraged by many in the media.

We are told, though the returns are not yet in, that North Vietnam will now establish a regime of Titoist independence from its Communist benefactors. By playing off China against the Soviet Union it perhaps can achieve this status. But with China on its northern frontier, this is highly problematical.

We are asked to believe by a journalistic commentator doing a television stint that the Indochina misadventure proves the folly of war any time anywhere. War, he says never in the history of the world accomplished anything. Not even the war against Hitlerism? Well, maybe. But in that war a lot of unnecessary battles were fought. So they may have been. But it takes an arm-chair amateur 30 years later to muster the gall to redo that history.

Then there is the expert on Vietnam, credentials in good order, who writes in a national news magazine: "Our Vietnam was dying, a corrupt, feudal society; theirs, like it or not, was a new, modern society born of the colonial war with the French." So Communist dictatorship represents "modern society." It is reminiscent of the Lindberghian thesis that, like it or not, Nazism was "the wave of the future."

Not many Americans chose to ride that wave. Dictatorial communism has more appeal, especially as the answer for backward countries trying to modernize. Moreover, many Americans can tell themselves that they never approved of the war in Vietnam or, if they did, were tricked into it along with ex-Sen. William Fulbright. They accept no responsibility for the outcome. But the world sees only what the United States did, and didn't do; it makes no distinction between approvers and disapprovers within this country.

A minority of Americans, growing in assertiveness and perhaps also in numbers, proudly professes sympathy with Hanoi and the Vietcong. One of its self-appointed spokesmen interrupts the Oscar awards to state his partisanship for the Vietcong to the applause of a Hollywood audience. Both he and his audience are, of course, free to embrace this kind of modern copperheadism. It is an attitude not unknown even in Congress.

It is becoming apparent that on the far left there are those who hope that the United States itself will be the ultimate domino.

NEW YORK TIMES
26 April 1975

New Slogan in Hanoi: 'Everything for the South'

Le Monde, Paris

HANOI, North Vietnam, April 25—"Everything for the South": That is the new slogan in North Vietnam.

Until now it was a question of "freeing the South and strengthening the North." Now that formula is outdated.

The people of North Vietnam are being told that the end of the war is not going to mean abundance, but rather hard work—even more than before—to develop the North and help lay the foundation for the new regime in the South.

A few days ago a crowd formed on the great square in front of the national bank. The loudspeakers worked well and people came by the thousands to listen to the singers, accompanied by accordion and violin.

"Clearly amateurs," a Viet-

namese commented. "And for a good reason—all the professional groups have left for the South."

Hanoi is becoming empty of officials, professors, doctors, all kinds of professionals. Bank notes in the currency used in the North are being sent beyond the 17th parallel to replace Saigon's open-devalued piaster, or what remains of it.

With transportation obviously limited, it would be an exaggeration to speak of an air link between Hanoi and Da Nang and other southern cities, but there is constant traffic, and also a tie between Haiphong and "the newly liberated provinces" by way of the sea.

Is that to say that after having sent its armies, the North, thanks to its organization and material assistance, is conquering the

South? The North Vietnamese say that is not really what has been going on. According to them, the division of Vietnam was never measured by the 17th Parallel but rather by political and cultural attitudes of Vietnamese in general.

Those in the South, they add, were never considered South Vietnamese but supporters of a liberating cause that was shared by Hanoi. It is also evident for those under the jurisdiction of areas administered by the Provisional Revolutionary Government that Hanoi's soldiers are numerous but that they are not considered by the local revolutionaries to be "North Vietnamese."

Besides, the army of North Vietnam intervened in strength when the Americans sent their expeditionary force. It was also necessary

to fill the great gaps among the troops and in the political networks when the "pacification" campaigns killed tens of thousands of rebels.

The free circulation between North and South today also permits reunions between family members. A great number of South Vietnamese left for the North in 1954, in accordance with the Geneva agreements. Today thousands of Saigonese have parents in Hanoi, and in the North's capital also live Vietnamese originally from the country's center who are now going to look for their own.

"I am going to Da Nang tomorrow," an official said. "My mother lives in Saigon. I have received no news. My village was located 12 miles from Da Nang. I know it has been demolished. Will I find the tree, once planted there?"

WASHINGTON STAR
24 April 1975

CROSBY S. NOYES

Why Aren't They Out Dancing in the Streets?

When it comes to Vietnam, it certainly is not a question of who's to blame. It is very much more a question of who won.

I can identify the losers easily enough. They include some 18 million South Vietnamese, along with the men who emerged as their leaders over the last 20 years. They include a large number of Americans, several million who fought in South Vietnam and some 55,000 who died there. They include many of us who have believed that helping a small country defend its freedom was neither an ignoble nor an impossible thing to do.

The winners, of course, are the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Presumably, at this point they are all at least figuratively dancing in the streets. And it is something of a wonder that a large number of Americans—including many members of Congress and some of my respected colleagues in the press—are not out dancing with them.

There is, to be sure, some exultation in what is euphemistically known as the "anti-war" ranks. The director of one conspicuously pro-Communist "documentary" had the courage to hail the liberation of South Vietnam as he accepted an Oscar for his propagandistic achievements. But the rest of our anti-war propagandists have fallen strangely silent as the legions of Hanoi move in for the kill.

Not, perhaps, in a practical sense. When it comes to voting for money to supply arms and ammunition to the people that we ourselves have been fighting for, the Congress is totally obdurate. We are, at long last, saving the South Vietnamese from themselves by delivering them over to their deadliest enemies. Even when it comes to the relatively small amount of money that it would take

to save the lives of those in greatest peril from a Communist takeover, the answer seems to be a hard and final "no."

Yet it seems to me that there is in all this a singular lack of exultation and triumph among those who have worked tirelessly for the result in Vietnam that now seems certain. For if one can argue that the conflict there was a civil war from the beginning, it also quite certainly became one in this country, with large and ever-growing numbers of Americans consciously and explicitly committed to the defeat of policies pursued by the government of the United States.

It may be, as these critics never tire of telling us, that these policies were wrong and doomed to defeat from the outset. We are told that the side we were backing—the 18 million people who threw in their lot with us—were products of a decadent and corrupted society and that all virtue and valor were on the side of the Communist liberators. We may even come to believe it.

Yet even so, it is puzzling that the Americans who have worked and presumably prayed for this famous triumph of virtue over error and corruption are not celebrating their victory with more enthusiasm. For without them, it is quite certain that what is taking place would not have happened. And they most certainly deserve a major share of the credit for the victory that will soon be celebrated in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.

Surely, they cannot be worried about the possible consequences of their victory. By the time the Communists take over in Saigon, there will be no American reporters and TV crews around to record the unpleasantness that will follow. And the very large American role in the defeat of South Vietnam will be quickly and conveniently forgotten.

WASHINGTON STAR
30 April 1975

A Pentagon View: War Fought With One Hand Tied

By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.
Washington Star Staff Writer

It was a war they were ordered to fight but not "allowed" to win, many military men feel, and with the fall of South Vietnam the resentment and some bitterness is again rising.

"There is disappointment, deep disappointment," says one Pentagon general. "But only in a few cases is it actual bitterness," he maintained.

"I believe most of us who've been through that period would not say we've been stabbed in the back," he continued.

Some time around the turn of the century the last Vietnam veteran will leave the U. S. armed forces. But for the time being and for years to come the officer corps will be heavily weighted with those for whom Vietnam was a personal experience.

BY THE FALL of 1972, the last year of substantial U. S. military involvement in Vietnam, 91.5 percent of all Army lieutenant colonels, for instance, had served in Vietnam. For the rank of major the figure was 84 percent and for captains, 78 percent.

Thus, the war provided enormous amounts of combat experience along with a sophistication in the use of helicopters unmatched anywhere and advances in communications, electronic warfare and logistics.

But the most often repeated lesson of the war is, as one high-ranking officer put it last week: "By God, if you're going to fight a war you ought to fight it right."

The source of the frustration was the restraints placed on conduct of the war by the civilians who ran it.

"I DON'T THINK there were any military lessons learned as far as basic principles were concerned," says Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But he maintains that nearly all those principles were violated. "All of the restraints were imposed because of the political aspects," says Moorer, who believes the lesson of the war is: "You can't ignore experience and you can't ignore military judgment."

Many military men feel such restrictions as those on bombing North Vietnam, mining harbors and attacks

WASHINGTON POST
19 April 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Vietnam: Autopsy of the Collapse

"It was not a lack of courage, patriotism or even training on the part of the soldiers, but notoriously poor generalship which steadily weakened under pressure of diminishing U.S. aid."

An autopsy of the collapse of South Vietnam performed at a high level here points less to the widely presumed culprit, President Nguyen Van Thieu, and far more to a single command blunder in the field which combined with slumping U.S. military aid to produce irreversible tragedy.

The autopsy was performed not by Saigon embassy staffers closely associated with Thieu but by Washington-based officials not at all interested in his reputation who visited Vietnam after

the collapse. Their story, cross-checked for accuracy and fully substantiated, helps explain why soldiers of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) now fight bravely at Xuan Loc and elsewhere but ran in disorder last month. The answer is not lack of courage, patriotism or even training but notoriously poor generalship which steadily weakened under pressure of diminishing U.S. aid.

Failing support from Washington, along with Moscow's blank-check backing of North Vietnam, probably insured

on North Vietnamese supply lines and sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos were fundamentally wrong.

But despite the revival of the old arguments about the war, there seems little feeling that top military leaders would be quicker to back their views in the future by resigning, by "turning in their suits."

Moorer said he has heard the issue discussed many times but doesn't think it would happen.

"YOU CAN'T have it both ways," says one two-star general. "If you believe in the principle of civilian control, then you can't quit to buck that control when it is wrong, provided it's legal and moral."

One high-ranking officer familiar with the dealings between the presidents who conducted the war and the joint chiefs of staff says that despite strong military misgivings, a resignation *en masse* by the joint chiefs would have been regarded as mutinous.

"The one great unknown," says this general, "is the extent to which the war in Vietnam may be a primary factor affecting our younger officers and enlisted men; affecting their view of country, society, morality."

One man who must contend with the impact of the war on younger generations is Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway, the Pentagon's super salesman for the all-volunteer force.

Callaway says he still gets laughter as a response when he asks groups of young people visiting the Pentagon if they intend to join the Army.

BUT, HE SAYS the bitter anti-military feeling prompted by the draft and the war has long passed. And young people are, in his view, being sold on the Army for such reasons as educational opportunity, pride and challenge.

His recruiters, helped by high unemployment in the civilian economy, are doing turn-away business.

The reaction to the fall of South Vietnam, Callaway says, is not at this level but at the highest level. He says, when asked, that resignations might be more likely at this level if another conflict were launched with decisions perceived as as fundamentally wrong as those in the Vietnam war.

South Vietnam's eventual fall. But the macabre events of mid-March may have hastened Saigon's doom by years, in a manner magnifying the damaging impact on U.S. policy.

Communist destruction of the 23d ARVN division in capturing Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands dramatized for Thieu the altered power balance. He determined then that his troops must retreat from exposed positions. But contrary to popular belief, he gave no precipitate order.

On March 13, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, commanding the 1st corps in the North, flew to Saigon to confer with Thieu. Thieu ordered Truong to withdraw, abandoning Hue if necessary, but to make a stand at Danang. Truong agreed, adding he would defend Hue if possible.

On March 14, Thieu summoned a top secret council of war (unknown to the U.S. embassy) at the military base

of Cam Ranh Bay. Five generals attended: Thieu; Prime Minister Tran Thien Khieu; Gen. Cao Van Vien, chief of the general staff; Lt. Gen. Dang Van Quang, the president's military adviser; and Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu, commander of the 2d corps headquartered at Pleiku in the Central Highlands.

Following Thieu's strategy, it was decided to abandon Pleiku and Kontum in the highlands—but certainly not withdraw all the way to Saigon. Rather, their plan was to regroup, then counterattack at Ban Me Thuot, seeking to end the hesitant Communist offensive. Just when Pleiku and Kontum would be abandoned was left open, a vagueness of historic importance. Four of those present thought the pullout was to take place gradually the last two weeks of March.

The fifth man, 2d corps commander Gen. Phu, has a long and valorous record as one of only two Vietnamese officers in the French army at the fatal 1954 battle of Dienbienphu. But he fits a familiar ARVN pattern: first-rate division commander unable to cope with complexities of corps command. What distinguishes Phu now is committing the long war's greatest single blunder.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

Americans, Vietnamese: Mutual Misconceptions

By DAVID K. SHIPER

The Vietnamese and the Americans never knew each other very well. By the time the United States troops withdrew, taking with them the epithet "gook," profound gulfs of ignorance still remained. Even those who tried to see beyond the stereotypes often slipped into subtler misunderstandings.

These problems of perception proved fatal for dissimilar peoples who depended on each other to fight one side of a nasty, politically complex civil war. Many Vietnamese overestimated American power and American resolve. Many Americans of differing views found that they could see whatever they wanted to, all in the murky, contradictory politics and culture of Vietnam.

From both ends of the American political spectrum, misinterpretations were often made, for example, of the suppleness that enabled so many Vietnamese to survive by masking and adjusting loyalties and attitudes as military control by one side or the other shifted and flowed over them and their villages.

American officials, who questioned peasants or refugees by using the vocabulary of one side in the conflict—terms such as "Communists," "Vietcong" and "South Vietnamese Government"—could get predictable and appropriate answers, while American Quakers,

Returning to Pleiku late on March 14, Phu inexplicably ordered withdrawal that very night without preparation. In the old days, American advisers would have restrained Phu, planned an orderly withdrawal and mocked up the Ban Me Thuot counterattack. But such advisers left after the Paris accord of January 1973 (which permitted 140,000 North Vietnamese regulars to stay).

Abandoning equipment worth tens of millions, Phu's troops set off east on routes 19B and 7B, the latter a road to hell. 7B is an unimproved road with no bridges, assuring chaos as heavy trucks chewed up river fords. Retreating troops, trailed by 200,000 refugees, were ambushed at Cheo Rco by the 320th North Vietnamese division. The result was more chaos, massacre and a calamitous retreat surpassing storied Caporetto and needing a Hemingway to describe.

The disaster on route 7B quickly spread. Fearing isolation, in the North, Gen. Truong ordered a withdrawal from Hue. But now President Thieu panicked. Disregarding the March 13 meeting, he ordered the troops to return. Counter-marching, they collided with streams of refugees and soon turned back again. By then, Truong's

prized 1st ARVN division had so disintegrated that defense of Danang was impossible. Thus, premature withdrawal from Pleiku cost South Vietnam five infantry divisions, the country's northern half and almost surely its independence.

This autopsy provides valuable lessons. It justifies President Ford's not heaping blame on Thieu, as some advisers wanted. It confirms that what the ARVN has needed is not political dedication or even inspired low-level leadership so much as halfway decent generalship. And though Congress may resist, it points up the unescapable casual relationship between steadily reduced U.S. aid and the Vietnam disaster.

Even if some renewed aid now enables Saigon to re-equip five divisions and stabilize the military situation, the most hoped for is an interval for orderly evacuation of Saigon's leaders, a new government and negotiations leading inevitably to Communist rule. The long, immensely costly war was lost on the ides of March. But whoever was to blame, this autopsy makes clear. It was not the long-suffering, much-abused ARVN foot soldier.

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ters, using another lexicon—"liberation troops," "Provisional Revolutionary Government," "Saigon regime"—would hear quite different responses.

As a result, an important cultural trait was frequently misread as a political attitude, when in fact political views and loyalties—to the extent that they existed at all—usually remained deeply buried beneath a complex set of defenses.

Similarly, the ethnocentrism of Vietnamese society—a traditional distaste for foreigners that kept the culture resilient through a long history of Chinese domination, French colonialism and American intervention—was sometimes seen by the American left as a rejection of the American-supported side in the war and as a popular affinity for the Vietcong.

The antiforeign feelings were so pervasive, moreover, that it was as easy to find them among strong anti-Communists and Government officials as among those sympathetic to the Vietcong. So ethnocentrism served poorly as an indicator of a man's politics.

It was true that for some Vietnamese, the Government of Nguyen Van Thieu seemed "foreign," and the Vietcong, by virtue of their long sacrifice and suffering in the wilderness, seemed more noble, more purely Vietnamese. But this view, usually vague and blurry, did not always correlate with support for the Vietcong. Rather, it underscored the deep ambi-

valence that many Vietnamese felt about their political choices.

Sympathy for the Suffering

"I hate all Vietnamese who have no sign of suffering on their faces," said a Vietnamese newspaperman one day as he sat in a restaurant watching a couple of pudgy army colonels at the next table.

The newsman had grown up in Hanoi, tried to join the Vietminh as a boy, migrated south in 1954, became an official in the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem, was jailed by that Government for his role in an abortive coup and then worked as an interpreter for high-ranking American military officers. He had spent much of his life trying to discover where he fit in his own society.

It was a common search, and it illustrated the degree to which the political matrix that was imposed on Vietnam by the war clashed with the most fundamental historical themes of Vietnamese culture.

Many Vietnamese felt revulsion for both sides. Even some who took direct, violent action against American intervention scoffed at the notion that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese represented true Vietnamese nationalism.

'We Are Pacifists'

This was put succinctly about a year ago by a militant Buddhist student who had helped organize the fire-bombing of American cars and jeeps in the nineteen-sixties. He had spent recent years in constant

hiding and fear, dodging the Saigon police, moving from house to house, friend to friend. But he did not feel comfortable with the idea of going to the Vietcong.

"If I lose my morale, perhaps I will go," he said. "But I'm not a Communist. There are certain parts of Communist policy that I don't accept. We are pacifists. We are against the fighting. The Buddhists do not like foreigners. The Buddhists do not accept foreign ideas, Marxist or capitalist."

Of course the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, with roots in the anticolonialist struggle that defeated the French, tapped much of the elemental drive for independence from foreign domination. But they had no monopoly on this, at least philosophically, for even in the elementary schools in Saigon, history lessons played the theme.

A teacher, standing one morning at an intricate battle map draped with colored chalk on a blackboard, described with delight an ancient Chinese defeat at the hands of the Vietnamese. "We escaped being colonized by the Chinese," the teacher told her pupils. "What is the lesson? The lesson is that the Vietnamese people are determined to fight all aggression."

Nevertheless, Western notions of "nation" and "country" always seemed somewhat inappropriate to Vietnam, for while the Vietnamese retained a strong sense of themselves as a people and as an ethnic group, the institutions with which they identified first were usually family and village, rarely the central government. Even when refugees were

uprooted by the war, they often moved as whole villages, surviving the turmoil and squalor of the refugee camps and resettling together in the shantytown slums of city neighborhoods. They carried with them the structure of village organization, often retaining the same village chief and village council through the years.

Similarly, despite the powerful, wrenching crosscurrents of war, many Vietnamese kept their family loyalty intact; ancestor worship remained a central element of religious life, not merely for the Buddhist majority, but to some extent among the Roman Catholics and other minorities as well.

Old Ties Weakened

The strong family and village ties, combined with the religious mandate for descendants to stay close to the graves of their ancestors, may once have welded the Vietnamese peasant to his land, though no more. The war, some Americans believe, has been doubly cruel, for the introduction of intense American bombing and shelling of rural areas broke the bond between peasant and ancestral land, forcing him to flee and leave the souls of the dead untended.

Some among the Vietnamese regard the notion of religious attachment to the land as little more than a foreign stereotype

that fails to take account of the historic mobility of the Vietnamese, or the Annamites, as they were once known, who have migrated southward over the centuries into the fertile Mekong delta.

However strong a pull ancestral land once exerted on the peasantry, it is considerably weaker now. What remains among many who have crowded into the cities is a nostalgia for the land, a belief in rural, village life as truly Vietnamese, a distasteful distaste for the city as Western, foreign.

Urbanization may have been the most durable American impact on Vietnamese society. From 1960 to 1974, the proportion of South Vietnam's population living in cities jumped to 45 per cent from 15 as millions of farmers sought refuge from the saturation bombing and shelling that accompanied American drives into much of the countryside.

Peasants who had stayed in their villages through Vietcong raids and propaganda drives, through terrorism by both sides and through skirmishes between guerrillas and Government troops could not stand the heavy carpet of bombs and artillery brought by the United States. Many of them left, not to "vote with their feet," but, as they described it, to save their lives.

The economic and social con-

sequences were severe. Food production dropped sharply, and Vietnam stopped exporting rice in 1965. When the American withdrawal was complete in 1973, there was virtually no industrial base to justify what had been a false urbanization.

The wives and families of soldiers as well as of civilians struggled in a primitive economy of petty commerce and small marketplaces to feed themselves. The grinding deprivation, some South Vietnamese officers believed, contributed to the sagging morale of their troops.

Many Families Disintegrated

Simultaneously, the sprawling, disorganized cities corroded the important institutions of village and family. Many families held together, but others disintegrated. Marriages collapsed, boys took up lives in the grimy streets, orphanages overflowed with abandoned children, drug addiction spread, teen-age delinquency multiplied.

Yet even as the despair grew and the weariness deepened, the society bred less malignancy than might have been expected. The Vietnamese were full of paradoxes, and this baffled many Americans.

If corruption was rampant, so were honesty and pride. If the army collapsed and

ran, the people bore much of the war with a tough stubbornness, rarely succumbing to the lethargy of defeat, scratching out a living through tireless enterprise and inventiveness.

The Vietnamese were often open about their sorrow, yet subtle and oblique in their anger. They wept freely and they held back their tears; they smiled in joy and embarrassment and sadness, and they wore masks of cold correctness.

The Americans, in turn, were misread by the Vietnamese, who misunderstood American power and American resolve.

"Some of my students think the Americans are responsible for everything good and everything bad that happens in Vietnam," a Saigon high school teacher observed about a year ago. It was an extreme version of a common view.

Combined with a certain fatalism and resignation, it produced a sense of helplessness and dependency. Oppositionists waited for a gesture from the American Embassy. Students felt themselves without power. A bizarre, conspiratorial view of politics bred rumor and distrust.

Military skill and efficiency were seen as the exclusive property of the Americans. Vietnamese could not depend on Vietnamese.

Sunday, April 27, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

U.S. and U.N. Are at Odds On Relief for Indochinese

Special to The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS, April 26—Continuing disputes between the United States and the United Nations over Indochina may be hampering an efficient large-scale emergency aid program for the millions of civilians left behind in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

"There are only two outfits that can effectively administer a relief operation of the size required," a U.N. official maintained—"the U.S. and the U.N."

"In this case, the Americans can't move in and function themselves—but only they can provide the money."

The money is there—\$150 million in the compromise aid bill passed by Congress. The aid would be channeled through unspecified "international organizations" so it is up to the administration to decide whether to use the United Nations. So

far, U.N. officials admit, the U.S. administration "has been reluctant" to do so.

Until the United States comes through, "we're broke," said Sir Robert Jackson of Australia, who ran the U.N. relief operation for Bangladesh and is now running the one for Indochina.

"Our funds are now totally inadequate to the needs of the region," Jackson said in an interview. He put the need at well above the \$100 million from all sources that Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has publicly requested.

So far, 13 Western governments have given \$11 million, with nothing from the United States, the Soviet block, the oil-exporting nations or China.

The money has been used to deliver more than 1,000 tons of food, drugs and shelter materials to Phnom Penh, Saigon and the areas of South Vietnam under

Communist control. "Now we're operating on credit," Jackson said.

Food stockpiles, as well as charter planes and ships, are available in Bangkok and Singapore. Requests for specific items are coming in from the Vietcong and the new Cambodian government has signaled that it will soon ask for relief aid. "We are able to get the stuff in quick," Jackson said. "What we need is the cash."

The American reluctance to provide it through the United Nations, says a White House official, stems from American "irritation" at actions by Waldheim on Vietnam, and the anti-Americanism of the Third World majority that dominates U.N. forums.

"We're tired of the U.N. always asking for money but not letting the U.S. have any control over it," the White House official said. "The Third World has all the U.N. votes, but it isn't paying its share."

U.S. pique at Waldheim was generated when he allowed the Vietcong to open a liaison office with the United Nations in Geneva early this year. More recently, Waldheim did not heed an American request that he publicly appeal to Hanoi to allow the evacuation of Danang after it fell.

Agency for International Development Director Daniel Parker told a U.S. congressional committee that Waldheim's attitude was "unconscionable" and "unthinkable."

U.N. officials maintained that a response to the U.S. request would have achieved nothing, antagonized Hanoi, and endangered the U.N. capacity to provide aid to Vietnamese civilians behind Vietcong lines.

When the United States found itself with \$5 million for relief it turned the money over to the Red Cross, not the United Nations. "It's not punitive," a

WASHINGTON STAR
30 April 1975

CARL ROWAN

More Trouble Is Coming

State Department official insisted, "It went to the most efficient channel."

The differences between Waldheim and the U. S. government may have been eased somewhat by Friday's meeting between the secretary general and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. U. N. officials reported that although there was "no clear answer from the U. S. on aid funds, Waldheim is encouraged and optimistic; the meeting was friendly and none of the frictions came up."

A potential new friction is a recent U.S. request that the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees help resettle the Vietnamese who are being evacuated to Guam. State Philip Habib told a Senate committee that he was still "trying to extract an answer."

High Commissioner Prince Sadruddin Aga Kahn is being cautious. His is one of the two U.N. agencies involved in the Vietnam relief effort. "There may well be strong feelings on the Vietcong side," one U.N. aide admitted. "It's a case of heads you win, tails I lose."

But U.N. officials indicated that in the end, Sadruddin would agree to the U.S. request.

"If the U.S. wants to help at all," a U.N. official insisted, "here we are, and we can do it."

More friction may emerge on Monday when the U.N. Economic and Social Council is to take up a proposal to invite the Vietcong to a U.N. conference for the first time—in June, in Mexico City, on International Women's Year.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

Kissinger Says U.S. May Shelter 70,000

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 30—United States Navy ships continued today to pick up South Vietnamese refugees fleeing their country, in small boats, the State and Defense Departments reported.

In addition to 6,000 South Vietnamese evacuated by helicopter yesterday from Saigon along with 1,373 Americans, the State Department said, 22,000 South Vietnamese have been picked up by Navy ships waiting off the South Vietnamese coast.

As the flow of refugees continued, Secretary of State Kissinger, who yesterday used a figure of 56,000 refugees, estimated that the United States

might have to resettle as many as 70,000 South Vietnamese.

Mr. Kissinger told reporters on Capitol Hill that the Administration would soon ask Congress for funds to handle the resettlement of the refugees. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, estimated that as much as \$500-million might be required over the next year to take care of the refugees.

The Defense Department declined to say how many ships had been left in position to pick up South Vietnamese who were able to flee by small boat into the South China Sea. As for the legal authority to continue the rescue effort now that Americans have been evacuated from South Vietnam, Jo-

seph Laitin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said at a Pentagon briefing: "There is no law that says you can't pick up people in distress on the high seas."

The Defense Department said the ships were remaining in international waters, outside the three-mile territorial limit claimed by the former South Vietnamese Government. There is some question, however, whether this limit still applies, since North Vietnam, and presumably the Provisional Revolutionary Government, which is taking over control in Saigon, claim a 12-mile territorial limit.

Confusion over the territorial limit claimed by North Vietnam was a key element in the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, 1964, which led to a Congress-

hangs naked, twisting slowly in the revolutionary winds. Only God knows how many thousands of tons of bombs were dropped on North Vietnam by U.S. planes flown from Thailand. That fact alone is central to current speculation as to whether Hanoi will be satisfied with the conquest of all of Indochina, or whether anger, revenge, ideological zeal require the fomenting of a successful revolution in Thailand.

When President Ford says that the war is over in Indochina in so far as the U.S. is concerned, is he saying that we also wash our hands of involvement in any future violent upheavals inside Thailand — or South Korea or the Philippines?

Even Americans who never endorsed "the domino theory" must understand that we could hardly restore U.S. pride by ignoring completely assaults against countries that stuck with us through the toughest days of a losing venture.

Yet, no matter what troubles erupt tomorrow or five years from tomorrow in these countries, there would be millions of Americans screaming that Thailand is utterly corrupt, that South Korea has degenerated into a brutal dictatorship and that the Marcos regime in the Philippines qualifies for both descriptions.

This society would find itself in a searing, divisive dilemma probably more emotional than the agonizing over Indochina. Is such a dilemma in the cards? Detente notwithstanding, I think it is. I just can't believe that the Communists won't move elsewhere to challenge the United States, to attempt to add insult to humiliation.

Believe me, long before we can talk seriously about restoring U.S. pride, we shall have to decide whether and how to respond to any new challenges.

sional resolution authorizing President Lyndon B. Johnson to introduce troops into South Vietnam. The Defense Department at first contended that two destroyers that it said had come under North Vietnamese attack were in international waters but later acknowledged that they had gone within the 12-mile limit claimed by North Vietnam.

The Defense Department declined today to say whether the United States was continuing unarmed reconnaissance flights over South Vietnam. Before the fall of the Saigon Government, the Defense Department regularly conducted such reconnaissance flights, contending that they did not violate either the 1973 Paris agreement accords or Congressional restrictions against the reintroduction of American military forces into Indochina.

Meanwhile, a debate was developing between Congress and the White House over whether President Ford had legal authority to use American troops for the evacuation yesterday of 6,000 South Vietnamese from Saigon.

Before the evacuation, Mr. Ford and Administration lawyers contended that the President, as Commander in Chief, had inherent authority to use troops to rescue endangered Americans but had no authority to use troops in the evacuation of South Vietnamese citizens. Congress had not completed action on legislation requested by Mr. Ford giving him restricted authority to use troops in the evacuation of South Vietnamese citizens.

Asked what had been the President's authority to use American troops to rescue South Vietnamese citizens, Ron Nessen, the Presidential press secretary, said Mr. Ford had acted on moral, not legalistic grounds.

Mr. Nessen quoted Mr. Ford as having said: "I did it because the people would have been killed, and I'm proud of it."

'Morale Rationale' Cited

When reporters noted that the White House was not citing any legal authority, Mr. Nessen, seeking to cut off the question, said, "I'm citing a moral rationale for it."

On Capitol Hill, Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, Democrat of Missouri, one of the authors of the Senate's original War Powers Bill, issued a statement questioning the legality of the President's action. While acknowledging Mr. Ford's "human-

itarian motivation," the Senator said that "the President had no constitutional authority to use U. S. armed forces to evacuate foreign nationals from South Vietnam."

While the evacuation effort is now completed, Senator Eagleton said that "Congress must now legalize that operation by granting him the required authority." Otherwise, he said, Congress will be establishing the precedent that "the President has an inherent right to use U. S. forces to rescue foreign nationals without the prior authority of Congress."

Similar advice was given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York. But one committee member, Senator Dick Clark, Democrat of Iowa, argued that Mr. Ford had exceeded the authority granted him in compromise legislation approved by the Senate but not yet adopted by the House of Representatives.

Senator Clark cited a provision in the legislation specifying that the duration of the use of armed forces to rescue non-Americans should not exceed the time required for evacuation of American citizens.

It is evident, Senator Clark said, that the evacuation effort was extended to permit the removal of a large number of South Vietnamese.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved today a bill providing up to \$50-million in humanitarian aid for Cambodia, to be administered by international agencies. But it decided to hold up the legislation until the House decides whether it will act on compromise legislation that authorizes

\$327-million in humanitarian assistance for South Vietnam as well as giving the President circumscribed authority to use the armed forces in evacuation of South Vietnamese.

In general, there was little Congressional criticism of the evacuation effort, with many Senators and Representatives issuing statements praising the way the operation was carried out.

The Defense Department said that apparently the only incident in which the forces had had to resort to use of their weapons was when a F-4 fighter-bomber bombed an anti-aircraft site that was firing on the plane.

Fleet Moves Farther Offshore
ABOARD U.S.S. BLUE RIDGE, in the South China Sea, April 30 (UPI) — The 40 American ships involved in the Vietnam evacuation operation moved out to a new holding area today about 50 miles off the coast.

Navy spokesmen said that the operation was officially over. [Communications monitored in Singapore showed that while the principal exodus was over, some lesser offshore operations were continuing, Reuters reported.]

More than 6,000 people, including about 900 Americans, were flown out of Saigon in the last phase of the American airlift and landed on the decks of vessels that were waiting 30 miles offshore.

Among the last to leave was the American Ambassador, 61-year-old Graham A. Martin. He appeared drawn and weary as he stepped out of a Marine

helicopter before dawn onto the deck of the Blue Ridge.

The Americans aboard included two correspondents of The New York Times, Malcolm W. Browne and Fox Butterfield.

Among the 500 to 600 refugees on the Blue Ridge, which has served as the command and communications vessel of the 40-ship evacuation fleet, are Nguyen Cao Ky, former Vice President of South Vietnam, and several three-star Vietnamese generals.

A United States Embassy spokesman, John Hogan, said he believed that about a dozen Americans, including newsmen and relief agency representatives, had chosen to stay behind in Saigon.

Other Operations Reported
SINGAPORE, April 30 (Reuters) — Ship communications monitored here today showed that a vessel on charter to the United States Agency for International Development was carrying refugees from one end of the South Vietnamese island of Con Son to the other.

It appeared that the people on the island, which is in the South China Sea, were being moved to a site where they might be taken off more easily.

Some refugee operations were also reported around Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam. But it was not clear whether people at the refugee center there were still being evacuated.

During the afternoon, some Americans who had escaped by river from the southern part of South Vietnam reached the United States fleet's holding area, southwest of Vung Tau.

WASHINGTON POST
24 April 1975

Oil Firms Abandon Viet Investments

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

A dozen of the world's major oil companies have abandoned the offshore fields of South Vietnam, leaving an investment of as much as \$100 million paid in bonuses to South Vietnam for offshore leases in the South China Sea.

The companies include many of the world's and most of America's giants, Mobil, Shell, Exxon, Cities Service, Sun and Marathon.

"It's a shame," said Corbett Allen, vice president of Global Marine Co. in Los Angeles, which until 10 days ago had operated a drilling rig for Mobil Oil Corp. in the South China Sea. "That whole part of the world looked like it was going to be the world's next oil province."

The Global Marine rig was one of two huge offshore rigs drilling for oil in

the South China Sea in acreage leased by the South Vietnamese government. Both rigs have pulled up stakes in the last 10 days and moved to the safety of Singapore.

The 150 men who operated the rigs have been moved with their families from Saigon to Singapore.

One rig was called Glomar 4 and was leased from Global Marine by a combine that included Mobil, Japan's Kaiyo Sekiyu and France's Societe Nationale des Petroles Aquitaine. The second rig was leased from Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. in New Orleans by Shell Oil Corp. and Cities Service Co.

The Mobil group has no immediate plans for its rig, which costs an estimated \$50,000 a day to operate. The Shell rig, which is called Ocean Prospector, will be moved sometime in the next month to the waters off the coast of South Korea, where it has done exploratory drill-

ing before.

The two rigs had drilled five test wells in the South China Sea in the last year, two of them successful. The Mobil rig hit a well that yielded 2,500 barrels of oil a day. The Shell well yielded 1,500 barrels a day.

Neither well was producing, but both companies called the finds "encouraging." Oilmen expected that South Vietnam would become a major oil producer, with one estimate that there was as much as \$5 billion worth of oil under the South China Sea.

Mobil had invested almost \$16 million in its South China Sea exploration, most of it in bonus bids to South Vietnam for the leasing rights. Shell had spent \$17 million through March of 1973, including its share of the bonuses.

Other companies willing to talk about their investment in South Vietnam included

Exxon Corp. and a combine made up of Marathon Oil Co., Sun Oil Corp. and Amerada-Hess. Exxon said it had spent \$2 million in bonuses. The Marathon group said it had spent \$6.1 million for its leases.

Cities Service, which is in partnership with Shell, refused to say how much it had spent.

So far, Exxon said, it had done only seismic tests, no exploratory drilling. Marathon had done only seismic tests, but said it had come very close to leasing a rig to begin drilling on its acreage, which lies about 150 miles south of Saigon.

"We are in the midst of discussing what to do about all this right now," said a Marathon official at the company's offices in Findlay, Ohio. "We still have an office in Saigon and are in touch with it, but we're certainly reconsidering the situation."

Other oil companies with major stakes in South Viet-

nam include Japanese, British, Australian and Canadian interests. One group of independent oil drillers is led by a combine called Sunningdale, which operates mostly in Canada.

Oil industry sources said that somewhere between 12 and 15 oil companies had

paid about \$100 million to the South Vietnamese government for drilling rights since the summer of 1973, when South Vietnam offered 88,000 square miles of the South China Sea as concessions.

The two drilling rigs already operating there were pulled out for safety's sake.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

SAIGON'S MISSION TO THE U.N. CLOSES

Staff Had Observer Status
—Cambodian Office Shuts
Without Announcement

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., April 30—The office of South Vietnam's observer mission to the United Nations and Consulate General closed today.

The closing of the office at 866 United Nations Plaza was announced in a one-sentence press release. The press representative, Mrs. Yen Chi, said it would not reopen.

Cambodia's Mission to the United Nations closed last night without even an announcement. However, the Chinese press agency, Hsinhua, said that it had received word from Phnom Penh today that the new Cambodian administration was taking over Cambodia's seat in the United Nations. The United Nations authorities had not received official word, but the move had been expected since the new regime took control.

A spokesman for the United States delegation said that Cambodian and South Vietnamese officials would have no difficulty in adjusting their immigration status if they chose to remain here.

Cambodia has been a member of the United Nations since 1955. Last year the Government headed by President Lon Nol narrowly defeated a campaign led by China to expel it in favor of the Communist-led insurgents who have now taken control.

South Vietnam is not a member of the United Nations but has had a diplomatic office here since 1952.

Confidence Shaken

Few diplomats here would comment publicly on the developments in Vietnam. One who did was Louis de Guiringaud, France's chief delegate, who said that one lesson to be learned from the collapse of the Saigon Government was that foreign assistance was not sufficient unless there was a "will to fight and something for which to fight."

Asked at a press luncheon if the Vietnam events had weakened the credibility of United States guarantees for Israel, he replied:

"There is no credibility to guarantee unless the guaranteed people want to fight for themselves and have some idea for which they will fight. This did not exist in Indochina but does exist in Israel."

If discipline and a goal to defend are lacking, Mr. Guiringaud asserted, no one else can supply them no matter what arms or foreign aid is given. "That is the lesson of Vietnam," he declared.

A number of Asian diplomats here said that the Vietnamese experience had shaken their confidence in President Ford's Administration. "A pledge of support from the President is meaningless, an empty commitment because no one can be sure Congress will fulfill the promise of help," remarked one diplomat who in the past has been a staunch supporter of the United States.

The refusal of Congress to approve additional military help for Saigon was "the worst case of desertion," he declared. He predicted that in the future Asians "would be more realistic."

Another diplomat maintained that the United States had exonerated itself "from a war it could not win" and was in a healthier position militarily and politically. He expressed confidence that security treaties with South Korea and Japan were not in jeopardy and said he hoped that "the United States would be more careful in committing itself in the future."

NEW YORK TIMES

1 May 1975

U.S. and Thailand in Dispute Over 125 Planes From Saigon

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, April 30—A dispute has developed here over the fate of the 125 South Vietnamese Air Force planes that arrived in Thailand before the Saigon Government surrendered to the Communists.

The planes, among them C-17 and C-130 transports and F-5 fighters, are now parked at the huge U Taphao air base about 100 miles southeast of here. All have been impounded by the Thai Government, which has said that it plans to negotiate their return to Saigon with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

But it is understood here that the United States authorities are unlikely to permit this. American officials are said to feel that the United States still has a proprietary interest in the aircraft because they were made available to the former Saigon Government under military aid programs.

The sudden influx of refugees

posed a delicate problem for the Thai Government, which had earlier announced that it would under no circumstances permit any Vietnamese to stay here for long.

Apparently in deference to the Thais' strong feelings on this matter, United States planes began moving the Vietnamese out of Thailand to Guam today it looked as if all would be moved there within the next few days.

There are still 2,000 to 3,000 Cambodian refugees in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border and at U Taphao, and the Thai Government has said they too must leave the country within 30 days. The 1,300 at U Taphao, came when the American Embassy in Phnom Penh was closed. According to an American Embassy official here, they are still being processed before being moved out of Thailand, probably also to Guam.

NEW YORK TIMES

19 April 1975

Cambodia Blocked Relief

By KATHLEEN TELTSCH

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 18—The former Cambodian Government compelled United Nations authorities to pay costly air-freight charges to fly powdered milk into the country aboard the Government-owned airline rather than permit the relief supplies to be flown in free, officials here said today.

"Children were dying in Phnom Penh and we were going against time," said an official of the United Nations Children's Fund, or UNICEF. "We would have preferred free delivery but we had no choice."

The spokesman said that during the last week of March the Cambodian authorities refused landing rights for planes to carry 110 tons of powdered milk donated by New Zealand.

UNICEF officials had arranged for at least part of the shipments to be flown by Bird Air, a charter line used by the United States Agency for International Development. For this, he said, there would have been no charge to UNICEF.

Some supplies were, in fact, moved before the Cambodian authorities made their demands that all further shipments be carried by Air Cambodge at a cost considerably higher than the going commercial rate.

United Nations officials who knew about the Cambodian demands explained today that there had been reluctance at the time to make them public for fear of jeopardizing the relief operation.

There was some question whether the Cambodian authorities were opposed only to

the use of Bird Air, said one official here, who said there seemed to be "bad blood" between the charter line and the Phnom Penh authorities.

UNICEF offered to have the relief goods delivered by Australian aircraft, but this too was refused.

Just how much money was involved in the Air Cambodge flights was not known by officials here who explained that the transactions had been made through the supply center in Bangkok, Thailand.

They said they could not verify a report that UNICEF had been charged as much as \$1,000 a ton.

There have been no relief shipments to Phnom Penh in the last few days. UNICEF received a message this morning from Paul Ignatieff, a Canadian who is in charge of the aid program in Cambodia, reporting that preparations were being made to discuss an aid program with the new Communist Government.

The United Nations has also had difficulty in persuading North Vietnam to allow relief supplies to be flown in by Australian or Canadian planes.

Such flights would have been made without charge to the relief organizations but Hanoi balked over the use of military aircraft or crews in uniform.

"The objections were political and it was not an issue of money in this instance," a UNICEF official said.

A shipment of supplies aboard a Danish charter plane was allowed into North Vietnam on Wednesday. The

plane owned by the Sterling charter airline, was the first Boeing 727 to land at Hanoi and posed some technical difficulties.

Alastair I. Matheson, a UNICEF information officer, said that a proposal has been made to Hanoi that the United Nations insignia be painted on

planes in a relief shuttle from Bangkok and Singapore for UNICEF and the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.

The Provisional revolutionary Government in South Vietnam has given approval for deliveries of supplies by sea to Da Nang, it was announced today.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 April 1975

U.S. hears good word on Vietnam

West German official backs its ally's policy

By David Mutch
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

West Germany's Defense Minister Georg Leber says he can see no reason "why we should have doubts about America's defense commitment in Europe."

And he added, in an interview with this newspaper:

"I think that our most important ally should feel that we did not regard him in Asia as an imperialist aggressor — to use Communist terminology — but that, on the contrary, we knew very well what was at stake there."

Mr. Leber has been under fire from members of his own party, the Social Democrats, for published statements earlier this month about the Indo-China situation.

Criticism centered on his clearly stated belief that present events in Cambodia and Vietnam were the "inevitable results of a long worldwide campaign" to make the U.S. abandon the war there. He also lamented the shortage of critics of Communist aggression in Indo-China.

The Social Democrats (SPD) executive board recently released a long and careful statement that "it looks as if Saigon's defeat" stems from its own lack of a credible domestic

policy in the interests of its citizens and not from "insufficient help from abroad."

So a debate on Indo-China goes on in West Germany — the strongest defense ally of the U.S. in Europe — similar to that in the U.S.

Mr. Leber's critics here have largely overlooked a balancing point he also made earlier and which he repeated in the interview:

"Even a nation as great as the United States cannot prevent a country from losing its freedom if that country itself is not prepared to provide the minimum essential prerequisites for preserving this freedom."

The Defense Minister's main point is that this concept of defense readiness must be honored strenuously in his own country and Europe as a whole. "Mutual trust is becoming of even greater importance in our times than it was in many times in the past," he said.

"To this end it is necessary that the people are conscious and convinced of the value of living in freedom, and that they are willing to make the sacrifices required to safeguard their freedom and independence."

He directs the following point to the West and East:

While Europe cannot be indifferent to the fate of the South Vietnamese, he says, it would be "erroneous and indeed dangerous to assume that the attitudes toward Indo-China and Europe were identical."

America's frontiers in terms of security, he said, "are here in Europe, for an inclusion of Western Europe in the Soviet sphere would reduce the U.S. to the position of a second-rate power."

Mr. Leber also said it would be "irresponsible" at this "early stage" to predict a negative result in Portugal. His government, he said, is doing its best to promote the freedom Portugal "missed so painfully for many years."

The events in Indo-China are "another lesson teaching us to be on our guard when concluding agreements" with Communist nations, he said.

WASHINGTON POST
27 April 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Cambodia: A Letter From a 'Supertraitor'

When the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps evacuated the last American officials from Cambodia April 12, the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh received an extraordinary letter that has produced a mixture of sorrow and foreboding in Washington.

The letter was written to Ambassador John Gunther Dean by Prince Sirik Matak, Cambodian high counselor. He and Prime Minister Long Boret, two of the seven "supertraitors" condemned to death by the Cambodian

Communists, surprised the embassy by declining seats on the last plane out of Phnom Penh. The letter revealing Sirik Matak's refusal poignantly spells out his sense of betrayal by the Americans and then, in shrouded oriental fashion, hints the United States will somehow suffer the consequences of that betrayal.

The decision by these Cambodian anti-Communists to go down with the ship conflicts with the cliché of corrupt Mandarins transporting hoarded gold to the French Riviera. But Sirik

Matak's letter also could provide additional evidence convincing government leaders in Asia and elsewhere that alignment with Washington is folly.

Gen. Sirik Matak was second-ranking member behind Marshal Lon Nol in the anti-Communist junta that seized power in 1970 triggering the Cambodian civil war. He served briefly as acting prime minister but was removed from real power (and was placed under house arrest for a time by Lon Nol). Sirik Matak was viewed

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

Unconventional Tactics Paid Off for the North

By DREW MIDDLETON

North Vietnam's victory in the South was achieved by conventional forces using unorthodox tactics against forces theoretically superior in numbers, air power and advanced weapons. The last and most decisive

Military campaign of a war Analysis that has sparked and sputtered in Indochina since the Vietnam rose against the French in 1945 went to an army able to deploy forces superior in numbers and drive in every critical engagement, from Ban Me Thuot to Bien Hoa.

The 30-year war ended with a rush but without a final major battle. With President Nguyen Van Thieu's resignation on April 21, Southern resistance dwindled around Saigon's perimeter and in the Mekong River delta, and the capital was delivered to its new masters almost undamaged by bombs or shells.

What lay behind the North's inexorable progress and the South's failures? How much did planning, morale, combat leadership and logistics affect the outcome? Such questions will concern staff colleges for a generation. United States military analysts, who have followed the campaign on a day-to-day basis, believe that some preliminary conclusions may be drawn.

Sometimes Brilliant

The final campaign had a character markedly different from previous operations in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese, the most adept practitioners of guerrilla war in Asia, fought in conventional style, but with a mix of weapons that is highly unorthodox by the standards of their Soviet mentors.

In no respect was it a guerrilla war. The Vietcong participated occasionally in small local operations, but the main burden was carried by regular North Vietnamese divisions.

Those divisions fought well, and at times brilliantly, without air support and in the face of potentially strong South Vietnamese air power. Hanoi thus flouted the doctrine, shared by Americans and Russians, that victory lies with the power best capable of combining all arms: aircraft, artillery, tanks and infantry.

The South Vietnamese, once they had partly recovered from the shock of their initial reverses, tried to follow the military doctrine taught by the Americans in the Vietnamization program. This involved a prodigal use of air power,

which was not there, lavish artillery preparation, which was inhibited by a shortage of shells, and flexible infantry tactics, in which armor supports riflemen in attacks launched only after the enemy has been sufficiently softened by bombing and shelling.

Better Motivation

Some basic elements in the North's victory are already apparent. Its troops were better motivated and in some respects better equipped. The commanders, although believed to be somewhat surprised by the speed of their early advances, were better able to control large formations than were Saigon's commanders and were able to retain the tactical initiative.

The performance of Saigon's forces was clearly inferior. Liaison from command to field units broke down at critical junctures. Combat leadership was poor—many senior officers left battles while the issue was in doubt—though the performance of company and battalion commanders was somewhat better in the final phases. Staffs, riddled with nepotism, were sluggish.

American officers studying the campaign ask, nonetheless, how a blanket charge of misconduct in battle can be reconciled with the stubborn fighting by the 18th Division and the Airborne Brigade at Xuan Loc? How, they ask, does the contention that the Northerners were omnipotent square with the failure of their superior forces around Tay Ninh to take advantage of gaps in Saigon's defenses?

Strategy Called Sound

The implementation of Saigon's plans, especially in the Central Highlands, was admittedly defective, but the strategy that inspired those plans was not, American officers maintain.

The South, they say, was faced from the outset with a situation in which the North was able to concentrate numerically superior forces where and when it desired. In view of Saigon's theoretical air superiority, this should have been impossible; the Communists' extensive employment of anti-aircraft missiles and guns, plus the decay of the maintenance and service facilities of Saigon's air force, turned an "impossible" into a "possible."

In theory the South held all the aces at the start of the campaign.

The Republic of South Vietnam had a regular army of 450,000 men that included 18 armored battalions and 14 independent artillery battalions. It

was supported by 350 rifle battalions in the regional forces, whose strength was put at 325,000, and about 7,500 platoons of the popular forces, for 200,000 more.

An air force of 500 combat aircraft included 108 F-5A fighters, 220 A-37 fighter-bombers, three gunship squadrons and 625 helicopters.

Weapons left by the Americans included tanks, armored personnel carriers, 1,500 heavy howitzers, 175 heavy self-propelled guns and a number of wire-guided antitank missiles.

The tactical doctrine instilled in the South Vietnamese depended for success on extensive bombing and shelling, which, in turn, required adequate supplies and efficient maintenance. As is turned out, the North had the superior numbers.

As of 1974 army strength was 570,000, without counting the Vietcong battalions established in the South. Included were an artillery division of 10 regiments, 4 armored regiments, 15 surface-to-air missile regiments and 24 anti-aircraft-artillery regiments.

There were more tanks than in Saigon's inventory—900 medium tanks and 60 light ones. Artillery included 800 heavy field pieces and an undetermined number of howitzers. The Soviet Union had also furnished Hanoi with recoilless rifles and an array of mortars and rocket launchers. There were also 8,000 anti-aircraft guns.

The air force, the North's weakest weapon, was never used. Of its 200 combat aircraft only 60 MIG-21's designed for interception could be considered modern.

The North's overwhelming advantage, most American analysts agree, was geographical position. There are no official figures on the number of Northern troops in South Vietnam at the start of the campaign; American sources estimate the forces at 140,000, while the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London believes it is 210,000 for South Vietnam, Laos and the Cambodian border areas, plus 10,000 deployed in Cambodia.

The North Vietnamese already in South Vietnam began the campaign. In retrospect military students probably will divide it into three phases.

Prelude in 1974

The prelude came in the autumn of 1974, when the American military advisers to President Nguyen Van Thieu told him that in view of the steady expansion of Northern forces in the area and of what was

by many knowledgeable Americans as the Cambodian best equipped to reform his country's hopelessly inept government and army. But in maintaining the low U.S. profile in Phnom Penh, no pressure was exerted to substitute him for Lon Nol.

It was in keeping with Sirik Matak's high reputation that on April 2 he thanked Ambassador Dean "for your offer to transport me towards freedom," but added, "I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion."

Then, in his hand-written letter, he poured out disillusionment typical of Cambodians who had counted on the big white foreigners: "As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which have chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection and we can do nothing about it."

Sirik Matak concluded with a cryptic paragraph containing intimations of a delphic deathbed prophecy: "You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, (but) we all are born and must die (one day). I have only committed this mistake of believing in you (the Americans)."

A footnote: By far the least expected of the Cambodian leaders remaining in Phnom Penh was Gen. Lon Non, notorious younger brother of Lon Nol and considered one of the army's worst political generals. Lon Non was among 21 Cambodians added by the Communists March 26 to the list of "supertraitors" to be tried as "war criminals" but not specifically condemned to death. Although he could have accompanied his brother to exile in Hawaii, Lon Non passed up that and later chances to flee.

President Ford invited members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the White House April 14 for a top secret briefing on the Vietnam crisis and got lectured by junior Democrats eager in the heady air of "reform" to tell the Chief Executive how to run his business.

Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, a 32-year-old first-term with no visible background in foreign affairs, instructed the President on the logic of the situation: Since the situation ultimately was hopeless, it logically followed that we should get out as quickly as possible. Other senators who generally agreed with Biden cringed at his didactic performance.

They cringed again over freshman Sen. John Glenn of Ohio, not a committee member but there as a guest. Gen. Frederick Weyand, Chief of Staff of the Army, listened stonily as Col. Glenn, star astronaut and Marine Corps aviator, lectured him on the logistical problems of the Saigon evacuation.

A footnote: Glenn's sounding off inside the White House surprised senators considering their famous freshman colleague's discreet and quiet behavior in the Senate. The unanimous choice for the freshman most inclined to sound off on every issue: Dale Bumpers of Arkansas.

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delicately described as the "inadequacies" of his forces' maintenance and logistics systems, a withdrawal from the Central Highlands might be advisable.

The advice was rejected, but Mr. Thieu reconsidered after the Communist attack on Ban Me Thuot on March 11, when the 23d Division there was badly mauled in the first battle.

The President called a council of war at Cam Ranh on March 14 at which, after a long and apparently disputatious discussion, he ordered the withdrawal of all forces from Pleiku and Kontum, two bastions in the northern highlands, and a retirement to the coast by forces farther north. The President's orders were not detailed, with implementation left to commanders on the spot.

They proved unable to handle the job. Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu, commanding the II corps, with headquarters at Pleiku, ordered an immediate withdrawal. There was no attempt at orderly retirement protected by combat formations capable of slowing the enemy.

Second Phase Opens

Though President Thieu had envisaged a counterattack at Ban Me Thuot, no attempt was made at a moment when the Communist forces had barely consolidated their gains. Instead the whole corps streamed eastward toward the sea, harried as it went by Communist divisions that were surprised at their good fortune but not too much to shell the retreating columns and the refugees who joined them.

While this situation was developing in the Central Highlands, the North Vietnamese forces farther north, now joined by three fresh divisions from across the 17th Parallel, opened the second phase by launching drives on Quang Tri, Hue and Da Nang, the most important positions north of the Central Highlands.

The exodus of troops and civilians from the Central High-

lands and the northernmost provinces was in spate when, on March 22, the Communists began their movement on Hue. Four days later Hue had been abandoned. Da Nang, the country's second largest city, was occupied on March 31. In the first week of April the Communist forces moved inexorably down Route 1, the main coastal highway, toward Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang and Cam Ranh.

The invaders' strength in these operations remains a matter of conjecture. Vigorous leadership and, apparently, accurate intelligence from sympathizers enabled them to keep the Government forces off balance — an impossible position from which to launch counterattacks.

In some instances the Communists, when they found themselves faced by strong Government forces, simply flowed around them. Days after Da Nang had fallen, about 7,500 Southern troops were still in defensive positions north of the city. Short of food and ammunition, their morale cracked and they fled.

South Vietnam's failure in the northern provinces and the coastal cities cannot be explained, the American sources say, by a single mistake comparable to that of General Thu in the Central Highlands.

Shortages Were Acute

The Government forces, it is conceded, suffered from acute shortages of spare parts, some weapons and some munitions. Expected air support did not appear. Accurate information was scanty and rumors of disaster were rife.

The forces had retired into positions that, given time, could have been turned into defensive enclaves. Still numerically strong, they had not suffered serious casualties and had retained some heavy weapons. But command failed as it had in the highlands and officers fled. Communists who penetrated Government lines spread

panic among the troops that few officers did anything to counter.

There seemed little chance of preventing the Communists from overrunning the Saigon area and the Mekong River delta when the third phase began in the first week of April.

Communist operations around Saigon contrasted sharply with those farther north. Strong forces that had been put around Tay Ninh, northeast of the capital, early in the campaign appeared around Xuan Loc in the third week of March, but decisiveness was missing.

The Saigon garrison of three divisions proved much tougher. The invaders' first attacks at Tay Ninh were driven off, and they had to fight for Da Lat, the resort city on the southern edge of the highlands.

Strong Reply in Delta

Government forces in the delta, generally considered the worst equipped in the southern army, fought well enough to prevent a swift overrunning of that area. When the Communist forces cut roads, the Government troops reopened them.

The Northern forces were now encountering troops unaffected by contagious panic and supported to some extent by air power.

On the evidence at hand, the analysts doubt that Hanoi's high command ever intended to besiege or storm Saigon. The political repercussions of a street-to-street battle would have been adverse for forces that came as liberators. What the North did want to do was break the Southern divisions outside Saigon and to cut communications with the capital.

By the end of the first week in April Hanoi had assembled sufficient troops to mount a drive on Saigon through Xuan Loc. The attack was preceded by now-familiar preparations: heavy artillery and rocket bombardment and forays by small groups of combat engineers or-

dered to destroy communications and command posts in the city. This time it was not so easy.

The South's 18th Division fought well, as did a brigade of the Airborne Division that reinforced it. If, as some believed, the North intended to end the war with a single decisive victory, as the Vietnam did at Dien Bien Phu 20 years earlier, it failed.

Here the superior numbers and mobility of the invaders made the difference. With the 18th and the Airborne pinned down around Xuan Loc, small groups of Northerners infiltrated the rough country around the city and cut the road behind the defenders. In the end Xuan Loc was not taken but bypassed.

Different tactics prevailed at Bien Hoa. The Communists' heaviest guns were brought up to shell the South's main operational airfield there. By April 18 the air force began to pull out of Bien Hoa and the invaders undertook a gingerly movement around the city toward Saigon.

Though the neutralization of Bien Hoa as an air base and the isolation of the troops fighting at Xuan Loc were the final Communist victories, the analysts note that they can be considered decisive only in the context of the battle for Saigon. Once the two positions had been dealt with, there was nothing to halt movement to the outskirts of the capital.

By April 23, it is estimated, Hanoi had assembled 120,000 troops in the immediate area of Saigon against a weary garrison of 30,000 regulars. The conditions for successful defense no longer existed.

Campaigns are often won in the first few days and in the reaction to them. In this case the fall of Ban Me Thuot and the subsequent rout in the Central Highlands and the northern provinces led inevitably to ultimate defeat.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
24 April 1975

THE VIETNAM DEBACLE... TREACHERY, GREED, BRUTALITY

BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Times Staff Writer

HONG KONG—This is the anatomy of a debacle, the disastrous collapse of South Vietnamese resistance within weeks amid almost incredible scenes of treachery, greed and brutality, as related for the first time by high-level intelligence sources.

The story cannot at this moment be told from Saigon. It describes the total breakdown of military and civilian authority in the Republic of Vietnam; running battles among fleeing soldiers and with civilians; an absolute paralysis of will on the part of then-President Nguyen Van Thieu; the large-scale treachery of the ruling Vietnamese elite to the people; and the presumed fate of 7.4 tons of gold worth approximately \$30 million, as well as additional millions in hard-currency reserves.

Above all, the debacle was precipitated by military de-

sertions—not soldiers deserting their units, but officers deserting their soldiers.

The information comes not from American, but other sources, primarily an officer high in Vietnamese councils. Some details are blurred by the fog of war. The officer's knowledge and probity are virtually unchallengeable, although he is, naturally, presenting his own view of the catastrophe.

Three main causes were directly responsible for the spectacular Communist victory. They are listed here in order of immediate, though not necessarily historical, gravity:

1—A major shortfall of promised U.S. supplies left the defenders of the two northern sectors of South Vietnam, Military Regions I and II, in an untenable position against opponents whose numbers and arms were swelling with remarkable rapidity.

2--Then President Thieu was paralyzed by the danger and would neither make up his own mind to act nor allow anyone else to act—except to safeguard his own wealth and person.

3--Despite almost 20 years of American involvement, the caste-stratified Vietnamese social structure, civilian and military, had hardly altered, so that the society remained deeply divided; and a small group of the urban elite continued to use the rural peasantry to protect their own privileges.

The immediate background was the desperate logistical situation as the Communists, obviously certain the United States would not attack North Vietnam itself, committed almost all their regular armed forces to the conquest of the south. Those massed, conventional units were lavishly equipped by the Soviet Union.

Saigon's forces had, for at least a year, been expending about one-ninth the aerial bombs previously used by the Americans in South Vietnam and no more than one-quarter the ground-fired ammunition, from heavy artillery to small arms. As authorized by the Paris Agreement of 1973, the United States had originally promised to replenish those items on a "one-for-one basis." Every bomb, shell, tank, truck or other piece of equipment expended or worn out was to be replaced. The rate of replenishment actually ran at roughly a one-for-three ratio, and the South Vietnamese armed forces were rapidly approaching the end of their physical resources.

Against that background, perhaps the clearest way to tell the tale is in chronological order, beginning on Jan. 15 of this year.

At that time, Thieu was urgently advised by a group of senior generals and intelligence officers that he had no option but to order evacuation of the two northernmost military regions, covering almost half of South Vietnam's territory. Because of the acute and intensifying lack of military supplies, the area could not be held.

Thieu was told that massive strategic withdrawal must begin no later than Feb. 15 if there was to be any realistic hope of saving the southernmost Military Regions III and IV, where well over half the country's population lives. If he reduced his territory and concentrated his forces, he was advised, he would almost certainly possess sufficient manpower to defend those regions for a long time. Besides, American supplies would be just adequate to enable those units to fight effectively.

In addition, major oil companies had proved offshore petroleum reserves in remarkably large quantities. Excellent prospects of exploiting those reserves promised a flow of

dollars that would, within a reasonable period, provide the financial resources Thieu's almost bankrupt government lacked and enable him to buy both military and civilian supplies on the world market.

But Thieu, already caching away a good part of his "personal" fortune in Switzerland, could not make up his mind.

It can, most charitably, be said that he was so appalled by the disastrous effects of a mass evacuation on civilian and military morale that his own will was paralyzed. However, he was already so isolated within a small band of cronies that no one not a member of that group can assess his motivations accurately.

The Feb. 15 deadline passed with no action whatsoever taken. The commanders of Military Regions I and II had contributed their assessments to the overall recommendation presented to Thieu, since they, above all, knew the situation on the ground. But they waited in vain for orders.

At the end of February, Thieu finally bestirred himself. Accompanied by his then prime minister, Tran Thien Khiem, and his chief of staff, Gen. Cao Van Vien, he made a "secret

reconnaissance in depth of the situation in the north." Actually, that reconnaissance consisted of no more than a brief flight and a brief stay on the ground at the ground at Cam Ranh Bay, 185 miles from Saigon, but 300 miles from Da Nang, the headquarters of northernmost Military Region I.

Thieu, already virtually encapsulated within Independence Palace in Saigon, still could not make up his mind.

Finally, about March 10, with the Communist attack on Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, Thieu approached his decision. Almost a month after the generals' deadline, he at last ordered withdrawal from the two untenable northern military regions.

It was, however, already far too late to execute that most difficult of all military maneuvers—a major, orderly retreat in force that would lift out entire units and their equipment in fighting trim. In any event, the officer corps of the Vietnamese armed forces took the order to mean: "Save yourself—if you can!"

The gulf between those officers and the rural peasants who were the privates and sergeants was already immense. The officers were the educated, privileged urban bourgeoisie, those, that is, who had not evaded military service.

(In the midst of a war of survival, university-level students from that social class remained a large, untapped manpower pool. With an annual need for 300 lawyers, South Vietnam's law schools still had an enrollment of tens of thousands—half, admittedly, women.)

Moreover, a war of small units meant that most—though, of course, not all—officers occupied safe billets at a reasonably secure distance from the enemy. Sergeants, rather than lieutenants, commanded platoons, the chief units actually in contact. With exceptions, even company commanders did not often come within range of enemy fire.

The alienated officer corps began a mass flight upon receiving Thieu's order. Generals and others with access to helicopters piled themselves, their families and their favorites into those short-range machines. According to one source, Quang Nai province, south of Da Nang, "is now littered with the wreckage of helicopters that ran out of fuel in their mad, unthinking southward flight."

When the senior officers had deserted their units, it was the turn of the colonels, majors and captains—indeed anyone who had access to any form of road transportation. Jeeps and ambulances were the favorites. The jeeps possessed "cross-country capability," while the ambulances' red crosses were, initially, respected by the common soldiers and the civilians—if not necessarily by the enemy. But the enemy was the officers' last concern by then.

Many military vehicles were also abandoned when they broke down or

ran out of fuel. All civilian vehicles, even the ubiquitous Honda motorcycles, became fair game as panic spread among the leaderless troops, who abandoned equipment worth at least \$800 million.

Soldiers armed with M-16s stood by the roadside and sprayed the riders of passing motorcycles. Kicking aside the bodies, they mounted the Hondas—often meeting the same fate after a few miles.

"There were, after all, more M-16s than motorcycles in the area," said one officer sourly.

Although many did not make it, the survivors of the spontaneous rout jammed into Da Nang, which possessed an excellent harbor and airport. Da Nang became a jungle, with every person fighting for his own survival, the armed soldiers naturally holding the advantage. All authority and order broke down in the rush to save oneself.

However, a certain vestigial respect for the red crosses on the ambulances remained. Initially, frantic soldiers and civilians waiting at the airport parted to allow patients to be ferried to airplanes.

But that respect vanished when those spectators saw the occupants of the ambulances rise up and fight each other for scarce space on the planes.

Hundreds of airmen and their families piled onto those desperately overloaded planes, which began falling with their big rear cargo-ramps open, standard operating procedure. Armed soldiers threatened the unarmed airmen and piled onto those ramps, overloading the planes still more grossly.

The first two C-130s barely waddled into the air—and crashed in flames a few hundred yards from the end of the runway. The pilot of the last, learning from his comrades' fate, frantically appealed through the public-address system for his passengers to lighten the ship.

Everything portable went out the hatches, men and women even tossed off clothing and wristwatches, while the infantrymen threw away their weapons. The air force men, massed in the front of the plane, then rushed on the soldiers and hurled almost a hundred off the rear cargo-ramp, from three to four thousand feet. That plane reached Bien Hoa safely.

Although the fleeing units were disorganized, demoralized and largely unarmed, the South Vietnamese still had a significant military preponderance in the two southernmost military regions. Even at that point, South Vietnam might have saved its heartland, although it had dissipated almost half its military assets.

But almost all combat-worthy troops were gathered into a static perimeter defense around Saigon itself.

Thieu did not use the arriving units to mount spoiling attacks against the encroaching enemy, who often sim-

ly walked into major provincial capitals. He did not even use the new arrivals to replace other units for such attacks, which were the only possible hope of halting the Communist juggernaut that was rolling forward virtually unopposed.

Instead, he deployed the entire South Vietnamese army as if it were an immense bodyguard intended to protect himself and his clique—and to ensure that they would escape with as much of their wealth as possible.

Mme. Thieu had already left the country when Thieu announced his resignation last Monday. Otherwise, 704 tons of gold bars, treated as if they were private property, were the clique's chief concern, as were a few millions in foreign-currency reserves.

Some informed estimates, incidentally, are vastly larger, ranging up to 10 times as much. However, those magnitudes appear most improbable—not necessarily because much greater sums were not diverted, but because it would have been imprudent to retain them in Vietnam. However, the true figures are, at this point, impossible to establish.

After failing to induce air carriers to move the gold, the clique reportedly shipped three tons on a freighter bound for Europe. The ship's name and its exact destination are not known to the informants.

An additional ton of gold was, according to some informed reports, moved by Air Vietnam, the national airline, late last week and early this week. Again, the exact destination is

unknown, although it is almost certainly in Europe and probably in Switzerland, where Thieu is likely to settle down.

By last week, the South Vietnamese forces were totally demoralized. Even those honest, patriotic officers who had neither fled nor looted saw no possible future in resistance. One-star generals complained openly that they had no idea what was happening and that they were receiving no orders from their superiors.

The Vietnamese navy was concentrated in the approaches to Saigon. There could be only one conceivable purpose, and it was not tactical. Those ships were to serve as a back-up evacuation force for Thieu, his clique and their loot. Already a substantial, if unknown, portion of the three tons of gold presumably remaining had been distributed among the clique.

Ironically, the high-ranking officer-defectors did not appreciate that. When the time came, the naval crews would probably save themselves and their families. Large bribes may, possibly, buy the senior officials passages. But, some informants predict, the angrily resentful crews could well dishonor any agreements they make.

Demoralization has been intensified by the rapid, visible American evacuation. Ambassador Graham Martin resisted the move for that reason. He may have waited too long to save tens of thousands of Vietnamese whom Washington considers particularly worthy or imperiled.

In that atmosphere, Thieu was finally forced to step down. He was succeeded, in violation of the strict provisions of the Vietnamese constitution, by 71-year-old former Premier Tran Van Huong. The presidency should have gone to Speaker of the Assembly Tran Van Lam, but he wanted no part of it.

A small group of senior Vietnamese officers and officials, anticipating Thieu's forced resignation, began several months ago to press Huong, an honest, capable, patriot, despite his years, to assume the responsibility. That group promised Huong its full support and counsel.

Even optimists, who predict that Saigon could still hold out for a few more weeks as a result of the political shifts, now fear civil disorder more than they do the immediate impact of the Communist takeover. Saigon, they predict, could become a Da Nang on a much greater scale—with revenge-inspired, loot-seeking mobs rampaging through the streets, killing their countrymen and foreigners indiscriminately.

The millions of Vietnamese crowded into the Saigon enclave have no place to go, unlike the Chinese Nationalists in Shanghai, who had Taiwan.

As a result, even die-hard anti-Communists now hope chiefly for an orderly transfer of power to avoid a final orgy of slaughter and destruction.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 May 1975

West Europeans See Fall of Saigon as Chastening Lesson for U.S.

Shift of Policy Expected To Bolster Role of NATO

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

BONN, April 30—Saigon's surrender after 30 years of struggle in Vietnam was seen in Europe today as a chastening defeat for American policy, but there were hopes that it might prove salutary.

Privately, many in the European community believe that the United States now will be able to turn from what they always considered a morbid preoccupation with Vietnam to more important issues of relations between the United States and Europe.

From London to the eastern Mediterranean, there was a sense of a historic event, possibly a turning point. Even in Moscow, a day before the May Day celebration of the Communist ideals that Hanoi's troops fought for, there was a

moderation, a sobriety to the tone of the news from Southeast Asia.

The news was commented upon and evaluated by bureaus of The New York Times in nine capitals of Europe and the Middle East, which gathered reactions through interviews and statements by officials, newspapers and individuals.

Almost exactly 21 years ago, Gen. Marcel Bigeard was commanding paratroops in Dien Bien Phu, the battlefield where France lost her colonial hold over Indochina.

Today, from the defense ministry in Paris, he said:

"This defeat was unavoidable. On the one side, people who lived in a sort of cocoon softly woven by the Americans. On the other, a young, tough

North Vietnamese Army. You cannot do anything against a unanimous people Communist or not, the idea of patriotism is an incentive to which nobody has found the equal."

America's allies in Western Europe confined their official reactions to a hope that, now that the fighting was over, the Vietnamese people would be allowed to heal their wounds in peace.

France Defers Recognition

France, with the only embassy still functioning in Saigon, was understood to have decided to go slowly before shifting formal recognition to the new government, a step that neutral Sweden took today.

In West Germany, officials said relations with South Vietnam had not been broken even though its diplomats evacuated Saigon last week.

Among officials in London and Bonn, there was a sense of a strong need to overcome the shock of the American loss of face in Saigon with a demonstration in Europe of soli-

darity with the United States. A meeting of all leaders of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization except President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France to be held in Brussels May 29 and 30, will fill this purpose.

The defeat of Saigon's Government, in a view often heard here, was not so much a sign of American weakness as it was of American illusions. The defeat did not come, West Germany's Social Democratic party declared a few days ago, because of insufficient American military aid. It was a product of an unpopular policy that failed to take account of the interests of "broad masses" of the South Vietnamese.

Little Gloating in Moscow

In Eastern Europe and in Moscow, those who have long supported Hanoi and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam welcomed the victory. But today at least, there was little official Soviet gloating. "The events in South Vietnam," commented Tass, the of-

ficial Soviet press agency, "again confirm the truth that in the present time a regime that rests only on foreign bayonets is utterly nonviable."

Important and influential voices in West Germany, Britain and France seemed to agree with Moscow that the fundamental error of the United States was in trying to defend a country that would not defend itself.

But Moscow does not emerge in triumph from the humiliation that its allies inflicted on the United States. Officials and ordinary people in Western Europe believe, as the Conservative former Foreign Secretary, Alex Douglas-Home, said in the British House of Lords today: "The free world has reached a point of insecurity where the democracies must require proof of Communist Russia's intentions and deeds which are compatible with cooperation and partnership."

Israelis Are Concerned

There is no country more dependent on United States military assistance for protection against aggression than Israel. There was some nervousness among Israelis today that the turn of events in Indochina could weaken the credibility of American support for Israel.

The Israeli newspaper Maariv commented, however: "The final sad chapter of the Vietnam struggle demonstrated once

more the old savage truth that tools of war, no matter how powerful, are no substitute for spirit, without which an army is nothing but a huge mass of panic-stricken people."

In Cairo, officials said privately that they thought the American "defeat" was a major blow for Secretary of State Kissinger and for President Anwar el-Sadat, who has been trying to use his "American connection" to ease the threat of another war with Israel.

The outcome in Vietnam, described by the Cairo radio as "a victory for all peace-loving people" will limit Mr. Kissinger's influence in Cairo, according to Egyptian diplomats and others.

The importance of the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe against aggression is especially stressed in West Germany, whose eastern border with East Germany is the dividing line between opposing social and political systems.

From the lowliest stoneworker in the Rhine Valley to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, there seems to be little inclination towards equating Vietnam and any country in Europe.

"My friends and I used to talk about it a lot," said a worker in Cologne, "but even when you had 500,000 troops there, we said, 'The same thing will happen to them as happened to the French.' The

peace treaties were just paper, and I think it's dumb to argue that only the Americans or the South Vietnamese were to blame for breaking them."

Brandt Emphasizes Ties

Former Chancellor Willy Brandt put some thoughts about Vietnam into a domestic political campaign speech in Dortmund last week.

"We will not allow ourselves to be separated from the United States," he said. "Our sympathy belongs to the victims of both sides and we should not deny our help to refugees and children. A European mercy mission is also called for because this war resulted from the heritage of the European colonial period."

In London, the new American Ambassador, Elliot L. Richardson, said that British officials had gone out of their way to tell him that the defeat in Vietnam should "not affect American commitments in Europe."

As in West Germany, some British newspapers have been less confident. The Daily Telegraph said today: "America has received a fearful jab in the face, from which it will take years to recover."

"It is world Communism's biggest victory, the free world's biggest defeat," it added.

Jacques Fauvet, editor of Le Monde in Paris, wrote today: "Contrary to the prophecies, the victory of Communism is

not inevitable. The Western world must be more concerned to defend social justice. This justice which is often synonymous with independence, in Asia as in Europe."

American diplomats in Bonn believe that recent visits to Europe by members of Congress have dispelled some of the concern in West Germany that the Congress might now be able to force the Administration to reduce the number of American troops in Europe.

"There is a vague fear," said one, "that there could be some lasting effect after Vietnam in the United States, a neoisolationism, but I think the overriding feeling is relief that the fighting is over."

Der Spiegel, the left-center West German news magazine, said:

"America bids farewell to Vietnam with a guilty conscience but glad the darkest hours of U.S. history are ending."

In Rome, Pope Paul VI issued a cautious statement through the Vatican spokesman, Federico Alessandrini, who said that the Pontiff shared the "anxiety and trepidation" of Roman Catholics in South Vietnam and hoped that real peace could now be brought about in Vietnam in strict respect of civil and religious rights."

BALTIMORE SUN

1 May 1975

U.S. task in Asia: Stop the dominoes

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The United States, which for years has been arguing the validity of the domino theory in one form or another, now must persuade its remaining Asian allies that it isn't necessarily so.

President Ford and Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, had argued with increasing vigor in the weeks before the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia to the Communists that the failure of the American Congress to appropriate emergency aid to those countries could have disastrous consequences for American foreign policy around the world.

Allies, they argued, would believe they no longer could depend on American promises of support. Enemies would probe for weak spots.

Mr. Kissinger has made it clear that the chief objective for American foreign policy in Asia now will be to reassure the allies and warn the enemies. He has not made it clear how that

goal can be achieved.

Mr. Kissinger said in his Tuesday press conference that it is too early to assess the consequences of the fall of South Vietnam on the rest of Asia. But he added:

"There is no question that the outcome in Indochina will have consequences not only in Asia, but in many other parts of the world. To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing with them."

Then there was the parting fill-up of optimism, obligatory as counterpoint to the secretary's public pessimism. "But I am confident that we can deal with them, and we are determined to manage..."

One of the lessons to draw from the United States' Indochina experience, Mr. Kissinger said, is that "foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, and if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable."

That seemed a clear indica-

tion that the United States, given the feelings of Congress on Indochina, will neither guarantee the defense of other non-Communist nations in the area nor expect commitments from them.

Further, since the "sustainable" commitments to Asia are obviously severely limited, given the mood of both the nation and the Congress, the United States might be expected to give its unofficial blessing to whatever accommodations nations in the area can make with Communist regimes.

Many non-Communist countries, including some staunch American allies, have not needed American encouragement to move in that direction. Thailand is scrambling toward a neutral stance, ordering South Vietnamese refugees to move on quickly, guaranteeing the return to Cambodia and South Vietnam of war materiel taken from those countries by the refugees, and moving quickly to

recognize the new government in Saigon.

Mr. Kissinger said American officials will confer soon with Indonesia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. The first two, while enjoying stable governments and a comfortable geographical distance from Indochina, are nevertheless anxious to work out a method of living with a bigger Communist presence in the area and in neutralizing the destabilizing effects it might have.

Australia and New Zealand enjoy the additional comfort of long, strong ties with the United States, reinforced by common Anglo-Saxon beginnings. But they, too, are trying to adjust to the new realities of the growing power of non-Anglo, non-democratic regimes in Asia. Australia, significantly, already has announced its intention of recognizing the new government in South Vietnam.

WASHINGTON STAR
30 April 1975

Goldberg: 'The War Is Finished — There Shall Be No More Vietnams'

Arthur Goldberg was American permanent representative to the United Nations, 1965-68, and was associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1962-65. He is now in the private practice of law.

By Arthur J. Goldberg

The war in Vietnam is finished. The cost is incalculable — in lives, American and Vietnamese; in dollars; in divisiveness among our people; in disruption of our economy; and in disaster for the people of South Vietnam.

The dead have died with valor but without victory, the dollars have been squandered, a new isolationism menaces our vital national interests in other parts of the world. Divisiveness and disruption of the economy have corroded the quality of American life. And the plight of the South Vietnamese people is beyond comprehension.

There is no need for a commission to assess responsibility; we know where the fault lies. All administrations, past and present, however well intentioned, which have either involved us in this war or prolonged our involvement, are responsible for the consequences of Vietnam.

I WRITE NOT from hindsight. In 1965, when I first assumed a position of responsibility in foreign affairs as our ambassador to the United Nations and ever since, I have steadfastly adhered to the view that there was no justification for our involvement in this war.

Inasmuch as President Lyndon B. Johnson declassified my memorandum to him of March 15, 1968, which summarized my consistent viewpoint throughout my tenure at the U.N., I am at liberty to quote from this memorandum:

"Developments in our country have demonstrated that there is grave concern among the American people whether the course we have set in our Vietnam policy is right. . . concern which has been deepened by the reverses we and the South Vietnamese suffered during the Tet offensive, by the apparent lack of energy, effectiveness and appeal of the South Vietnamese government, by the mounting rate of American casualties.

NEW YORK TIMES
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ties, by the extent of the destruction of life and property in Vietnam, and by reports that requests have been made of the President for substantial troop reinforcements in South Vietnam. . . . Public support is permanently and substantially eroded. . . . And never has a serious move towards a political settlement been more necessary."

The thesis of this and prior memoranda and statements by me to the National Security Council was a simple one: Our government, we are taught by the Declaration of Independence, depends upon the consent of the governed; consent of the governed increasingly became lacking in the Vietnam war, not because of overexposure by the media, but for good and solid reasons.

The people were not fooled; long before their leaders, the people recognized that the course we had set in our Vietnam policy was not right.

It is said that this is not the time for recriminations; I agree. This is a tirade, however, to ponder whether we have indeed learned the lessons of this great tragedy in American history which has caused us such incalculable damage.

Let me state what I conceive these lessons to be.

There shall be no more Vietnams. This is a catchy phrase which only partially illuminates the teaching. It means that we must not fight wars or make major military commitments without the underlying consent of the people and their representatives in Congress. Under the Constitution, Congress, not the President, declares war. Congress must assume and discharge this responsibility. The people's representatives in Congress must see to it that this constitutional command is not infringed by the President.

America cannot be the world's policeman. The end of the war in Vietnam calls for a realistic reassessment of our commitments — both legal and moral. A great nation should make only realistic commitments, but it should keep the ones it makes. We committed far more in Vietnam than we should have, but less than we had led the Vietnamese to expect.

In reassessing our commitments, we must determine by constitutional processes and candid, public discussion what our real interests are, interests which would truly justify commitment of American forces. Public opinion polls which indicate that the American people support our commitments to Europe, to Japan, to Israel, areas of vital interest, are not convincing. They do not really test public opinion on the hard question. Are we prepared to commit American forces, suffer substantial casualties, spend huge sums of money, and dislocate our economy in order to support other nations — even those whose interests are vitally linked with ours? Before Vietnam the answer would have been clear. It is not so now.

Reassessment dictates that we rebuild national confidence just as Gen. DeGaulle did for France after its defeat in Algeria. This will not be easy, not only because of disillusionment with Vietnam, but because of the state of our domestic affairs. Our economy is in a shambles, present unemployment intolerable, inflation rampant, crime still growing, our cities in squalor, our racial problems unresolved, any cynicism about our political process widespread.

It is a first priority that we put our domestic house in order if America is to return to a viable foreign policy.

NO AMERICAN president and no Congress can any longer assume that Americans will, as they often have done in the past, adhere to the notion that: "Our country . . . may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong."

This slogan is no longer on the masthead of the Chicago Tribune. It is no longer on the masthead of the American people. They are patriotic but not jingoistic.

Our country will henceforth have to be right in its foreign involvements and commitments. Being wrong, as Vietnam teaches, will no longer command the consent of the governed. And on the vital question of declaring and waging war, the ultimate lesson of Vietnam is that the consent of the governed is imperative.

Some Participants Look Back

By R. W. APPLE JR.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 29—For many Americans it may have been a day of simple emotions — relief, perhaps, that the long war in Vietnam was near an end, or bitterness that the United States and its ally had in the end lost.

But for many Americans who played prominent parts in the long Indochinese struggle — senior officials in Washington, leaders of the antiwar movement, reporters who covered the war, officials who served in the American Embassy in Saigon — reactions were more complex.

Some talked of fear for their friends' well-being; some dwelt on mistakes they felt they and their country had made; some expressed hope that the future would be better.

Here are what some of them had to say on the day the last American officials left Vietnam, ending an involvement of two decades at a cost of vast blood and treasure:

ROBERT W. KOMER, former chief of the pacification program in Vietnam and adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson:

"I feel terrible frustration and depression about all the things that we should have done and could have done and didn't do. In hindsight, it was a disaster, but that's

easy.

"I haven't thought about much in the last month except the people who are still there—waking up in the middle of the night, worrying about people like Colonel Be [a Vietnamese pacification expert]. We'll recover. But will they?"

WILLIAM J. PORTER, former Deputy Ambassador in Saigon and chief negotiator at the Paris peace talks, now Ambassador to Canada:

"All of my worries of all these years about how it was going to end have materialized. We didn't understand the place, we didn't know how to fight there. It was a sad epoch.

"There are lessons to be drawn from it, very clear lessons. We should never have tried to get by with half-measures, because you can't do that and control the outcome. The national moral is that you apply power if you have it."

BARRY ZORTHIAN, former chief information officer for the United States Embassy in Saigon, now an executive of Time Inc.:

"I feel a real sense of horror about the awful way in which we had to get out combined with a sense of relief that it's finally over. But then there are the beginnings of analysts, second thoughts, recriminations, distillations.

"Where did things go wrong? Could there have been a different result? I'm not sure, but I sometimes think we would have been better to have let them solve it their way 10 years ago. To what degree was it our desires, our ambitions, our pressures that kept putting them through this?"

ANTHONY LLAKE, former Foreign Service officer in Vietnam and aide to Secretary of State Kissinger who resigned to protest the American invasion of Cambodia:

"I'm glad the fighting is coming to an end, but I feel shame that it took so long and that we played the role we did in extending it for so long. It has been inevitable that they would win the war for so many years.

WASHINGTON POST

29 April 1975

Marquis Childs

Sky Writing and Carpet Bombing

Sifting the true from the false in examining the fall of South Vietnam will be an endless pursuit. As reflected in Congress and the public opinion polls, most people would like to get it over with and forget it.

But while repeatedly declaring that he has no intention of pointing the finger of blame, President Ford continues to worry the issue with an uncomfortable awareness that he is the commander-in-chief at the moment of this grim climax. He can hardly speak the truth, which is that he inherited

"Now here's a chance to figure out what kind of foreign policy we should have instead of having Vietnam rip us apart. That hasn't been possible before, not when anyone who objected to military aid for Saigon automatically was being called neo-isolationist."

MORTON HALPERIN, former Defense Department official and aide to Secretary Kissinger, whose telephone was tapped:

"I'm relieved that it's over and that we didn't go back again. My fear was that Vietnam was a film that would keep running backwards and forwards and would never end.

"Then dismay that people talk of losing Vietnam or the fall of Vietnam. That country has not fallen and we didn't have it to lose. Vietnam will now be independent."

RICHARD HOLBROOKE, former Foreign Service officer in Vietnam who now edits *Foreign Policy*, a quarterly:

"I'm just sort of weary. We never belonged there even though so many people tried to do so many good things.

"And I'm angry at the gullibility of Nixon and Ford and Kissinger for believing that the South Vietnamese could survive this offensive without the vertebra of American fire power, when they couldn't survive any of the earlier ones without us. By this colossal foreign policy failure we provided for our own humiliation, we made the worst of a bad situation.

"Why did we never go to Thieu, after Paris and the Congressional arms cutoff, and tell him that this was a new world and he had better negotiate unless he wanted defeat?"

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, long-time participant in American foreign policy, who turned against the war in the late nineteen-sixties:

"It is tragic that President Roosevelt's determination not to let the French back into Indochina after World

War II was not carried out. It would have saved France, the United States and the Vietnamese people this desperate experience."

DEAN RUSK, Secretary of State under President Johnson and President John F. Kennedy:

"Obviously, I'm very saddened by recent developments, but also concerned where the story ends. We haven't seen the final bill yet. The American people around 1968 decided that if we couldn't tell them when the war would end, we might as well chuck it. Part of this decision was to take the consequences, and that's what we are going to have to do now.

"I can't avoid my responsibility for what happened in Southeast Asia, but I don't think others, including the peace movement, should either for what will happen now."

CORA WEISS, antiwar activist who helped establish contact withanoi concerning American prisoners of war:

"It's a very exciting and tragic moment at the same time. Exciting because no more lives will be wasted, because the people of Vietnam will be able to determine their lives without foreign interference. Tragic because one can't forget the needless death and destruction.

"For 25 years the United States has tried to control 25 million people on a tiny strip of land and we couldn't do it, and we should never try to do it again anywhere else."

SAM BROWN, one of the organizers of the Vietnam moratorium demonstrations, now Treasurer of the State of Colorado:

"There were some people here today suggesting a celebration. That's so far from what I feel. We started that era with great hopes and expectations, and Vietnam crushed them and our sense of the future. Now I feel no sense of rebirth; something has ended but nothing has started.

"Unfortunately, we still think we should play with

the destinies of other countries; we only think our tactics were bad in Vietnam. We're in for a period not of real soul-searching, which we need, but of blame-assessing."

PROF. RICHARD FALK of Princeton University, a key antiwar theoretician:

"It goes back to the Paris cease-fire accords. We were caught in a trap.

"We couldn't get our prisoners back without Thieu's agreement, and we could only get Thieu's agreement if we promised to support his opposition to bringing about peace. The result was an unnecessary added interlude of suffering."

WARD S. JUST, a former Washington Post correspondent in Vietnam, now a novelist:

"I was asked the other day to write something about all this and it just wouldn't go, it just wouldn't write. I had nothing helpful or enlightening or ameliorative to say.

"You can only look on it with a kind of horrified fascination. I don't believe the cultures mix. It was a kind of failure of our national temperament; we felt that if we kept plugging away even if we were on the wrong course, by the triumph of American innocence everything would come out all right. It didn't."

MORLEY SAFER, a CBS news correspondent in Vietnam:

"I feel a deep unhappiness, a sense that surely there must have been a better way, sorrow for the Vietnamese who saw the momentary advantage of going along with us.

"It's vital to refight this war for a long time to come so that we understand just what we did over there, not only to ourselves but to them, and why we did it. We don't understand it yet, and we have to make the effort."

Some of those who supported the American effort to the end, including both journalists and military officers, said they were either too bitter or too sensitively situated professionally to comment on the day's events.

on the way.

As one official put it, the real reason was morale. Congress could have told Nguyen Van Thieu and the world that the United States intended to stand behind the South Vietnamese and with this pledge Thieu's armies would have fought on.

In my opinion that is a highly doubtful proposition. The only thing that would have changed the situation is direct American intervention with bombers and troops. That is the morale-builder Thieu had apparently continued to hope for, which was understandable in a man trapped in the blind alley of his own past.

It is truly remarkable that President Ford shared this view, as he revealed in the CBS interview. The Congress, he said, "unfortunately" took away from the President in August 1973 (by the Cooper-Church amendment) "the power to move in a military way to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris." That can only mean that if he had not been hobbled by

Congress he would have reopened American participation in the war as the only way to save Thieu.

We shall hear a great deal as the noose tightens and the end draws near about blood baths. Already we have seen nightly on television the desperate plight of the refugees. The horrors of the Communist takeover in Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968, burial alive for many victims, were written large.

But in any accounting of blood hatreds it is well to remember there is much on both sides of the blood-stained ledger. When Secretary Kissinger's peace negotiations with Hanoi broke down in Paris in mid-December 1972 President Nixon gave the Communists 72 hours to go back to the table. When that deadline passed, he unleashed terror bombing on a scale never known before with fleets of B-52s, Phantoms and Navy fighter-bombers.

In a two-week period much of Hanoi

was razed. In the suburb of Thai Nguyen, nearly a thousand civilians were dead or wounded. The two principal hospitals and a dispensary were destroyed. On the walls left standing angry slogans were chalked: "We will avenge our compatriots massacred by the Americans." "Nixon, you will pay this blood debt."

Opinion around the world was revolted. Le Monde, the Paris newspaper, compared the bombing to the Nazi levelling of Guernica in the Spanish civil war. The revulsion publicly expressed reflected the intense feeling in almost every chancellery in the West.

At the end of two weeks of carpet bombing, which by its very nature could have little relation to military targets, the Communists agreed to resume negotiation. At the end of the 24th round of talks in 42 months the accords were signed — accords that have proved no barrier at all against a resumption of the war.

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The Secret War

by George McT. Kahin

In assessing American policy in Cambodia it is not sufficient to judge the legitimacy of Lon Nol's regime simply on the basis of its having been overwhelmingly dependent from the outset upon the US Treasury. More important is the fact that its origins were tied to a covert and subversive American intervention aimed at displacing Sihanouk's neutralist government by one willing to align itself with US strategic objectives.

The key features in this Nixon-Kissinger policy can best be understood against the background of earlier American attempts to destabilize Sihanouk's government. These go back at least to 1958 and were centered on building up an oppositionist military force known as the Khmer Serei (Free Cambodians), led by Son Ngoc Thanh, a bitter opponent of Sihanouk. Recruited primarily from South Vietnam's large Cambodian minority (Khmer Krom), this force was armed, financed and trained by the CIA and later supervised by US army special forces. Operating from bases in Thailand and South Vietnam, these troops were by the mid-1960s successful enough in penetrating Cambodia's frontiers to tie up a substantial part of the small 30,000-man Royal Cambodian Army. On a visit to Cambodia in 1967, during which I visited one of the border areas, I found that these Khmer Serei operations were regarded by the diplomatic community in Phnompenh as aimed at keeping a counterforce available in case the United States might want to use it against Sihanouk, while more immediately keeping pressure on him to ensure against his departing too far from an international posture acceptable to the United States. In fact this policy had already backfired and become a major reason for Sihanouk's decision in 1965 to break diplomatic relations with the United States.

During the last year of the Johnson administration, the counterproductivity of American support of military opposition to Sihanouk had become evident, and although the Khmer Serei were not disbanded,

Washington and Phnompenh moved toward a rapprochement. Sihanouk, worried over Cambodia's deteriorating relations with China during the Cultural Revolution and desirous of keeping the mounting air and ground war in Vietnam away from his border areas, welcomed improved relations with the United States, and ultimately on June 11, 1969, a resumption of diplomatic ties was announced.

Under continual US prodding during the last months of the Johnson and the first months of the Nixon administrations Sihanouk began to take actions helpful to the US military position in Vietnam. Although not extensive, these included public criticism of Communist Vietnamese occupation of border base enclaves and actions calculated to reduce the flow of overseas supplies to them via Cambodian ports. Ironically, however desirous he may have been to reduce the flow of military supplies and food to NLF and Hanoi forces, Sihanouk could in fact do little because of the deep involvement in this traffic by Lon Nol, Sosthenes Fernandez and other highly placed Cambodian army officers who were unwilling to give up their lucrative roles as middlemen. While Sihanouk apparently acquiesced to American demands that the US be permitted to carry out hot pursuit of Vietnamese Communist troops a short distance into Cambodia, it is quite certain that he would never have tolerated anything like the all-out American military invasion against the border bases of the PRG and North Vietnam subsequently approved by his successor, Lon Nol. In any case Sihanouk's concessions were evidently not sufficient to satisfy the Nixon administration.

By at least the early fall of 1969 plans had been set in motion that led to the ousting of Sihanouk. There is no doubt that there was considerable dissatisfaction with his rule among much of Cambodia's urban civilian elite, as well as in the officer corps. But it is inconceivable that those who mounted the coup of March 18, 1970 against Sihanouk would have dared move against him had they not believed that prompt US recognition and support would be forthcoming. However irrational Lon Nol may have seemed in recent years, it is impossible to

believe that without advance assurance of American military backing he would have acted immediately after the coup to challenge Hanoi and the PRG by sacking their embassies and ordering their military forces to leave Cambodian soil within 48 hours. But this move was necessary to set the stage for the American invasion aimed at ousting North Vietnamese and PRG forces from their border bases, for which the US military command in Saigon had been pressing.

Whether or not American personnel were directly involved in the coup against Sihanouk, US mercenaries were. During the course of the year preceding it, under the aegis of Gen. Lon Nol there occurred a series of what were officially described as "rallings" of some 2000 of the CIA-supported Khmer Serei to the Royal Cambodian Army and police. Infiltrated under Lon Nol's direction into a number of key army and police units, they were later to emerge as the main activists among the anti-Sihanouk forces which sacked the Hanoi and PRG embassies and applied the pressure necessary to cow some of the Cambodian deputies into voting for Sihanouk's removal.

These CIA mercenaries were in fact rallying not to Sihanouk, but to Gen. Lon Nol, and on terms worked out between Lon Nol and the head of the Khmer Serei, Son Ngoc Thanh, in negotiations that probably began as early as September 1969 (soon after the unsuspecting Sihanouk had appointed Lon Nol as his prime minister). It is appropriate that these Khmer Serei "ralliers" have been termed a "Trojan Horse"—but a Trojan Horse, it should be noted, that was paid for by the United States and presumably directed by its agents. That there had been an understanding respecting further US support if Lon Nol should encounter difficulties is suggested by the promptness with which the United States sent him military reinforcements of additional US-trained and financed Khmer Krom from South Vietnam after the coup. Within a few weeks approximately 4800 of these men, seconded from either Saigon's army or directly from the American-led Khmer Krom Mike Forces, were flown into Pnompenh aboard US planes. ("Mike Force," short for Mobile Strike Force, was an elite military element trained and advised by US special forces, and often drawn from

South Vietnamese minority groups—Cambodian or Montagnard.) Presumably the Khmer Krom involved in the riots against the PRG in the Cambodian border province of Svey Rieng 10 days before the coup were also US Mike Force personnel, sent directly across the border from US bases in South Vietnam. According to Son Ngoc Thanh, the Khmer Serei's leader with whom I spoke in mid-1971, the total American-trained and financed Khmer Krom—including Khmer Serei, Mike Force and others—who had by then been infused into the Royal Cambodian Army were in excess of 10,000, with the US still providing their pay. Ngo Cong Duc, former Saigon government congressman from South Vietnam's Vinh Binh province, recently told me that from his province alone approximately 7000 Khmer Krom soldiers from the ARVN, led by three lieutenant colonels, were dispatched to Pnompenh shortly after the anti-Sihanouk coup. If Mike Forces are included, he estimates that ultimately a total of 30,000 Khmer Krom soldiers from South Vietnam were sent to fight in Cambodia.

United States intervention in Cambodian affairs helped cut out the middle ground and push people of a variety of political convictions toward the standard of opposition provided by Prince Sihanouk and the National United Front. This was reflected as early as August 1971 in a talk I had with Gen. In Tam, then Minister of Security and Internal Affairs in Lon Nol's government. He estimated the existing strength of the armed opposition at about 10,000, of whom he classified 3000 to 4000 as Khmer Rouge (pro-Communist). For the other 6000 to 7000 he used a term that he translated for me, a little sheepishly, as "Cambodians striving against being under American occupation." The whole of this Cambodian opposition is now bound together in a broad coalition—the National United Front of Cambodia—that must enjoy a political base far broader than Lon Nol ever had. If the present administration is now to approach Cambodia in terms of political reality, it should acknowledge this and act accordingly.

George McT. Kahin, professor of government, directed the Southeast Asia program at Cornell.

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29 April 1975

Australians Disturbed by Haste In Closing Embassy in Saigon

Special to The New York Times

SYDNEY, Australia, April 28 —The Australian Government has been strongly criticized here for closing its embassy in Saigon before all the Vietnamese eligible to enter Australia were evacuated.

Earlier this month the Government announced that it would permit the entry of Vietnamese who were spouses or children of Vietnamese studying in Australia or who had long and close association with Australia and considered their lives in danger.

According to newspaper reports published here, at least 250 Vietnamese who would

have qualified for entry were left behind when Ambassador Geoffrey Price and his Australian staff flew out of Saigon Friday.

The reports said those left in Saigon included embassy employees who had asked to be taken to Australia. One of them was reported to have told a correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald:

"It is shameful and Australia's name will never be forgotten because of it."

In an article in the Herald today, the correspondent, Michael Richardson, said: "I have never felt ashamed of my Government before. But I felt

profoundly ashamed of it in Saigon on Friday."

Malcolm Fraser, leader of the opposition Liberal and Country parties, said Prime Minister Gough Whitam stood indicted for procrastination and heartlessness.

William Morrison, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, who last week said the United States was "acting illegally" in taking plane loads of Vietnamese out of South Vietnam, asserted that there was "no question" of the lives of embassy employees being in danger. He said only two of the 64 Vietnamese connected with the embassy had asked to be taken

to Australia, but even they had not left with the Australians.

Mr. Morrison also said the Saigon authorities had been "making it very difficult for Vietnamese to leave the country." He added that Australia had sought without success to influence the Saigon Government to liberalize its formalities.

NEW YORK TIMES
23 April 1975

'Pipeline' Postscript

By Paul P. Brocchini

RIO DE JANEIRO—In purest bureaucratic it was labeled "the pipeline." One entered it in Washington and emerged in Saigon. I went in the pipeline in January, 1966, as a junior officer in the United States Information Agency.

In those days a selected number of State Department, Agency for International Development, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.I.A. and military people were sent to the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Va., for intensive Vietnamese-language training.

In the basement of Arlington Towers, a dreary complex of red-brick apartment buildings facing the Potomac, we wrestled with exotic phenomena, studied Vietnamese history and culture, and had access to an amazing amount of intelligence that painted an accurate picture of what was really happening throughout Indochina.

In 1966, tunnel-gazers who never failed to see that terminal light, were still in vogue in the upper echelons of the United States Government. But down at our basement level, at the level of truth, we knew that was no light. Yet most of us accepted our assignments, pulled forward by the inexorable forces of bureaucracy, ca-

reer considerations and conformist pressures.

It was strange there in the basement. While great moralizing and hard-sell campaigns emerged from myriad Administration sources, peddling dominoes, World War II fears and Red threats to the public, there was no one trying to sell us, the pipeline people. On the contrary, in an age of institutionalized deceit, it was a refreshingly honest place, that basement. No pep talks: No rah-rah about saving democracy and freedom in places where neither had ever existed. But lots of straight talk.

Bernard Fall, the writer and historian who had devoted his life to the affairs of Indochina, would come in every week or two to tell it like it was.

Rand Corporation confidential reports on Vietcong morale made it devastatingly clear who was motivated in Vietnam, who fought with conviction and who did not.

Foreign Service officers coming back from Southeast Asia rarely covered up: It was bad out there and getting worse. But they had finished their tours and were relieved to be able to pass on the mess to us.

Everyone who passed through that basement, and there were thousands of

sensitive, reasonably well-educated people, knew the score. But few, if any, did anything about it. We, products of immense advantages, possessors of hosts of academic degrees, persons trained for careers in international relations, sat on our hands.

Our training failed us, our country and mankind, insofar as we had the opportunity to influence events—and I am convinced that even at our basement level we did—because it lacked the most essential element of civilized life, a system of values.

Our credo was pure American: "To get along, go along." All our lives, parents, teachers, supervisors had told us to shine our shoes, brush our teeth, comb our hair, if we wanted to fit in, to reap the rewards of American life.

"Don't rock the boat. Don't make waves. Go along."

And so we did, in spite of the bright light of truth that shone in our basement. We, the pipeline people, shut our eyes and ears, turned off our minds as easily as the evening news on television, and moved through our figurative pipe as surely as water downhill.

Paul P. Brocchini, who had been a cultural officer with the U.S.I.A. in Colombia and Brazil, left the pipeline—and the foreign service—after six months at the Foreign Service Institute. He is now a businessman in Brazil.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 April 1975

Charles W. Yost

People Didn't Accept Vietnam 'Obligations'

New York

In speaking before a joint session of Congress April 10, President Ford gave an account of United States "obligations" toward Vietnam, arising from the Paris agreements of two years ago, which may well have represented the private intentions of the Nixon administration to maintain the Thieu regime at any cost.

These intentions, however, did not reflect in any sense obligations or commitments accepted by the United States Congress and people either in January, 1973, or today.

The US decision to withdraw from the untenable position which it had unwisely assumed in Indochina was taken March 31, 1968, when President Johnson conceded in effect both the failure of his policy and his own political demise.

The die was cast at that time, and consequent disengagement should have been prompt and unequivocal.

Yet the Nixon administration continued for four more years our military involvement, extending it into Cambodia in 1970 and escalating it in 1972 with the Christmas

bombing of Hanoi. The agreements concluded a month later in Paris were recognized by almost everyone (except unfortunately the American negotiators) as no more than an elaborate screen behind which United States withdrawal could be completed and United States prisoners liberated.

Nor was the ultimate outcome ever in any serious doubt, though it came more quickly than most expected.

What has been lost this month is not American honor or credibility, but the last shreds of this illusion.

It is therefore with consternation that one hears the President charging that, if Congress had only supplied more aid, "this present tragic situation in South Vietnam would not have occurred." Or the secretary of state insisting, "We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere."

To put one's country's posture, in tragic but inexorable circumstances, in the worst possible light is an act of singular irresponsibility. If our leaders claim we are unwor-

thy of trust, how can they themselves expect to be believed?

Of course the claim is preposterous. The American Congress and people have kept and will keep commitments they themselves have undertaken. Had our final exit from Vietnam been more timely, it would have been more graceful, but it had to be made. We will be stronger, not weaker, when it is at last completed and this consuming obsession is dissolved.

James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, said in a recent article in the *Philadelphia Bulletin* that the outcome in Southeast Asia is "primarily psychological" and the impact of losing that part of the world to the Communists would be "a very slight weight indeed."

What is needed now from our leaders and ourselves is the sober confidence our basic circumstances warrant. We remain the world's strongest military power. We remain, despite a depression already beginning to lift, the world's strongest economic power. We remain the world's most conspicuous and stable democracy. Our institutions confirmed

and strengthened by Watergate. We remain unequivocally committed by formal treaties to our North Atlantic allies, Japan, the Philippines and others, and by strong public sentiment to Israel. These commitments will be deemed unreliable only if we persist in saying they are.

We no doubt shall find it expedient from time to time during coming years to make our exit from other parts of the world. Let us prepare to do so gracefully and in timely fashion, not as though each disengagement were the end of the world.

Let us judge coolly and realistically what in the 1970's our truly vital interests are, and adjust our priorities and strategies accordingly. Nothing could be more fatal, and more likely over time to undermine confidence at home and abroad, than to overreact out of fear of seeming "weak," to hold on where we are not wanted until we are squeezed out, to equate solid commitments to compatible partners with some imagined need to maintain a universal status quo.